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 ' IUNISDU "HON OFTHE APPELLATE COURT .: .-
This is an appeal from a criminal sentence imposed by the Third Dish ic\ l OLM'L ^alt 
Lake County, Stale of Utah, involving the conviction ( ; . v p p c i i A ^ -
degree felony, over wnici; . . • : \,'i\\i \ w- - '^i.'suani iu Utah Code 
; uutotaied i:i 7!v?.a-.V2)(e). '' - • '' *' • " ' • • ' • •'• ' 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. ]}],! the trial ^ourl abuse its discretion in sentencing Mi Mumptc" « J»> 
indeterminate term of incarceration of M , , >u ie .".•.* - .mviction? 
\., !. .c • . M. . •• ' " - QUI i ioi abuse of discretion/' Slate v. Nuttall 
•
 ]f
 V ~}-4. 4 56(JJiahApp. 1993); cited in. State v. Houlc 906 P.2d 907,909 (UtahApp. 
1995). 
2 Did the trial court abuse iL Jiscidiuii m icnieiu in*: Mi Mumpl* In an 
iiideterminak term ul iiu'.'iuvMtion ul II tu S veiirs on die third degree felony conviction? 
61V- • - * • \ i ••:.•••'• c sentencing decisions of a trial court for abuse of discretion." State v. Nuttall 
861 P.2d454, 450 ;1'tan App. 1993): cited in, Statev.Houk, 906 I' -,i ^ > •. :.a.. ;p-
1995). 
• - • ^Muate findings of fact when imposing 
vntmee on both felony convictions? "We. review the sentencing decisions of a trial court 
for abuse of discretion.." Stale v. Nuttall. S61 P.2d454,456 (Utah App. I vv ^ . ciicu ,/,..v>au 
vJHouk,90r.P.2d907,9(WiLLiii \ ; [ ; . , v - -
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The sentence of the trial court in this matter constitutes "plain error" under Utah 
Rules of Evidence 103(d). This appeal was timely made after the sentencing hearing before 
the Third District Court. 
APPLICABLE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-404.1. Sexual abuse of a child - Aggravated sexual abuse 
of a child. 
(1) A person commits sexual abuse of a child if, under not amounting to rape of a 
child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or an attempt to commit any of 
these offenses, the actor touches the anus, buttocks, or genitalia of any child, the < 
breast of a female child younger than 14 years of age, or otherwise takes indecent 
liberties with a child, or causes a child to take indecent liberties with the actor or 
another with intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily pain to any person or with 
the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person regardless of the sex of 
any participant. 
(2) Sexual abuse of a child is punishable as a second degree felony. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-401. Unlawful sexual activity with a minor - Elements- ^ 
Penalties - Evidence of age raised by defendant. 
(1) For purposes of this section "minor" is a person who is 14 years of age or older, 
but younger than 16 years of age, at the time the sexual activity described in this 
section occurred. I 
(2) A person commits unlawful sexual activity with a minor if, under circumstances 
not amounting to rape, in violation of Section 76-5-402, object rape, in violation of 
Section 76-5-402.2, forcible sodomy, in violation of Section 76-5-403, or aggravated 
sexual assault, in violation of Section 76-5-405, the actor: 
1 
2 
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(a) has sexual intercourse with the minor; 
(b) engages in any sexual act with the minor involving the genitals of one 
person and the mouth or anus of another person, regardless of the sex of either 
participant; or 
(c) causes the penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of 
the minor by any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, including 
a part of the human body, with the intent to cause substantial emotional or 
bodily pain to any person or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual 
desire of any person, regardless of the sex of any participant. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony unless the defendant 
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence the mitigating factor that the 
defendant is less than four years older than the minor at the time the sexual activity 
occurred, in which case it is a class B misdemeanor. 
Amendment VIII, United States Constitution. 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted. 
Section IX, Constitution of Utah. 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall 
cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not 
be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
3 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS1 
Matthew J. Shampton is 25 years old, with no prior criminal record of any kind. 
When Mr. Shampton was 19 years old, he met and began a relationship with S.E., who was 
12 years old at the time. The relationship was with the approval and encouragement of 
S JE.' s parents who would regularly invite Mr. Shampton to their home to see their daughter. 
Mr. Shampton and S. E. spent large amounts of time together, on dates, at church events, at 
family gatherings of both parties, and socializing with family and friends of both. 
S. E. characterized Mr. Shampton as her "boyfriend," and the parties did engage in 
a limited physical relationship when S. E. was approximately 13 years of age. Mr. Shampton 
and S. E. never engaged in sexual intercourse. They did engage in some physical activities 
found to be in violation of U.C.A. § 76-5-404.1(1) and U.C.A. § 76-5-401. This 
relationship continued for approximately five (5) years, until mutually terminated in August, 
1999. The parents of Mr. Shampton and S. E. were fully aware of the relationship at all 
times, and were never of the opinion that it was an abusive or inappropriate relationship. 
As an example of this, the majority of the limited physical activities which led to the 
conviction occurred at the home of S. E., during times when Mr. Shampton was invited to 
i 
The relevant facts have never been at issue, in that Mr. Shampton confessed to all elements 
of the offenses in an interview with police officers prior to an Information being filed. The 
relevant facts were not disputed, and the statements of Mr. Shampton and the victim have 
been virtually identical at all times. Attached hereto in the Addendum is the Presentence 
Investigation Report which largely reiterates said facts, as well as the Transcript from the 
Sentencing Hearing. 
4 
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the home by S. E.' s parents. The relationship was open and obvious to all, and neither Mr. 
Shampton nor S. E. made any effort to conceal or hide the fact of their relationship. The 
incidents which form the basis of the charged offenses remained unreported until 
approximately March or April, 2000, when S. E. first reported the limited sexual activity to 
a counselor. Mr. Shampton initially admitted the incidents to his LDS Bishop, and then with 
the Bishop's encouragement, to the police. 
Mr. Shampton is currently married, having married earlier this calendar year. He was 
employed full-time prior to his incarceration, and has a strong support group of family and 
friends. Mr. Shampton is active in his church, and did discuss the relationship with S. E. 
with religious leaders both prior and subsequent to charges being filed. Mr. Shampton 
cooperated fully with the authorities investigating this matter, and was motivated to spare 
S. E. the pain and anguish of being forced to testify in this matter. He is genuinely 
remorseful, and never intended to harm S. E. during their relationship, although he does 
acknowledge the inappropriateness of their relationship. 
Subsequent to Mr. Shampton's entry of a guilty plea to the charges, a Presentence 
Investigation Report was conducted by Adult Probation and Parole. After interviewing the 
victim, Mr. Shampton, and other parties involved or with pertinent information bearing upon 
the character of Mr. Shampton, and after thoroughly examining the facts of this case, it was 
the recommendation of Adult Probation and Parole that Mr. Shampton serve six (6) months 
in the Salt Lake County Jail, complete a sexual offender treatment program, pay restitution, 
5 
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pay a fine of $500.00 plus an 85% surcharge, and not to have contact with S. E. or any 
females under the age of 18 years. As Mr. Shampton had never been charged with a crime, 
nor convicted, and had never undergone counseling or probation of any kind, Adult 
Probation and Parole felt that Mr. Shampton was an appropriate candidate for probation 
supervision. 
At sentencing, Judge Wilkinson went far beyond the recommendations of the State 
in this matter. Deeming this matter as a "prison case" from the outset, as Judge Wilkinson 
stated on the record, the Judge disregarded the Presentence Report and the best interests of 
society and Mr. Shampton in this matter. A lengthy incarceration, as is currently pending, 
utterly fails to meet the goal of rehabilitation, while going far beyond what is necessary to 
punish Mr. Shampton for his actions. The current sentence abuses the lower Court's 
discretion in sentencing and creates a far greater harm by imposing a sentence of up to 
fifteen (15) years on Mr. Shampton. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. SENTENCING JUDGE ABUSED DISCRETION WHEN IMPOSING 
A SENTENCE WHICH SUBSTANTIALLY DEVIATED FROM 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE. 
It is accepted that a trial judge has discretion when imposing sentence. However, this 
discretion must be limited by the trial court's thoughtful analysis of all factors which go into 
sentencing, including both the need for punishment and the age and rehabilitative 
possibilities of the defendant. "The overriding consideration is that the sentence be just. 
6 
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One factor in mitigation or aggravation may weigh more than several factors on the opposite 
scale." In the matter at bar, the trial court focused exclusively on the punishment prong, 
saying at one point that "punishment protects the public is the greatest goal." (Sentencing 
Transcript, page 5, line 12-13.) This narrow focus of the trial court is improper and in and 
of itself an abuse of discretion. 
II. TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS WHEN 
IMPOSING SENTENCE. 
Appellant's concern over the trial court's abuse of discretion is based in part upon the 
trial court's failure to make sufficient findings when imposing sentence. As set forth above, 
the exclusive focus of the trial court was punishing Appellant, with no mention made of 
Appellant's rehabilitative possibilities. The only mention of this was by counsel for 
Appellant, which was apparently neither considered nor used in any way by the Trial Court 
in determining the sentence. It is clear from the Presentence Recommendation that 
Appellant is perceived as being a more than viable candidate for probation and out-patient 
treatment. This was not addressed at all by the trial judge. Given that no findings were 
made on any issues other than punishment, stating the reason therefore as "[s]he was a child. 
A child. Taking advantage of her, the Court just does not allow that type of situation to go 
on and the defendant, although he has changed his lifestyle now, he has to pay the piper and 
the penalty must be paid." 
7 
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ARGUMENT 
I. SENTENCING JUDGE ABUSED DISCRETION WHEN IMPOSING 
A SENTENCE WHICH SUBSTANTIALLY DEVIATED FROM 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE-
Appellant pleaded guilty to two (2) felonies in the Third District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on July 18, 2000. Subsequent to Appellant's change of plea, the 
State of Utah ordered a Presentence Investigation Report to be performed by Adult 
Probation and Parole. After a lengthy and involved investigation of Appellant, his personal 
background, his relationship with family and friends, and the impact of his actions on the 
victim and the family, Adult Probation and Parole did make the following recommendation: 
1. The defendant serve six months in the Salt Lake County Jail; 
2. The defendant enter into, participate in, and successfully 
complete a specialized sexual offender treatment program 
through a provider approved by the Department of Corrections. 
Treatment is to include a complete psychosexual evaluation, 
including plethysmograph testing, to be paid for by the 
defendant; 
3. The defendant have no contact of any type with the victim or 
her family, including personal, written, telephonic or through 
third persons; 
4. The defendant pay restitution in full for the costs of the victim's 
counseling, and those of her family members, as directly related 
to the present offense, to include reimbursement of any third 
parties paying for the treatment; 
5. The defendant have no contact with any females under the age 
of 18, without prior approval of the defendant's therapist and 
probation officer. Any approved contact with females under the 
age of 18, must be supervised by an adult approved by the 
probation officer; 
6. The defendant pay a fine in the amount of $500 plus an 85% surcharge. 
{Presentence Investigation Report, Agency Recommendation, page 19.) 
8 
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The above recommendation is made only after a thorough analysis of all aspects of the 
crime, its impact, the need for retribution by the State for Appellant's actions, and the 
possibility of rehabilitation of Appellant. It was a reasoned and rational recommendation, 
and does appear to take into consideration all of the appropriate factors. 
However, at sentencing, the District Court turned this recommendation on its head. 
In relevant part, the District Court stated: 
Yes, I (Judge Wilkinson) think there's a lot of fault in this case on the other parties. 
I cannot understand the parents (of the victim) in this matter, how they could sit by 
and not recognize what was taking place. But they're not on trial here and I'm not 
casting dispersions at them [sic]. He's (Appellant) the one that did it. She was a 
child. A child. Taking advantage of her, the Court just does not allow that type of 
situation to go on and the defendant, although he has changed his lifestyle now, he 
has to pay the piper and the penalty must be paid. 
The Court does sentence the Defendant Matthew Shampton for the crime of sex 
abuse of a child, a Second Degree Felony, incarceration in the Utah State Prison for 
an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years. Commitment will be forthwith. The 
Court also sentences the Defendant for the crime of unlawful sexual activity with a 
minor, being a Third Degree Felony, to incarceration in the Utah State Prison of an 
indeterminate term of zero to five years, commitment to be forthwith. The Court 
would order the two terms run concurrently. The Court would also order the 
Defendant be responsible for restitution in this matter. Restitution, of course, is for 
any type of rehabilitation that the victim may need and anything else that would be 
restitution. That will be the order. 
(Sentencing Transcript, pages 8-9.) 
From the statements of the District Court made at the time of sentence imposition, it is clear 
that the Court focused its attention solely on the retributive aspect, punishing Appellant far 
in excess of what was seen to be appropriate by individuals who had given much more 
attention to the matter. 
9 
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Appellate courts set aside sentences imposed if the sentence "exceeds that prescribed 
by law or unless the trial court has abused its discretion." State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 810 
(Utah App. 1998); citing, State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990). "An abuse of 
discretion may be manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing were 'inherently unfair' 
or if the judge imposed a 'clearly excessive' sentence." Id, quoting, State v. Gerrard, 584 
P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). A sentence will be set aside only if the "sentence represents an 
abuse of discretion, if the trial court judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors, or if 
the sentence imposed exceeds the limits prescribed by law." State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 
1133, 1135 (Utah 1989). In the matter at bar, although the sentence imposed is within the 
limits prescribed by law, the trial court failed to consider all legally relevant factors and the 
sentence imposed represents an abuse of discretion. The record below discloses that the 
Trial Court failed to even consider the matters relevant to the sentence. 
"The overriding consideration is that the sentence be just. One factor in mitigation 
or aggravation may weigh more than several factors on the opposite scale." State v. Russell, 
supra, at 192. This Court has previously set forth factors which are relevant at sentencing; 
"rehabilitation is not the only factor the trial court may consider when making a sentencing 
determination. Other factors include deterrence, punishment, restitution, and 
incapacitation." State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah. App. 1991); citing, Scott W. 
Rodgers, Binding Sentencing Guidelines: A Means of Controlling Utah's Prison Population, 
1990 Utah L.Rev. 309 (1990). Discretion is not unfettered, punishment must be tempered 
10 
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by wisdom, and justice is served only when this is done. Here, the trial court found that the 
need for punishment is the "greatest goal." (Sentencing Transcript, Page 5, line 13) While 
mentioning that Appellant had "changed his lifestyle2," this was not explained and did not 
seem to temper the trial court's decision, as it still went far beyond the Sentencing 
Recommendation. 
It is clear from the record below that the sentencing court did not address the history, 
character or rehabilitative needs of the Appellant. It is undisputed that punishment is a valid 
and necessary goal of the criminal justice system, but it cannot be said that it is the only goal. 
It is the apparent failure of the sentencing court to incorporate such concerns in the sentence 
that is most alarming, constitutes an abuse of discretion on the part of the sentencing judge, 
and which is obvious when juxtaposed against the information set forth in the Presentence 
Investigation Report. 
Utah case law recognizes the need for the trial court to engage in such determinations. 
In State v. Pier son, 2000 Ut. App. 274, the defendant appealed his sentence as being 
excessive when he was sentenced to serve consecutive sentences. Id. at \ 10. In ruling that 
the trial court did not impose an excessive sentence in that matter, the Court of Appeals 
2 
Appellant would take issue with the characterization that his lifestyle has "changed" 
significantly. Appellant has never been charged with another crime, and there is no assertion 
of a pattern of abuse. The victim described Appellant as her "boyfriend," (Presentence 
Recommendation, page 2), and as set forth herein, families and friends of both parties were 
well aware of the relationship at all times. The criminal acts did occur, but within a 
relationship which Appellant thought was appropriate at the time. Apparently the Court was 
referring, by this remark, to Mr. Shampton's marriage. 
11 
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found that the trial court had evaluated "defendant's age and his rehabilitative needs and 
accepted all letters in support of defendant in sentencing." Id. at f 23. Here there was an 
utter disregard any analysis of Appellant's age and possibility for rehabilitation. 
The sentencing court set forth a predisposition towards the singular goal of 
punishment at the outset of the sentencing hearing. The sentencing court made no pretext 
at evaluating other relevant factors which must be analyzed when imposing a sentence. The 
trial court's utter failure to address the age of the Appellant, Appellant's lack of any prior 
record or any other criminal activity of any kind, the unique circumstances of this case, the 
likelihood of rehabilitation, and the recommendations set forth in the Presentence 
Investigation Report constitutes an abuse of the discretion with which the sentencing court 
is vested. 
H. TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS WHEN 
IMPOSING SENTENCE. 
As set forth in more detail above, and as can be gleaned from the transcript of the 
sentencing hearing attached hereto, the trial court essentially made no findings when 
imposing sentence. Subsequent to counsel for Appellant making a presentation to the trial 
court at sentencing, the trial judge made no substantive comments evaluating Appellant's 
character, the possibility of rehabilitation, or the impact on the victim. Rather, the trial court 
stated "I'm looking at the State prison in this case." (Sentencing Transcript, page 3, line 
13.) This conclusory statement set forth early on in the hearing the sentencing court's 
predisposition for punishment, and disregard of other relevant factors. In ultimately 
12 
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imposing sentence, the sentencing court made no reference to other factors or goals beyond 
punishment. 
The failure of the trial court to make any findings of fact on the record is one which 
justifies this Court remanding this matter for an additional sentencing hearing, and specific 
findings on the record as related to the specific facts of this case, and the relevance of these 
facts to the imposition of a fair sentence which addresses the myriad, and sometimes 
contradictory, goals of the State. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Mr. Shampton. This matter 
should be remanded for re-sentencing with instructions to the lower court to make 
adequate findings when entering sentence. 
DATED this O ^ day of December, 2000. 
[ Joseph R. Goodman, Jr. 
\ Attorneys for Appellant 
13 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be placed in the United States Mail, first class 
postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to the 
following: 
J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
DATED this ZJn day of December, 2000 
L.-
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; AUGUST 25, 2000 
HONORABLE JUDGE HOMER G. WILKINSON 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: State of Utah versus Matthew Shampton. 
This is a time set for sentencing counsel. Is there any legal 
reason why sentence should not be imposed? 
MR. GOODMAN: There are none, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. GOODMAN: Your Honor, I've had the opportunity to 
view the pre-sentence investigation report with my client. We 
feel that the State's recommendation shows both wisdom and 
compassion, but there are some others issues that we think 
should bare upon the Court's decision here today and we'd like 
to address those. 
First and foremost is Mr. Shampton as the Court 
(inaudible) gleaned from a pre-sentence investigation has a 
wide and extensive circle of family and friends. He is 
currently married. He's employed full time. He's an active 
and vital member of the community. To incarcerate him for even 
a short period of time would sever or substantially alter those 
relationships, would deny him the ability to work, force him to 
loose his job and would really negatively impact these positive 
aspects of his life. 
Secondly, Mr. Shampton through this process has, at 
all times, since he aided the State in the prosecuting this 
1 
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matter. He did not deny his responsibility. He did plead 
guilty to charges which obviated a need for the victim in this 
case to be forced to testify and go through the pain of a trail 
of this matter. When he made that decision, that was one of 
the primary reasons therefore, he didn't want to put her 
through this. He's always expressed concern, compassion, for 
the victim. What he made was a terrible mistake. He knows 
that. He's acknowledged that. He's never denied 
responsibility. He's extremely remorseful and he apologizes to 
the victim and to all the parties and individuals he hurt, none 
more so that his family and friends who have been made to 
suffer as a result of this as well. 
We would ask that the Court, and the recommendation 
of the State is an extensive period of probation, a jail term, 
an extensive period of probation, psychological counseling and 
treatment, which he's already begun that process. Were he to 
be incarcerated, and speaking to the State, he's not going to 
receive that treatment until after he gets out. I think it 
would be more beneficial that he be allowed to start this 
probation. He's never been convicted of a crime, never been on 
probation. Do the probation, do this counseling, have that 
review but allow him to maintain his job, maintain his 
relationship with his wife, family, etc. I think those are 
factors the Court should weigh. In the alternative if the 
Court does deem that some term of incarceration is appropriate, 
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could there be some flexibility on how that's imposed? Could 
it be some sort of weekend sentencing where he'll be able to 
maintain his employment, report to the jail on Fridays and 
serve his time, or a period of time on the weekends. 
THE COURT: Where is the State in this matter? 
MR. D'ALASANDRO: Nick D'Alasandro for the State. 
Your Honor, this is Mr. Cope's case. He apparently discussed 
this case with the pre-sentence investigator and his 
recommendations appear to have been incorporated into the 
recommendation of the Court. So, on the basis of that, we 
would submit it. 
THE COURT: Where are his recommendations? Counsel, 
I'm looking at the State prison in this case. 
MR. D'ALASANDRO: According to the statement 
contained in the report, Mr. Cope felt that because of the 
serious nature of these offenses, the terms of probation should 
run consecutively on each count apparently after a jail term 
and that he should undergo a psychosexual evaluation and that's 
what's incorporated into the pre-sentence recommendation, Your 
Honor. Perhaps Court could inquire as to whether the victim or 
someone representing the victim is this morning. 
THE COURT: Is Mr. Cope going to be here? 
MR. D'ALASANDRO: I don't believe so, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Counsel, (inaudible) somebody speak, 
please find out will you please? 
3 
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MR. D'ALASANDRO: The victim is heref Your Honor, 
perhaps she would like to address the Court at this time. I'm 
not sure that Mr. Cope is not coming over on this case this 
morning. 
THE COURT: Ma'am, please step forward. Please state 
your name and who you are. 
MS. ELLSWORTH: Sarah ElLsworth, victim. The only 
reason that I would do any of this and go through any of this 
is for all the times that people have said that I can stop it 
from happening. I don't feel like what you're saying will stop 
it from happening again. If I could ever find a way to tell 
you how hard this is and how horrible this has been, and how I 
don't know if I will ever be able to have a normal relationship 
or act like a normal teenager or have anything close to a 
normal life because of this experience. If I could help you 
understand that, I don't see how you could ever make it 
possible for him to have a chance to do that again. And if you 
read my letter, then you will know that there are many reasons 
for believing that he would do it again and try to find ways to 
do it again. Like I said, the only thing I can do is try to 
convince you that that can't happen. 
THE COURT: I appreciate your coming forward and, 
yes, I have read your letters and yes, I understand what you're 
saying. Thank you. 
MS. ELLSWORTH: Thank you. 
4 
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THE COURT: The punishment protects the public is the 
greatest goal. 
MR. GOODMAN: I understand that. 
Do you want to say anything to the Court? 
We're prepared to submit, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything you wish to say, sir? 
THE DEFENDANT: I recognize that I did harm her 
greatly, but that was never my intention. I know that I've 
caused a lot of harm to her and her family and to her 
relationships and as meaningless as it would be to her and her 
family, I am very sorry for what I did. 
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Let me say to you 
Counsel that I don't know if Mr. Cope has any information in 
this case that I don't have. Mr. Cope can appear before me at 
5 
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1 any time and know his feelings on this matter. I don't want to 
2 (inaudible) this case and I don't want to rush this through. 
3 So I guess what I'm saying to you, I've indicated where I'm 
4 looking at this case and where I'm going on this case. If you 
5 wish to confer with Mr. Cope and have him present, then of 
6 course, I will continue this matter. But, otherwise I'm 
7 prepared to go on today. 
8 MR. GOODMAN: We would ask that Mr. Cope be here to 
9 address these matters. I think the pre-sentence report, we 
10 would support to the pre-sentence report. I think Mr. Cope 
11 simply did go into that. 
12 THE COURT: I don't hear pre-sentence report. 
13 MR. GOODMAN: I understand that. Can we continue 
14 this to have the opportunity to talk with Mr. Cope? 
15 THE COURT: Yes. The Court is going to be away. Let 
16 me indicate to the victim and the people here on this case 
17 that -
18 MR. D'ALASANDRO: Your Honor, Mr. Cope is here. 
19 THE COURT: Oh, Mr. Cope, we're on this case of 
20 Shampton, Matthew Shampton. The Court has read the pre-
21 sentence report and the Court does not agree with the 
22 recommendations made in the pre-sentence report. The victim 
23 has appeared before the Court and testified and I don't know if 
24 you have any insight you wish to give to the Court in this case 
25 or have you made any recommendations or any - what is your 
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recommendation? 
MR. COPE: In general terms, Your Honor, I believe 
that the defendant has minimized the seriousness of the 
offense. The pre-sentence report seems to follow suit. It's 
my opinion that the Court should strongly consider sending this 
man to prison. He did something that he had to have known was 
against the law and he did it for a long period of time. I 
don't believe that the Court should countenance that kind of 
behavior and I believe that we had some negotiations on how to 
settle this case, and I believe that the Defendant received a 
substantial benefit from that bargaining, but it appears to me 
that his offense, in and of itself, is worthy of prison. 
THE COURT: Thank you sir. 
Any response Counsel? 
MR. GOODMAN: The facts in this case and maybe the 
Court would like to focus on that, it was a long term 
relationship or it was evolving between these parties. It was 
not, Mr. Shampton made a mistake. He knows he made a mistake, 
but he never intended harm. He cared about this young lady at 
all times and he didn't mean to harm her. He didn't intend to 
harm her and I think that can be gleaned from the fact that 
during the entire relationship, both families were heavily 
involved. He would spend time with her parents, watching 
movies, going to dinner, going to family outings. She would 
spend time with her (sic) family. There was much more external 
7 
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1 familiarity on both sides and you would have to question if it 
2 was that horrendous. At the time, would the parents have not 
3 recognized that? Apparently they didn't but I think that leans 
4 toward the fact that this wasn't on its face, and to all the 
5 people that were around, all the people that observed this, the 
6 people of their church, the people in their families, they 
7 didn't see abuse going on. They didn't think this was an 
8 abusive relationship. We pled to the crime. The facts are 
9 stated before the Court but there are other factors that I 
10 think go to mitigate in this case. He's always admitted the 
11 responsibility. He's always been cooperative with the State. 
12 He sought to make the victim in this case avoid the pain and 
13 stress of going through a trial in this matter. He has acted 
14 out of concern for her in this case and he has, as best he can, 
15 moved on with his life. He is a vital part of the community. 
16 He's employed. He's married. He's got relations. He 
17 contributes to society and we run the risk of throwing that 
18 away with a long term prison sentence. 
19 THE COURT: Anything further you wish to say, sir? 
20 And yes, Counsel, we do stand the risk of throwing 
21 that away, but that's what he brought upon himself. Yes, I 
22 think there's a lot of fault in this case on the other parties. 
23 I cannot understand the parents in this matter, how they could 
24 sit by and not recognize what was taking place. But they're 
25 not on trial here and I'm not casting dispersions at them. 
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1 He's the one that did it. She was a child. A child. Taking 
2 advantage of her, the Court just does not allow that type of 
3 situation to go on and the defendant, although he has changed 
4 his lifestyle now, he has to pay the piper and the penalty must 
5 be paid. 
6 The Court does sentence the Defendant Matthew 
7 J Shampton for the crime of sex abuse of a child, a Second Degree 
Felony, incarceration in the Utah State Prison for an 
9 I indeterminate term of one to fifteen years. Commitment will be 
10 forthwith. The Court also sentences the Defendant for the 
11 crime of unlawful sexual activity with a minor, being a Third 
12 Degree Felony, to incarceration in the Utah State Prison of an 
13 indeterminate term of zero to five years, commitment to be 
14 forthwith. The Court would order the two terms run 
15 concurrently. The Court would also order the Defendant be 
16 responsible for restitution in this matter. Restitution, of 
17 course, is for any type of rehabilitation that the victim may 
18 need and anything else that would be restitution. That will be 
19 the order, 
20 J (Whereupon the proceedings were concluded. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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PAGE 2 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
SHAMPTON, MATTHEW JARED 
PLEA BARGAIN: 
The defendant was originally charged with Count I, Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child, a First 
Degree Felony and Count II, Unlawful Sexual Activity with a Minor, a Third Degree Felony. 
Through plea negotiation., the defendant was allowed to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser, 
included offense in Count i. Sexual Abuse of a Child, a Second Degree Felony and to Count II, 
as originally charged, 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Records of the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office. 
OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: 
On April 17,2000, Detective J. DuVal of the Sandy City Police Department, and Ms. Sheme 
Hatch, Division of Child and Family Services, interviewed Sarah Ellsworth (date of birth; 
December 24,1982, age 17) at the Children's Justice Center Sarah was asked why she had been 
brought in to speak with the detective and Ms. Hatch, and stated she was there because her 
Bishop and her parents had told her she needed to report some incidents which had occurred. 
Sarah stated she was also seeing a counselor, who told her she could gain some control back in 
her life, if she reported the incidents. The counselor also informed Sarah that she (counselor) 
was bound by law to report the incidents Sarah had disclosed. Sarah then stated she was "scared 
to death," did not want to prosecute, and did not want "him" to know that she had spoken with 
the detective, 
Sarah was asked to explain what she was talking about, and stated Matt Shampton had been her 
boyfriend for about five years. They met over die computer, corresponding in a chat room type 
program that was run by her father, and only people from Utah could use it. She stated everyone 
knew each other, and they would meet in person every week at various coffee shops or parks. 
She stated she was 12 years old and Matt was 19, when they started corresponding. They 
progressed from corresponding via the computer to talking on the phone, then met in person at 
Liberty Park, Sarah stated they "hooked up" right away. 
Sarah stated, when she initially began seeing the defendant she experienced some traumatic 
events, including the death of a young niece7 to whom Sarah was more like a mother than an 
aunt, and the suicide of Sarah's brother, She stated her relationship with Matt continued, he 
appeared to be the only person who understood how she felt, and "things" started to happen. 
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PAGE 3 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
SHAMPTON, MATTHEW JARED 
OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: (Continued) 
Sarah stated she was in the sixth grade, attending Oakridge Elementary, and she and Matt would 
meet on Friday night. She stated her parents knew about this. Matt would also come to her 
home on Sundays for "movie night" with her family. She stated their dates would usually consist 
of dinner and a movie, but they also would go to water parks, Gallcria and Lagoon. She stated 
they dated until August of 1999, when she was 16 and Matt was just turning 24. 
The detective asked Sarah what sort of relationship she and Matt had. She stated in the 
beginning she "thought she had to(submit to sexual activity)" and that Matt would occasionally 
assault her, by hitting her in the stomach or on her arms. She stated she had braises on her arm 
once, but they were easy to conceal The detective attempted to gather more information about 
the type of relationship Sarah had with Matt. She then stated they had "done everything you can 
imagine" but never had intercourse. She was asked what she meant by "everything," and 
disclosed the defendant had touched her on her vaginal area and breasts, skin-to-skin, and she 
had touched him. She stated there was also oral sex between the both of them, and he would 
penetrate her vagina with his finger. Sarah stated one or more of these act*; would occur 
approximately two times per month. She stated the sex acts began when she was 12, and 
continued until their relationship ended. Sarah stated the sexual activity would occur at her 
house, the defendant's home and in his vehicle at various locations throughout the Salt Lake 
Valley. 
Sarah stated she believed the first time anything sexual happened between them, she and Matt 
were at Murray Park during the day. They were lying down and began to kiss. While they were 
kissing, Matt put his hand down her pants and penetrated her vagina with his finger. She stated 
she could not recall the first sexual act which occurred at his house, because there were too 
many; Sarah stated the sexual activity would usually be the same., whether they were at his 
house or hers. They would be watching a movie with a blanket over them and would touch each 
other, Sarah stated Matt always instigated the sex acts, and was "never nice or loving about it" 
She stated if she fought or struggled during the acts, Matt would "hurt her inside.'5 
Sarah stated, after each incident of sexual activity, Matt would apologize and ask her forgiveness. 
Things would be fine in their relationship for a couple of weeks, then more sex acts would occur. 
The cycle continued throughout their relationship. Sarah stated she was afraid of Matt, and 
believed he would retaliate, if he knew charges might be pending against him. At the end of the 
interview, Sarah stated she was still worried about what Matt might do, but was willing to testify 
and more forward with the case. 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
SHAMPTON, MATTHEW JARED 
OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: (Continued) 
Following the interview with Sarah, the detective spoke with Sarah's mother and informed her of 
the disclosure which had been made. Sarah's mother appeared surprised that Matt might be 
going to jail or prison. She stated she thought he would just get some counseling, and not spend 
anytime in jail, 
Detective DuVal met with the suspect. Matt Shampton. on April 20, 2000. Post Miranda, the 
suspect was asked to tell the detective about Sarah, and he responded "she's my ex," He stated 
he had known Sarah about four years, and they first met when she was 12 and he was 19, He 
stated they only saw each other approximately two times a month for the first couple of years, 
and "officially"* started dating when Sarah turned 16. 
When informed of the allegations, the suspect stated he would not deny there was sexual contact, 
but it was "never forced." He stated the sexual touching started when Sarah was about 13 years 
old, occulted at her residence, his home and in his vehicle, and involved skin-to-skin fondling of 
Sarah's vagina and breasts, digital penetration of her vagina, mutual oral sex and Sarah 
masturbating the defendant. The defendant claimed Sarah only masturbated him to ejaculation a 
couple of times, toward the end of their relationship. He was asked how many times he thought 
they touched each other during the relationship, and could not estimate an amount. He stated 
neither he nor Sarah liked oral sex, so they had only done that a couple of times. 
Matthew was asked if Sarah ever stated she did not want to participate, or try to stop him. He 
stated she never said she didn't want to participate, and the only time she said she didn't want to 
do it was after the fact, when they were both "feeling ashamed/' He stated Sarah, had told him 
once, her vaginal area was sore after he had digitally penetrated her, so he stopped penetrating 
her vagina with his fingers during their relationship. 
The defendant admitted he knew how old Sarah was when they started their relationship. Due to 
the number of times sexual contact occurred, the detective noted neither the suspect nor victim 
could separate individual incidents, Both agreed the sexual contact occurred at Sarah's 
residence, the defendant's, in parks and in the defendant's vehicle. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Records of the Sandy City Police Department. 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
SHAMPTON, MATTHEW JARED 
DEFENDANT'S VERSION OF OFFENgE: 
The following is taken verbatim from the handwritten statement submitted fay the defendant: 
"I met the victim, Sarah, about 5 yeas ago. We met over the computer and had various mutual 
friends. We were both going through alot in our lives, and found each other to be a good listener. 
Over time, a friendship, and later a relationship developed. 
I struggled with the obvious age difference, and intended to keep things on friendly terms until 
she was older, and then see what would happen, A$ time went on and we spent more time 
talking, and had seen each other in person with our friends, it became harder to deny that I. was 
having feelings for her. I should have walked away then, and wish that I would have, but I can. 
offer no clear reason why I didn't. We were both lonely and found happiness in each other. We 
both had someone to turn to who was always there. I guess I was afraid to give that up. 
Over the next few years our relationship developed, and eventually turned somewhat sexual We 
never had intercourse, it was usually fondling each other under a blanket while watching a movie 
at her house. On a couple of occasions we experimented with oral sex, but neither of us 
particularly liked it so that didn't continue. 
1 have never done anything In my life that. I have regretted as much as this. I know that although 
I never intended to hurt her, I was totally wrong in what I did, and nothing can justify it. I have 
confessed to my Bishop in order to make things right with God, I had encouraged Sarah to talk 
to her Bishop, as well as a councelor if she thought it might help, 1 even offered to go with her. I 
cannot think of enough ways to express just how sorry I am for what 1 have done." 
Dated: August L 2000 s: \ Matthew Shampton 
COMMENTS: 
The defendant stated his relationship with. Sarah lasted between 1994 and 1999, "but I was only 
charged up tc l9&." He stated the relationship ended, "because we'd been fighting off and on for 
a long time, breaking up and getting back together." The defendant stated Sarah was the one 
who ended the relationship. He indicated her parents were aware of the relationship, "I went on 
family trips and things." 
i 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
SHAMPTON, MATTHEW JARED 
DEFENDANT'S VERSION OF OFFENSE: (Continued) 
COMMENTS: (Continued) 
The defendant denied ever being physically abusive toward Sarah, and farther denied ever 
forcing sexual activity upon her. Kc had no explanation as to why Sarah would allege this when 
it had mot occurred, "she doesn't seem out to get me. I don't like saying she made it up, she's not 
that type of person, but itididn't happen. We both felt bad afterward, she'd say she was sorry, I'd 
say I was sorry? and we'd'try not to do it again." 
Concerning the impact of thi$ offense on the victim, the defendant stated "I know she's had a 
hard time with it we had contact off and on after v/e broke upT I encouraged her to go to a 
counselor and her Bishop. I know she had a hard time, a pregnancy scare with her new 
boyfriend, and her parents threatened to kick her out. I believe these things axe related to this 
offense. Because she was too young to be in. a relationship, it probably made her feel guilty and 
confused. I hope she is getting the help she needs." 
The defendant was asked if he had looked into receiving specialized sexual offender treatment, 
following Sarah's disclosure in April, and stated he had not. He was given a list of specialized 
sexual offender treaiment jproviders approved by the Department of Corrections, and instructed to 
have completed an intake appointment prior to sentencing, and bring a letter of verification to the 
Court. He agreed to do so. 
The defendant expressed the hope he would receive probation in the present offense and stated, if 
so, his goals for the future; would include "I will continue schooling while working to get out of 
debt. My wife and I would also like to have a child as soon as possible. My first goal before that 
can happen, however, is to take my wife to the temple and be sealed to her." 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION 
The defendant. I 
CO-DEFENDANT STATUS j 
There are no co-defendants identified in this case. 
i 
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THE CHURCH OF 
JESUS CHRIST 
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 
HIDDEN VALLEY THIRD WARD 
SANDY UTAH HIDDEN VALLEY STAKE 
Juiv 31,2000 
To Whom- It May Concern: 
I have had many visits with Matt Shampton. He is a fine young man. 
Most recently I have metj with Matt and his fiance prior to they: marriage. 
She is a wonder&l young lady, Matt is a talented young man and a 
productive member of sojciety. His goals and aspirations include building a 
healthy family unit. He ^ making positive steps towards that 
accomplishment 
Sincerely, 
Bishop C Reed Cutler 
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BALLARD 
MEDICAL PRODUCTS1 
12050 Lone P$ak Parkway 
Draper, Utih 84020 
(301)57*8600 
Fax: (801) 572-6399 
Date: July 2f\ 2000 
Subject: Letter of Recommendation 
To whom it may concern; 
i 
Matthew Shampton has been employed by Ballard Medical Products since 
February 14,| 1997. He has been a part of the Customer Service Team 
since August of 1997, 
Matthew is a! very conscientious worker and can be counted on to 
accomplish whatever task is put before him in an accurate and timely 
manner. He also exhibits excellent attendance and great technical skills. 
Sincerely, 
Becky Oawsion 
Customer Servie 
Ballard Medical 
Phone: 801-323 
e Team Leader 
Products 
-5218 
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I 
July 31, 2000 
To whom it may concent. 
I am writing this as a reference for Matthew Shampton.1 have known 
Matthew for a little overja year, and I have bwn married to him for just over 
2 months. He is a very dependable, reliable, helpful,, trustworthy, loving, 
and compassionate persbn. 
Matthew is known to go out of his way for others. He has often given 
up his own leisure time to help with any job that needed to be done, no 
matter how big or small, j Any job that needed to be done, He helped with 
cheerfully. He always gave in his hand cheerfully and energetically. 
Matthew is a hard 
worked at Ballard MedicW/K 
a half years. Never once 
been given to do. He has 
his co-workers. 
and dedicated worker in the office place. He has 
irnberly Clark in customer service for three and 
have I heard him complain about the tasks he lias 
received several promotions and is well-liked by 
Matthew has been j a wonderful friend and husband. He is loved by his 
family, and many friends. He is never too busy to soothe a friend who is 
having a bad day or need someone to talk to. He will always stop and listen 
to anyone who just needsj someone to lean on. I have never been given any 
reason to doubt his compassion, sincerity, or honesty. He is truly a 
wonderful person in my lite, and in the lives of many others around him. 
Sincerely, 
Angela Shampton 
y 
i 
i 
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Monday, July 31t2OO0 
To Whom It May Concern: 
I am writing to letter on behalf ofjmy son Matthew Jaied Shampton. It is both with sorrow and happiness I 
share my thoughts with you. j 
When Matt first brought to my attention what was going on his first desire was to leave Sarah completely 
out of the picture and not make things worse for her. It was he at fault and he was ready to suffer the 
consequences. Matt had already gfone to his spiritual leader to make it right with him and the Lord. I know 
it was wrong what he did but I was happy he was trying to make it right with the Lord. When be talked 
with the detective he trying to do }vhat was right with State. 
To Sarah I was known as dad. I really thought by the time she graduated from high school they would be 
married. She attended all our family activities and Matt theirs. Of course, things did not work out for them 
as a couple. 
I know Matt would never intentionally hurt her or anybody for that matter. He has always been a kind and 
gentleperson. He cried when his brother left on his mission. He was emotionally upset when his 
grandmother and grandfathers died. He has always taken a special interest with his mother to help in 
anyway possible because of her plight with Multiple Sclerosis. 
Matt has gone on with his life the best way possible. He has married a lovely young woman that has 
brought much happiness to both of them. He k active in bis church. He is productive at his work and does 
an excellent job for them. He is continuing his education at the community college. When he had spare 
time he has been helping my wife and me with our new home, 
I do not feel it's in the best interest of either the Stats or Matt to punish him further. These past few months 
have been an emotional drain, on him and should be punishment enough. Financially it has put him in debt 
for along time regarding bail and lawyers fees. I know I am sounding like a father but he really iias been 
put through the ringer. He is not a jhreat to the State. He made a mistake that will remain with him for a 
long time. Justice has been served land I plead you now to have mercy, 
Thank you for taking the time to road my thoughts on this important matter. 
Sincerely, 
s^uM^ 
Michael J. Shampton 
14099 Lcwiston Peak Drive 
Riverton, Utah 84065 
971-6047 Cell 
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August 1,2000 
To Whom It May Concern: 
I would like to tell you about my son, Matthew Shamptoa He is the joy in my life and in 
the lives of many other people. He makes friends wherever he goes. He is easy to talk to 
and listens when you talk to hint. 
ji 
Matt is a thoughtful and caring person. He is always trying to cheer someone up or help 
them. 
Matt is honest, trustworthy and responsible. He has a good job where he has had several 
promotions- I think this spedks well of his character. 
Matt is married to a super giii whom he loves and respects. They have a wonderful 
future ahead of them. 
Matt is a blessing in my life. 
to have him for my son. 
He is a wonderful son and a wonderful person. I am proud 
i ,. Thanks for your time and consideration. 
Sincerely, 
^kj OM&M^ ^ 1 ^ ^ 4 ^ 
Marianne Shampton 
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To Whom It May Concern; I 
My name is Alyssa Anne (nee Traugott) Shampton. I must apologize right off the bat because I 
am a horrible letter writer. In my college and high school career, I have barely made passing grades in 
English. So if this letter does notj Mow well, you will understand why. 
I have known my brother-m l^aw, Matthew Jared Shampton for three years. Matt and I have 
always had a friendly relationship); we have had many theological^  political, and social discussions. Most 
of the time Matt has had a differing opinion than i7 but we have always been able to discuss topics at 
length and our opinions haven't changed our friendship,. 
Matt is a generous man, | Matt and (have worked at the same company for a year. When a job 
opened up in his department, I applied for it and Mat: even spoke to his boss to encourage her into hiring 
me. Unfortunately, 1 was lackingjin skills and did not get the position anyway. When my husband and 3 
were getting married, Matt knew that we didn't have enough money for a fancy wedding ring, 50 he gave 
us a good-sized diamond that his parents had bought for him when he was bom. With that diamond, we 
were able to make a good enough jcuig. 
hs my experience, I do thiink that Matt is of great benefit to society- He has been taking 
community college classes to cam! a degree in order to support his wife and himself in their new life. 1 do 
wish the best &>r him. I hope thatjyou would too, 
Sincerely, 
Alyssa Anne Shampton 
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August 1,2000 
To Whom It May Concern, 
i 
My name is Michael John SHampton. I am Matthew Jared Shampton's older 
brother, so I have known hinp all his life. We have spent a lot of time together over the 
years, and I know him well. Matt is a very wonderful person. He is someone I can trast. 
He has always been honest vkth me never given me any reason to suspect otherwise. He 
is respectable and deserves respect. He is very responsible and handles responsibility 
very well. He is intelligent. He is generous and would give you all he has to help, He 
cares about how everyone else is doing and tries to make life better for everyone. He has 
many friends and makes morje everywhere he goes. Although our opinions can differ at 
times, I value his greatly and] always seek it. He has a wonderful wife and together they 
make a beautiful family. He lias a good job, and a good future. Our future as a society 
would be better if more people were more like Matt. 
Respectfully, 
i 
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My 31,2000 
To Whom It May Concern; 
My name is Julie Jensen; I am Matthew Shampton's younger sister. I, have known him 
for over twenty-three years. | 
I have many memories through the years of fun times spent with my big brother. 
Whether we were sitting around telling ghost stories or sledding down the mountainside 
in the winter we always had tun together. Even now that we are both married we enjoy 
spending time together. Matt and his wile have corns over many times to watch movies 
and keep me company when my husband was working through the night. We have all 
enjoyed taking hikes and going to Lagoon for the day. Our lives have each changed, but 
our friendship still remains. 
Matt has been an example throughout my life. It doesn't seem to matter what is going on 
in my life, he has always beeni there for mc. Most recently, Matt was with us at the 
hospital as we awaited the arrival of our first son. He was there the next day with the 
cutest outfit from Baby Gap. j 
I have seen all the help that Matt has been to our mom who has had Multiple Sclerosis for 
most of our lives. He is a wonderful support for her, especially with his special technique 
for curing headaches. When she is feeling down, nobody can cheer her up quite like 
Matt I 
| 
I love Matt very much, I have always known him to be a good and honest person. He is 
very kind, thoughtful, and sincere. He is an asset in my life, in our family, and in society. 
Sincerely, 
^jljilM WWMJ 
Julie Jensen 
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July 31,2000 
To Whom It May Concern: 
My name is Bryan Jensen and i am Matthew Sbampton's brother-in-law. I have .known 
Mate for more than 3 V4 years. 
When I married into the family, Matthew was very friendly and 1 always felt welcomed 
by him. I still feel the same around him and 1 get along with him very well 
We went on a family vacation to Disneyland last year and it is obvious that he loves his 
family and loves to be with them. He doesn't like anyone to be left out when we do fun 
activities together. I have also seen him demonstrate his love to his family members in 
their various tunes of need. He is more than willing to help anyone. 
My wife and I haw done many things with Matt such as hiking, going to Lagoon, 
traveling to Mesquite, and watching movies, to name a few, and he loves to joke around 
and .always tries to make the event fan for everyone. 
As far as I am concerned, Matt is a great person and 1 am proud to call him my brother-
in-law. 
Bryan Jensen 
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July 31,2000 
To Whom It May Concern, 
I am writing to you on behalf of my brother, Matthew Jared Shampson and to give reference of his 
character. I know that Matthew loved Sarah. She was a part of our family and WES called Aunt Sarah by 
our children. Matthew and Sarah came to al I of our birthday parties, family dinners and she was even 
included when we drew names for Christmas. Together they took our children to movies, McDonald's and 
spent many hours entertaining them. 
Our 5-year-oid son tells everyone about his bout friend "Big Matt'* wd how terrific he is. Matt is 
terrific and very sensitive, I can recall a time that I passed him m the haJL, I said, "I hope you know I tove 
you" on he cried. He Is also very trustworthy and an over al! good person, Matthew has suffered a great 
deal over this situation and he is ready to move on in his life with his new bride. I hope you will kindly 
take these things into consideration. 
Sincerely, ^ ^ ^ 
Michelle Josie ^-
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My 31,2000 
To Whom It May Concern: 
I am writing this letter on behalf of my brother-in-law, Matthew J« Shampton, In the eight years that I 
have been associated with the Shampton family 1 have known Matthew to be an honest and good person. I 
think he is someone you can trust and our children ihink the world of him. 
Sincerely, 
Troy R. Josi/" 
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STATE v. BAKER 
Cite as 963 P.2d 801 (UtahApp. 1998) 
Utah 801 
of due process. We therefore affirm the trial 
court's judgment. Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Judge 
BENCH and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
> | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM E> 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Mark Joseph BAKER, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 911650-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
July 30, 1998. 
Following jury trial before the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake Department, Ho-
mer F. Wilkinson, J., defendant was convict-
ed of rape and sodomy of a child. The Court 
of Appeals, 884 P.2d 1280, reversed. On fur-
ther review, the Supreme Court, 935 P.2d 
503, reversed Court of Appeals, and remand-
ed for consideration of remaining claims. 
The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held 
that: (1) allowing expert testimony as to 
child's truthfulness on issue of whether she 
had been abused was not plain error; (2) 
allowing prosecution to emphasize child's 
honesty during closing argument was not 
error under circumstances; (3) isolated ref-
erence to defendant's invocation of his right 
to remain silent did not violate due process; 
(4) defendant was not denied effective assis-
tance at trial; (5) evidence was sufficient to 
sustain conviction; and (6) imposition of min-
imum mandatory terms would not be dis-
turbed. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <3=>1036.6 
In prosecution for rape and sodomy of 
child, improperly allowing expert testimony 
as to child's truthfulness on issue of whether 
she had been abused was not plain error, 
where defendant had conceded in opening 
argument that child was molested by some-
one. 
2. Criminal Law <s>1030(l) 
Plain error is determined under the le-
gal standards applicable at the time of trial. 
3. Criminal Law ®=>723(1) 
Prosecutor did not exceed bounds of 
proper closing argument in prosecution for 
rape and sodomy of child and did not improp-
erly engender sympathy for victim by focus-
ing on child's vulnerability at time of sexual 
abuse and evidence corroborating her story 
in order to support conclusion that child was 
telling truth. 
4. Criminal Law <s»1037.1(2) 
To extent some of prosecutor's com-
ments in closing argument may have ex-
ceeded the bounds of permissible argument 
by evoking sympathy for victim, comments 
did not rise to level of plain error, where 
challenged comments could also have been 
interpreted as merely urging jury to believe 
victim and evidence against defendant was 
considerable. 
5. Constitutional Law ^268(10) 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits use of a defendant's 
post-Miranda silence for impeachment pur-
poses. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
6. Constitutional Law ®=>266.1(1) 
Criminal Law <§=>414 
Isolated reference in detective's testimo-
ny to defendant's invocation of his right to 
remain silent did not violate defendant's due 
process rights, where prosecution did not use 
comment to undermine defendant's right to 
silence and defendant testified at trial, offset-
ting any negative inference regarding his 
post-Miranda silence. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 14. 
7. Criminal Law <£=>641.13(1) 
Prejudice from ineffective assistance of 
counsel will not be presumed under Strick-
land test. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
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8. Criminal Law <$=>641.13(2.1) 
In prosecution for rape and sodomy of 
child, counsel did not provide ineffective as-
sistance by conceding, as matter of strategy, 
that child had been sexually abused by some-
one. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
9. Criminal Law <s=>641.13(6) 
In prosecution for rape and sodomy of 
child, counsel's failure to move to exclude 
evidence of similar sex acts was not ineffec-
tive assistance where motion would have 
been futile, given relevance of evidence to 
establish identity. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6; 
Rules of Evid., Rule 404(b). 
10. Criminal Law <s=>.369.2(5) 
In prosecution for rape and sodomy of 
child, wife's testimony regarding defendant's 
sexual activities with her was relevant on 
issue of identity of abuser where defendant's 
prior sexual conduct with his wife was strik-
ingly similar to conduct to which child victim 
testified she was subjected. Rules of Evid., 
Rule 404(b). 
11. Criminal Law <®=>641.13(2.1) 
Defendant failed to show prejudice nec-
essary for ineffective assistance claim as re-
sult of counsel's failure to explore more thor-
oughly possible bias of two prospective jurors 
based on their occupations, where neither 
juror indicated any inability to approach case 
impartially during trial court's general voir 
dire questioning. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
12. Criminal Law <®=>641.13(6) 
In prosecution for rape and sodomy of 
child, counsel's failure to present additional 
medical evidence on chlamydia was not inef-
fective assistance notwithstanding that, al-
though child had contracted disease, defen-
dant tested negative for it before trial, where 
defendant did not show how further investi-
gation would have produced evidence other 
than that presented. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 
6. 
13. Criminal Law <s=>641.13(2.1) 
Alleged failure of counsel to make ade-
quate record of objections and motions was 
not ineffective assistance absent any showing 
that defendant was prejudiced by ruling on 
issue discussed off the record. U.S.CA. 
Const.Amend. 6. 
14. Rape <s=»52(l) 
Sodomy <®=>6 
Evidence was sufficient to sustain con-
victions of rape and sodomy of child, notwith-
standing child's inconsistent testimony on 
some peripheral issues and inability to identi-
fy defendant in lineup conducted four years 
after crime. U.C.A.1953, 76-5-402.1, 76-5-
403.1. 
15. Criminal Law ®=>1134(3) 
Imposition of mandatory minimum 
terms of fifteen years for rape and sodomy of 
child based on four aggravating circum-
stances would not be considered on appeal 
where defendant challenged only two of cir-
cumstances, and either of two remaining bas-
es was sufficient to support sentences. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-3-201 (1991). 
Robert K. Heineman, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant. 
Jan Graham and J. Frederic Voros, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before WILKINS, Associate P.J., and 
BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
This is the second appearance of defendant 
Mark Joseph Baker before this court appeal-
ing his convictions for rape of a child, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-402.1 (1990), and sodomy on a child, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-403.1 (1990). Defendant claims 
numerous errors by the trial court, as well as 
ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND1 
Between July and October, 1987, defen-
dant was married to C.P. The couple lived in 
Salt Lake County with C.P.'s three sons and 
1. We recite the evidence and all reasonable infer- able to the jury verdict. See State v. Dunn, 850 
ences drawn therefrom in a manner most favor- P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1993). 
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STATE v. 
Cite as 963 P.2d 801 
her daughter, H.H. H.H. was five or six 
years old at the time. 
During that period, C.P. worked nights as 
a bartender and defendant watched her chil-
dren while she was gone. Although the boys 
often slept outside in a backyard tent, defen-
dant never allowed H.H. to sleep outside 
with them. 
Numerous times while the boys were out-
side, defendant went into H.H.'s room, un-
dressed himself, and told H.H. to put on her 
mother's nightgown. After then tying H.H.'s 
hands and feet and placing a bandanna in her 
mouth, defendant had vaginal or anal inter-
course with her. At times, he also forced 
H.H. to perform oral sex. 
Defendant was charged with rape and sod-
omy of a child, and a two day trial began on 
May 29, 1991. In his opening argument, 
defense counsel conceded that H.H. had been 
sexually abused. The only disputed issue 
was whether defendant was the perpetrator 
of that abuse. The State produced evidence 
that H.H. had identified the perpetrator as 
her stepfather, "Mark," who had curly hair 
and "fuzz" on his face, that H.H. never devi-
ated from that identification, and that, in 
fact, defendant did have facial hair during 
the time he lived with C.P. and her family.2 
The State also produced evidence that defen-
dant's sexual activities with C.P. included 
binding her in the same manner described by 
H.H. Finally, the State produced evidence 
that, in 1990, H.H. tested positive for chlamy-
dia in both the vagina and the rectum. The 
jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. 
The court sentenced defendant to two con-
current terms of five years to life, each with 
a minimum mandatory term of fifteen years. 
Defendant filed an appeal on June 28, 
1991. On November 2, 1994, this court re-
versed defendant's convictions, finding preju-
dicial error in the trial court's refusal to 
dismiss a juror for cause. See State v. Bak-
er, 884 P.2d 1280, 1286 (Utah Ct.App.1994), 
cert, granted, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995). On 
March 21, 1997, the supreme court reversed 
2. Although H.H. could not recall Mark's last 
name, evidence at trial indicated H.H. suffers 
from a learning disability that makes it easier for 
her to recall experiences than to recall factual 
information told to her by others. 
BAKER Utah 803 
(UtahApp. 1998) 
this court's decision, holding defendant had 
failed to preserve his juror claim by not 
using one of his peremptory challenges to 
remove the juror. See State v. Baker, 935 
P.2d 503, 510 (Utah 1997). The supreme 
court then remanded the case to this court 
for consideration of defendant's remaining 
claims.3 
ISSUES 
Defendant raises several issues on appeal. 
First, he argues that the trial court improp-
erly admitted expert testimony premised on 
the victim's credibility in violation of State v. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989). Sec-
ond, defendant claims the trial court improp-
erly allowed the State to invoke sympathy for 
H.H. in its closing argument. Third, defen-
dant asserts that the State improperly elicit-
ed testimony commenting on defendant's in-
vocation of his right to remain silent. 
Fourth, defendant claims he was denied ef-
fective assistance of counsel at trial. Fifth, 
defendant claims there was insufficient evi-
dence to support his convictions. Finally, 
defendant argues the trial court abused its 
discretion in sentencing him to minimum 
mandatory terms of fifteen years on each 
count. 
ANALYSIS 
Expert Testimony 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in 
allowing the State's primary expert to com-
ment on H.H.'s credibility, in violation of 
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 
1989). Because defendant failed to raise this 
issue below, we review his claim for plain 
error. Under the plain error doctrine, de-
fendant "must show . . . : (i) An error exists; 
(ii) the error should have been obvious to the 
trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable likeli-
hood of a more favorable outcome for [defen-
dant]." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 
(Utah 1993). 
3. The remand was pursuant to an order amend-
ing the supreme court's opinion. 
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The State's primary expert on child sexual 
abuse was Dr. Karen Hansen, a pediatrician 
at Primary Children's Medical Center, who 
examined H.H. on December 20, 1990. Han-
sen both interviewed H.H. and performed a 
physical examination of her. The examina-
tion produced "no findings that would have 
been corroborative of sexual abuse"; howev-
er, H.H. did test positive for chlamydia. Af-
ter meeting with H.H., Hansen concluded 
that H.H. had been sexually abused. At 
trial, Hansen testified: "[T]he basis was the 
fact about the way [H.H.] told her story with 
explicit details, what, you know, she had to 
say. And then the [chlamydia cultures were 
very convincing about the sexual abuse." 
In Rimmasch, our supreme court held 
that, absent foundation demonstrating the 
"inherent reliability" of the scientific basis 
for an expert's conclusion that a particular 
person was telling the truth on a particular 
occasion, an expert's opinion "based largely 
upon . . . the expert['s] subjective appraisals 
of the [victim's] truthfulness during inter-
views" is not admissible. Rimmasch, lib 
P.2d at 393, 406-07; see also State v. Bates, 
784 P.2d 1126, 1129 (Utah 1989) (finding 
error in admitting expert's bolstering testi-
mony where "State did not qualify her as an 
expert on discerning truth"); State v. Ram-
sey, 782 P.2d 480, 485 (Utah 1989) (same). 
[1] Under Rimmasch, the trial court's 
admission of Hansen's bolstering testimony 
was obvious error. However, Hansen's testi-
mony went only to whether H.H. had in fact 
been sexually abused.4 Defense counsel had 
already conceded that fact in opening argu-
ment. Thus, Hansen's testimony was essen-
tially cumulative. Because of this,- we do not 
believe that "absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable out-
come" for defendant. Dunn,^ 850 P.2d at 
1208-09. We conclude, then, that the admis-
sion of the testimony was not plain error. 
4. Hansen was never asked to identify H.H.'s 
abuser, and Hansen offered no opinion on that 
issue. 
5. Plain error is determined under the legal stan-
dards applicable at the time of trial, see Dunn, 
850 P.2d at 1228 (holding that counsel ineffec-
tiveness "based on an oversight or misreading of 
law" must be based on "the law in effect at the 
time of trial"); State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 
Closing Argument 
Defendant's second claim is that the trial 
court improperly allowed the State to invoke 
juror sympathy for H.H. in its closing argu-
ment. Because defendant did not object, we 
review the State's comments for plain error. 
See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 
(Utah 1993). 
[2] "Counsel is afforded considerable lati-
tude in closing argument to the jury and may 
fully recount the evidence adduced and the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn there-
from." State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 478 
(Utah 1989). Furthermore, "[c]ourts gener-
ally recognize that, during closing argu-
ments, a prosecutor may comment on the 
credibility of witnesses." State v. Cummins, 
839 P.2d 848, 854 n. 15 (Utah Ct.App.1992) 
(citations omitted), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 
(Utah 1993); cf. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 
546, 554 (Utah 1987) (suggesting that bolster-
ing witness is not improper in stating "it is 
clear that [the remarks] were intended to 
bolster [State witness's] credibility and were 
not intended to contrast her decision to testi-
fy with defendant's choice to remain si-
lent.").5 
The standard to be applied in determin-
ing whether improper argument merits re-
versal is twofold: (1) was the argument 
directed toward matters the jury would not 
be justified in considering, and (2) was the 
error substantial and prejudicial such that 
in its absence there is a reasonable likeli-
hood of a more favorable result for the 
defendant? 
Hopkins, 782 P.2d at 478; see also Tillman, 
750 P.2d at 555. In applying that standard, 
" 'the statements or conduct must be viewed 
in context; only by so doing can it be deter-
mined whether the prosecutor's conduct af-
fected the fairness of the trial.'" Hopkins, 
174 (Utah Ct.App.1992) ("When defendant raises 
the issues of both plain error and ineffective 
assistance of counsel, 'a common standard is 
applicable.' " (quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 
116, 124 n. 15 (Utah 1989))). However, we cite 
to Cummins, a case decided after defendant's 
trial, because it appears consistent with the su-
preme court's opinion in Tillman. 
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782 P.2d at 480 (quoting United States v. 
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1044, 
84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)); see also State v. An-
dreason, 718 P.2d 400, 402-03 (Utah 1986) 
(holding that in determining prejudice from 
improper argument, "we consider the entire 
record and circumstances of the case."). 
[3] The State's closing argument in this 
case, including rebuttal, spans twenty-nine 
pages of trial transcript. Defendant takes 
issue with essentially six paragraphs.6 A 
review of the State's argument as a whole 
indicates that it consisted primarily of a re-
view of the evidence. That review focused 
not only on H.H.'s vulnerability at the time of 
the sexual abuse, but also on evidence cor-
roborating H.H.'s story, as well as evidence 
explaining why H.H.'s testimony might at 
times have been inconsistent. All of this is 
proper closing argument. So too is the 
State's focusing on this evidence to support a 
conclusion that H.H. was telling the truth. 
[4] To the extent some of the State's 
comments exceeded the bounds of permissi-
ble argument, we do not believe they rose to 
the level of obvious error. Most of the com-
ments challenged by defendant are in fact 
ambiguous as to whether they urge the jury 
to feel sympathy for the victim or merely 
urge the jury to believe the victim based on 
the evidence. This ambiguity, combined with 
the fact that there was no settled case law in 
this state directly addressing comments 
6. In his brief, Defendant cites specifically to the 
following portions of the State's closing argu-
ment: 
[H.H.]'s only weapon that she had then and 
she has now is the truth. And if you don't 
believe her, you take away the only weapon 
that she has. And if you acquit Mr. Baker, 
then you send the message to [H.H.], Don't 
come in and tell us you were hurt because we 
are not going to believe you. 
Our constitution proclaims justice for all. 
And that includes the little ones, even the chil-
dren. And when a child's cry is hard to hear, 
we still have to try and listen. Children in our 
society deserve justice just like the rest of us, 
and that includes the right to be believed by 
eight adults. 
[H.H.] can't vote. We can't elect legislatures 
that are supposed to protect her. She can't 
even sit on a jury in child sexual abuse cases. 
But she still has the right to justice, and she 
still has the right to be believed. 
BAKER Utah 805 
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evoking victim sympathy, indicates the inap-
propriateness of applying the plain error doc-
trine to these comments. See State v. Ross, 
951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah Ct.App.1997) ("Utah 
courts have repeatedly held that a trial 
court's error is not plain where there is no 
settled appellate law to guide the trial 
court."). 
Finally, the evidence against defendant in 
this case was considerable. See Andreason, 
718 P.2d at 403 ("If proof of a defendant's 
guilt is strong, we will not presume the im-
proper remark to be prejudicial."); State v. 
Smith, 700 P.2d 1106,1112 (Utah 1985) (hold-
ing improper comment harmless when "rec-
ord contains substantial evidence of defen-
dant's guilt"). Thus, even if there was error, 
we do not believe the error was so "substan-
tial and prejudicial such that in its absence 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result" for defendant. Hopkins, 
782 P.2d at 478. 
Right to Silence 
Defendant also claims the trial court im-
properly allowed the State to ehcit testimony 
concerning defendant's invocation of his right 
to remain silent. " '[W]e will not disturb the 
trial court's rulings regarding the admissibili-
ty of evidence unless it clearly appears that 
the lower court was in error.'" State v. 
Braun, 787 P.2d 1336, 1337 (Utah CtApp. 
When you retire to the jury room, you have 
to decide what the truth is in this case. Please 
do not send a message to [H.H.] and all the 
other children, Don't come to us when you 
have been hurt because we won't believe you, 
we won't listen to what you have to say. 
I think when you retire to the jury room, you 
will know what's in your hearts. And you will 
know the truth about what happened, and that 
this man, this stepfather of [H.H.], raped her 
and sodomized her. 
Defendant also cites to a portion of the State's 
rebuttal: 
And as I said earlier, I know that when you 
retire to the jury room and you look in your 
hearts for the truth, you will see the weapon 
that [H.H.] is trying to use so that it doesn't 
happen again or to anyone else, and that is the 
weapon of truth. Please send her the message 
that you believe her and let her come forward 
and tell you about what has happened to her. 
And please find this man guilty of what he did 
to her. 
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1990) (quoting Belden v. Dalbo, Inc., 752 
P.2d 1317, 1319 (Utah Ct.App.1988)). 
[5] The Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits use of a defen-
dant's post-Miranda silence for impeachment 
purposes. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 
262, 267-68 (Utah 1998) (discussing Doyle v. 
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245, 
49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), and Greer v. Miller, 
483 U.S. 756, 763, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 3108, 97 
L.Ed.2d 618 (1987)). However, "the mere 
mention that a defendant invoked his consti-
tutional rights does not prima facie establish 
a due process violation." Id. at 268. Rather, 
for the reference to constitute such a viola-
tion, "the State must, in some way, use the 
defendant's silence to undermine the exercise 
of those rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Id. 
[6] In this case, nothing in the record 
indicates that the prosecutor used the refer-
ence to undermine defendant's constitutional 
right to remain silent. The comment came 
during Detective Cazier's testimony concern-
ing his investigation;7 it was isolated and no 
further reference was made to it during the 
course of defendant's trial. See id. at 269 
(finding no Doyle violation where comment 
was "merely incidentally and inadvertently 
elicited" and "prosecutor did not make refer-
ence to or inquire further into [the defen-
dant's] silence . . . , nor . . . attempt to use 
[the defendant's] silence to cast an inference 
of his guilt"); State v. Singleton, 693 P.2d 68, 
69-70 (Utah 1984) (finding no error where 
officer's comment "was elicited solely to pro-
vide foundation" for relevant and admissible 
statement made shortly thereafter, "[n]o fur-
ther reference or comment by the prosecutor 
was made at any point in the trial," and the 
questioning "does not suggest that it was 
7. During the State's examination of Detective 
Larry Cazier, the following dialogue took place: 
Q. Did you ever attempt to speak with Mark 
Baker? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did you speak with him? 
A. Just briefly. 
Q. All right. Did you have any discussion 
with him about the case? 
A. Our only conversation was— 
DEFENSE: I'll object to this, your Honor. I 
have a feeling that he is going to discuss the 
exercise of Mr. Baker's constitutional rights. 
conducted in any effort to encourage any 
inference of guilt from appellant's silence."); 
State v. Unas, 609 P.2d 1326, 1328 (Utah 
1980) (finding no violation where "prosecutor 
was having the officer testify to the circum-
stances of the arrest and . . . the information 
elicited was but a part of the natural se-
quence of events," and comment was not 
used "to cast any inference of guilt of the 
defendant"). 
Furthermore, defendant testified at trial, 
"thereby offsetting or even dispelling any 
negative inference regarding [his] silence." 
State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1206 (Utah 
1984) (finding comment harmless where 
"questioning was quite hmited," there "was 
no comment on it in closing argument," and 
defendant "testified extensively in her own 
behalf'), overruled on other grounds by State 
v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628 (Utah 1987). Ac-
cordingly, we hold that Detective Cazier's 
one reference to defendant's invocation of his 
right to remain silent does not constitute a 
Doyle violation. 
Ineffective Assistance 
Defendant asserts that his counsel's re-
peated errors at trial denied him the effec-
tive assistance of counsel guaranteed under 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. "When, as in this case, the 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
raised for the first time on appeal, we resolve 
the issue as a matter of law." State v. 
Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah Ct.App.1994) 
(footnote omitted). 
[7] To bring a successful ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim, "a defendant must 
show that trial counsel's performance was 
deficient in that it 'fell below an objective 
STATE: I am just trying to establish if he ever 
talked with him or what he did as part of his 
investigation. 
COURT: I would overrule the objection at this 
point. 
Q. Did you have a conversation with Mr. 
Baker? 
A. I asked him if he would speak to me and 
he declined to speak to me. 
Q. Now, Detective Cazier, did you screen this 
case with the County Attorney's Office? 
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standard of reasonableness,' and that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the out-
come of the trial." State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 
578, 579 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (quoting Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 6QS, 688, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). In 
determining whether counsel's performance 
was deficient, "we must 'indulge in the strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable profes-
sional assistance; that is, the defendant must 
overcome the presumption that under the 
circumstances, the challenged action "might 
be considered sound trial strategy." ' " Id. 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 
S.Ct. at 2065 (citation omitted)); accord State 
v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah CtApp. 
1993). To establish prejudice under Strick-
land, the defendant must show that, "but for 
the deficient representation, there is a 'rea-
sonable probability' that the result would 
have been different." State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 
712, 719 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (citation omit-
ted), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998). 
Prejudice will not be presumed, see Parsons 
v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 522-23 (Utah 1994), 
and if the defendant fails to establish preju-
dice, "we need not determine whether coun-
sel's performance was [in fact] deficient," 
State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 
1986). 
1. Admitting sexual assault occurred 
[8] Defendant argues that trial counsel 
was deficient in conceding during opening 
argument that H.H. had been sexually 
abused. We disagree. 
Although defense counsel must vigorously 
represent his or her client, "counsel [is] not 
required to develop every conceivable de-
fense that [is] available." State v. Miller, 194 
W.Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114, 127 (1995). This 
would seem especially so where evidence on 
the issue weighs heavily in favor of the State 
and a decision to dispute the issue could 
negatively affect counsel's credibility with the 
fact-finder when asserting other, more viable 
defenses. 
In this case, the State had substantial evi-
dence that H.H. had in fact been sexually 
abused. In light of that evidence, it was not 
BAKER Utah 807 
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unreasonable for defense counsel to concede 
that issue. Indeed, in doing so, defense 
counsel could then align himself with any 
outrage felt by the jury toward the perpetra-
tor and still credibly argue that his client was 
not that person. We thus conclude that de-
fense counsel's decision to concede H.H.'s 
sexual abuse was not deficient, but rather, in 
light of the circumstances of this case, could 
be considered sound trial strategy. 
2. Failing to move to exclude evidence 
of similar sex acts 
[9] Defendant also argues that trial coun-
sel was deficient in failing to move to exclude 
C.P.'s testimony concerning how defendant 
used to bind her before engaging in sexual 
activity. Here, too, we disagree. 
" 'The failure of counsel to make motions 
or objections which would be futile if raised 
does not constitute ineffective assistance.'" 
Parsons, 871 P.2d at 525 (quoting Codianna 
v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983)). 
Thus, "[t]o establish a claim of ineffective-
ness based on an oversight or misreading of 
law, a defendant bears the burden of demon-
strating why, on the basis of the law in effect 
at the time of trial, his or her trial counsel's 
performance was deficient." State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2cl 1201, 1228 (Utah 1993). Defendant 
has not met his burden in this case. 
At the time of defendant's trial, Rule 
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence exclud-
ed evidence of prior bad acts if the purpose 
was to establish a propensity to commit the 
crime charged. See Utah R. Evid. 404(b) 
(1991). However, such evidence was admissi-
ble to establish some other material element 
of the crime, such as identity. See State v. 
Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah 1989) 
(holding "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, 
or acts may be admitted if it has 'a special 
relevance to a controverted issue and is in-
troduced for a purpose other than to show 
the defendant's predisposition to criminali-
ty.' " (citation omitted)). Thus, for example, 
"identity . . . could be shown by the fact that 
the same pattern was followed in the com-
mission of the two offenses." Featherson, 
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781 P.2d at 430.s 
[10] In this case, the disputed issue at 
trial was the identity of H.H.'s abuser. De-
fendant's prior sexual conduct with his wife 
was strikingly similar to the conduct to which 
H.H. testified she was subjected; this evi-
dence was highly probative on the identity 
issue and, thus, admissible under Rule 
404(b). Trial counsel's failure to pursue his 
initial objection to this evidence, therefore, 
was not deficient. 
3. Miscellaneous claims of 
ineffective assistance 
Defendant also claims his trial counsel was 
deficient in failing to adequately participate 
in jury voir dire, in failing to investigate and 
present additional medical evidence on chla-
mydia, in conducting several off the record 
discussions with the court, and in placing 
potentially damaging transcripts into the rec-
ord.9 However, for none of these claims does 
defendant demonstrate prejudice. 
[11] Defendant argues, for example, that 
trial counsel should have conducted addition-
al voir dire on two jurors who he claims, 
because of their occupations, evidenced a 
possible bias. However, the trial court ques-
tioned the jury pool concerning any biases 
they had toward law enforcement officers, 
about any personal experiences with sex-re-
lated crimes, and about their ability to decide 
the case on the evidence. Neither of the two 
jurors now challenged indicated any inability 
to approach the case impartially. See State 
v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1251 (Utah 1988) 
(holding no prejudice when some jurors had 
expressed opinion before trial that defendant 
was guilty, noting that "after the trial judge 
had questioned them carefully, each unequiv-
8. Defendant's reliance on State v. Doporto, 935 
P.2d 484 (Utah 1997), is misplaced because that 
case, which placed new constraints on the ad-
mission of evidence under Rule 404(b), was de-
cided after defendant's trial. Furthermore, the 
holding in Doporto has been superseded by a 
1998 amendment to Rule 404(b). See Utah R. 
Evid. 404(b) (1998); Committee Notes to Utah R. 
Evid. 404(b) (1998). 
9. Defendant's ineffectiveness claims based on 
counsel's delay in invoking the exclusionary rule, 
his failure to object to cumulative hearsay, his 
failure to move for dismissal, and his failure to 
ocally stated that he or she would set aside 
preconceived notions . . . and decide the case 
on the evidence presented at trial."), habeas 
granted on other grounds, 949 F.2d 1546 
(10th Cir.1991). Although defendant sug-
gests numerous questions which counsel 
could have asked the jurors, he "has not 
demonstrated that further mquiry into each 
juror[ ] . . . would have altered the outcome 
of his [trial]." Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 
516, 526 (Utah 1994). Thus, defendant's 
claim fails. 
[12] Defendant also claims trial counsel 
was deficient for failing to investigate and 
present additional medical evidence on chla-
mydia. This evidence, defendant argues, 
would have aided in his defense because de-
fendant tested negative for chlamydia prior 
to trial. To demonstrate prejudice from 
counsel's failure to investigate, a defendant 
"must demonstrate a reasonable probability 
that further investigation would have yielded 
sufficient information to alter the outcome" 
of his trial. Id. at 523-24. In this case, 
numerous witnesses testified concerning how 
a child could contract chlamydia, whether a 
suspect's negative test for chlamydia ex-
cludes him as one who could have passed the 
disease, and the extent to which treatment is 
required to overcome the disease. Defen-
dant has failed to demonstrate how further 
investigation would have produced evidence 
other than that already presented at trial. 
Thus, defendant has failed to demonstrate 
how additional investigation would have pro-
vided him with "sufficient information to al-
ter the outcome" of his trial. Id. 
[13] Defendant also claims trial counsel 
was ineffective because he failed to make an 
adequate record of the objections and mo-
provide mitigating evidence at sentencing are 
without merit; thus, we do not address them 
further. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 
(Utah 1989). Defendant's claims based on coun-
sel's failure to object to Hansen's expert testimo-
ny and his failure to object during closing argu-
ment have already been considered under the 
plain error doctrine above. See State v. Ellifritz, 
835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (stating 
common standard of review is applicable when 
defendant raises both plain error and ineffective 
assistance arguments). 
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tions which he made off the record. Howev-
er, although defendant appears to suggest 
that his right to appeal has thus been preju-
diced, see State v. Rawlings, 829 P.2d 150, 
152-53 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (upholding trial 
court's order because "[i]n the absence of an 
adequate record on appeal, we cannot ad-
dress the issues raised and presume the cor-
rectness of the disposition made by the trial 
court."), defendant cites to no part of the 
record which suggests that the record gaps 
contain possible reversible errors, see State 
v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 232 (Utah 1992) 
(stating "showing of prejudice [is required] to 
overturn a conviction on the basis of tran-
scription errors"), nor has he contended he 
was prejudiced by a ruling on the issue dis-
cussed off the record, see id. at 236. Having 
failed to establish prejudice from an inade-
quate record, defendant's argument fails. 
Defendant lastly claims trial counsel was 
deficient in placing documents into the rec-
ord that contained damaging hearsay from 
interviews with H.H. and her mother. How-
ever, many witnesses, including both H.H. 
and her mother, testified at trial as to what 
H.H. had told others concerning the sexual 
abuse. Defendant fails on appeal to high-
light anything in the documents which is 
other than cumulative of that testimony. 
Once again, he has failed to establish preju-
dice. 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude defen-
dant has failed to demonstrate that he was 
denied effective assistance of counsel at trial. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
[14] Next, defendant claims there was 
insufficient evidence to support his convic-
tions. In a jury trial, "the jury serves as the 
exclusive judge of both the credibility of wit-
nesses and the weight to be given particular 
evidence." State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 
984 (Utah 1993). This court reverses a jury 
verdict only if, after viewing all the evidence 
and inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to that verdict, it finds the evidence 
'"sufficiently inconclusive or inherently im-
probable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the de-
fendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted.' " State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 
BAKER Utah 809 
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(Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443, 444 (Utah 1983)). 
In this case, H.H. never varied in her 
description of the perpetrator—a man with 
curly hair and fuzz on his face—or in her 
identification of that man as her stepfather, 
Mark. H.H. was also consistent in her testi-
mony concerning the circumstances under 
which the abuse occurred—the house H.H. 
lived in at the time, the location of H.H.'s 
mother and brothers during the abuse, and 
the method in which the perpetrator bound 
her. On many of these facts, H.H.'s testimo-
ny was corroborated by the testimony of her 
mother, her half-brothers, defendant himself, 
and Detective Cazier. Indeed, H.H.'s moth-
er testified that defendant used to bind her 
in the same manner to which H.H. testified. 
Despite this evidence, defendant argues 
that his convictions must be reversed be-
cause H.H.'s testimony was sometimes incon-
sistent and confused, and because H.H. had 
failed to pick defendant out of a lineup that 
occurred just prior to trial. Although we 
agree that H.H.'s testimony on peripheral 
issues was not always consistent, none of that 
testimony undermines the sufficiency of the 
evidence against defendant. See State v. 
Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1039 (Utah 1987) (re-
jecting insufficiency argument, noting "[ail-
though the victim had different recollections 
of certain details of the assault, that fact is 
insufficient to reverse the conviction."); State 
v. Garcia, 744 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Utah Ct.App. 
1987) (upholding conviction even though vic-
tim had recited several different versions of 
incident). 
Similarly, the fact that H.H. could not pick 
defendant out of a lineup is not determina-
tive. The abuse occurred in 1987, when H.H. 
was approximately five years old. The line-
up took place in 1991. Between 1987 and 
1991, H.H. had no contact with defendant. 
Defendant looked different in 1991 than he 
did in 1987. The fact that H.H., at age nine 
or ten, could not pick out a man that she had 
known four years prior and who looked dif-
ferent at the time she knew him is insuffi-
cient to upset defendant's convictions. 
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We thus conclude there was sufficient evi-
dence presented at trial to support defen-
dant's convictions. 
Sentencing 
Finally, defendant argues that the trial 
court abused its discretion in finding suffi-
cient aggravating circumstances under sec-
tion 76-3-201 of the Utah Code10 to support 
minimum mandatory sentences of fifteen 
years on each of defendant's counts. This 
court " 'does not disturb a sentence unless it 
exceeds that prescribed by law or unless the 
trial court has abused its discretion.' " State 
u Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990) 
(quoting State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 
(Utah 1986)). "An abuse of discretion may 
be manifest if the actions of the judge in 
sentencing were 'inherently unfair' or if the 
judge imposed a 'clearly excessive' sentence." 
Id. at 192-93 (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 
P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). 
[15] On appeal, defendant challenges 
only two of the four aggravating circum-
stances upon which the trial court based its 
sentencing determination. Specifically, de-
fendant challenges the trial court's findings 
of "substantial bodily harm" and of a "non-
familial relationship of trust." However, be-
cause defendant does not challenge the trial 
court's findings that the crime perpetrated 
"was a very cruel type of crime" and that 
the victim was "unusually vulnerable," we 
need not determine whether the trial court 
erred in considering the two disputed bases. 
See State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1301 
(Utah 1993) (affirming maximum minimum 
10. Section 76-3-201 sets forth the procedures 
which govern imposition of a minimum manda-
tory sentence. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 
(Supp.1991); State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 
1137 (Utah 1989). At the time of defendant's 
sentencing, that statute provided, in relevant 
part: 
(5) (a) If a statute under which the defendant 
was convicted mandates that one of three stat-
ed minimum terms shall be imposed, the court 
shall order imposition of the term of middle 
severity unless there are circumstances in ag-
gravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(e) The court in determining a just sentence 
shall consider sentencing guidelines regarding 
mandatory sentence where three of four ag-
gravating factors referenced by trial court 
supported that sentence and citing State v. 
Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988), 
"where we concluded that either one of two 
aggravating circumstances found by the trial 
court was sufficient to support the sentences 
imposed."); Russell, 791 P.2d at 192 (holding 
"[a]ny error in [trial court's] citing the sever-
ity of the offenses as an aggravating factor 
was . . . harmless" where there were "addi-
tional aggravating factors."). Because either 
of the trial court's unchalleged bases is suffi-
cient to support defendant's sentences, we 
affirm the trial court's determination.11 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the trial court did not 
commit plain error in allowing expert testi-
mony as to H.H.'s truthfulness concerning 
the fact that she had been sexually abused 
where defendant conceded in oral argument 
that such abuse had occurred. We also con-
clude that the trial court did not commit 
plain error in allowing the State to empha-
size H.H.'s honesty during closing argument 
where the State's argument focused primari-
ly on the evidence presented at trial and that 
evidence was substantial in identifying defen-
dant as the perpetrator. We further con-
clude that the State did not improperly elicit 
testimony concerning defendant's post-arrest 
silence where the comment was isolated and 
the State did not use the comment to under-
mine defendant's right to silence.12 In addi-
tion, we conclude that defendant was not 
denied effective assistance at trial and that 
aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the 
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp.1991). 
11. Defendant also claims his sentences are dis-
proportionately harsh. We do not address this 
claim because we find it to be without merit. 
See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 
1989). 
12. Because no substantial errors were commit-
ted in this case, we do not reach defendant's 
claim under the cumulative error doctrine. See 
State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 502 (Utah 1986). 
% 
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there was sufficient identification evidence to ~ 
support defendant's convictions. Finally, we 
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in sentencing defendant to a mini-
mum mandatory term of fifteen years for 
each conviction. We thus affirm both defen-
dant's convictions and his sentences. 
Utah 811 
WILKINS, Associate P.J., concurs. 
BENCH, J., concurs in result. 
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to deteriorate"; however, both fail to clarify 
defendants' statutory duty as the owner of 
the easement to maintain the ditch. 73—1— 
8, U.C.A. (1953) provides: 
Duties of owners of ditches—Safe con-
dition—Bridges. —The owner of any 
ditch, canal, flume or other watercourse 
shall maintain the same in repair so as to 
prevent waste of water or damage to the 
property of others, and is required, by 
bridge or otherwise, to keep such ditch, 
canal, flume or other watercourse in good 
repair where the same crosses any public 
road or highway so as to prevent obstruc-
tion to travel or damage or overflow on 
such public road or highway, except 
where the public maintains or may here-
after elect to maintain devices for that 
purpose. 
As owner, defendant had a clear duty to 
maintain the ditch both before and after it 
was relocated by plaintiff. Although plain-
tiff had no right to unilaterally increase 
defendant's burden of maintenance, and de-
fendant cannot be said to have acquiesced 
to that extent, the statutory duty of main-
tenance did not shift to plaintiff. It re-
mains with defendant, according to the 
clear legislative intent. 
The trial court decreed in its judgment 
that defendant "is not obligated to restore 
the chain link fence . . ." and that 
"defendant shall be responsible to maintain 
the ditch in the same manner and fashion 
as it was called upon to do when the ditch 
was in its original location . ." This 
language directly contradicts the statutory 
mandate requiring the owner to maintain 
the ditch in such repair as to avoid waste 
and damage to property. 
The judgment of the trial court should be 
modified to require defendant to perform 
all necessary maintenance in accordance 
with the statute. Defendant should then be 
allowed to recover from plaintiff the costs 
associated with defendants' increased bur-
den of maintenance. 
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The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
David GERRARD, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 15580. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 14, 1978. 
Defendant entered guilty plea on 
charge of rape. When he appeared for 
sentencing in the Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, J., the court 
stated intention to defer sentencing until 
after 90-day evaluation period. The de-
fendant then attempted to escape from the 
courtroom but was apprehended. The court 
thereafter rescinded its previous recommen-
dation for evaluation and proceeded to sen-
tence defendant to a term of one to 15 
years, and the defendant appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Ellett, C. J., held that: (1) 
it is sentence itself which constitutes final 
judgment from which appellant has right to 
appeal; thus, prior statements made from 
bench are not judgment of case and are not 
appealable, and (2) sentence imposed on de-
fendant convicted of rape was proper statu-
tory penalty for offense and sentence would 
not be reversed and modified since it was 
not clearly excessive or abuse of trial 
court's discretion. 
Affirmed. 
Maughan, J., filed dissenting opinion. 
1. Criminal Law ®=>986 
In felony cases, sentencing procedures, 
including use of an evaluation, are discre-
tionary with trial court. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-
404. 
2. Criminal Law <©=> 1023(9) 
It is sentence itself which constitutes 
final judgment from which defendant has 
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right to appeal; thus, prior statements 
made from bench are not judgment of case 
and are not appealable. 
3. Criminal Law <e=>1147 
Before court will overturn sentence 
given by trial court, it must be clear that 
actions of judge were so inherently unfair 
as to constitute abuse of discretion. 
4. Rape <§=>64 
One to fifteen-year sentence imposed 
on defendant convicted of rape was proper 
statutory penalty for offense and sentence 
would not be reversed and modified since it 
was not clearly excessive or abuse of trial 
court's discretion, notwithstanding that, 
prior to defendant's attempted escape from 
courtroom, trial judge had stated his inten-
tion to defer sentencing until after evalua-
tion period, but rescinded recommendation 
for evaluation after the escape attempt. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-3-203, 76-3-404, 76-5-402. 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Ass'n, Brad P. 
Rich, Salt Lake City, for defendant and 
appellant. 
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Earl F. 
Dorius, Asst. Atty. Gen., R. Paul VanDam, 
Salt Lake County Atty., Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
ELLETT, Chief Justice: 
The appellant was charged with the 
crime of rape pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, 
76-5-402. He entered a plea of guilty and 
when he appeared for sentencing, the trial 
court stated that it would refer the matter 
to the Board of Corrections for a ninety-day 
evaluation. The appellant then attempted 
to escape from the courtroom. When he 
was apprehended, the court recalled both 
appellant and his counsel on that same day 
and rescinded its previous recommendation 
for the ninety-day evaluation. The court 
then proceeded to sentence appellant to the 
Utah State Prison for a term of one to 
fifteen years. 
Appellant now appeals seeking a reversal 
of the sentence and a remand for the pur-
pose of referral to the Board of Corrections 
as originally recommended. The appellant 
does not challenge the term of sentence as 
such but objects to the sentencing proce-
dure itself, claiming that the trial court 
abused its discretion by rescinding its previ-
ous recommendation for a sentence evalua-
tion. 
[1] The sentencing procedures, includ-
ing the use of an evaluation, are clearly 
discretionary with the trial court. U.C.A., 
1953, 76-3-404, provides in pertinent part 
the following: 
(1) In felony cases where the court is 
of the opinion that imprisonment may be 
appropriate but desires more detailed in-
formation as a basis . the court 
may, in its discretion, commit a convicted 
defendant to the custody of the division 
of corrections for a period not exceeding 
ninety days . . [Emphasis added.] 
[2] Not only does the court have discre-
tion in deciding whether or not to order a 
sentence evaluation, but it is important to 
note that the recommendation of the court 
was never committed to a formal order. It 
is the sentence itself which constitutes a 
final judgment from which appellant has 
the right to appeal. Thus, prior statements 
made from the bench are not the judgment 
of the case and, therefore, are not appeala-
ble. 
In People v. Boyce1 the court held that 
where prior to pronouncement of judgment, 
an order of probation was revoked, that 
such an order, being made before judgment 
was rendered, was not appealable. This is 
analogous to the case at hand. Here, the 
court stated its inclination to defer the 
judgment until after an evaluation report 
could be submitted; however, he changed 
his mind and proceeded to enter the judg-
ment and to pronounce sentence. Only the 
judgment itself is subject to appeal and all 
incidents, impressions, or statements made 
by the court prior to that judgment are 
precluded. 
While we have 
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While we have not found a Utah criminal 
case dealing with this specific issue, the law 
is well settled in the state that the state-
ments made by a trial judge are not the 
judgment of the case and it is only the 
signed judgment that prevails. The case of 
Utah 887 
McCollum v. Clothier2 is illustrative. 
There, the judge, at the close of the evi-
dence, stated that it was his opinion that 
the plaintiff had failed to make a case. 
When proposed findings, conclusions, and 
judgment were presented to the court, the 
judge stated that he had concluded that he 
was in error and that plaintiff should recov-
er. The defendant appealed the ruling, and 
at page 320 of the Utah Report, at page 472 
of the Pacific Report this Court said: 
The fact that the trial court changed 
his mind and entered a judgment con-
trary to his orally announced decision at 
the time the case was submitted, cannot 
be the basis for over-turning the judg-
ment. The only judgment that can be 
given effect is the one entered in accord-
ance with law. 
Oral statements of opinion by the trial 
court inconsistent with the findings and 
conclusions ultimately rendered do not 
affect the final judgment. [Citations 
omitted.] 
Whether or not the judge elects to order 
an evaluation before passing sentence is 
clearly within his discretion, based on his 
own judgment of the case before him. In 
Hicklin v. State3 the defendant entered a 
plea of nolo contendere. He appealed, 
claiming in part that the trial court's sen-
tence was based on an unreasonable inter-
pretation of circumstances that existed at 
the prior hearings. The Supreme Court 
there dealt with the effect of sentencing 
procedures on the subsequent judgment by 
stating: 
2. 121 Utah 311, 241 P.2d 468 (1952); see also, 
Newton v. State Road Comm., 23 Utah 2d 350, 
353, 463 P.2d 565 (1970). 
3. 535 P.2d 743 (Wyo.1975). 
a judgment in a criminal case 
will not be disturbed because of sentenc-
ing procedures unless there is a showing 
of an abuse of discretion, procedural con-
duct prejudicial to defendant, circum-
stances which manifest inherent unfair-
ness and injustice, or conduct which of-
fends the public sense of fair play. . . 4 
[3] Before this Court will overturn the 
sentence given by the trial court, it must be 
clear that the actions of the judge were so 
inherently unfair as to constitute abuse of 
discretion. To do otherwise would have a 
chilling effect on the trial court which has 
the main responsibility for sentencing and 
which attempts to arrive at a proper sen-
tence based on the facts and law before it.5 
In State v. Harris* the court there said 
that the exercise of discretion in sentencing 
necessarily reflects the personal judgment 
of the court and the appellate court can 
properly find abuse only if it can be said 
that no reasonable man would take the 
view adopted by the trial court. We cannot 
say that such is the situation here. In the 
instant matter the court granted a sentence 
evaluation based on the appellant's plea 
that he, in good faith, wanted to be rehabi-
litated in order to have an opportunity to 
support the family with whom he was liv-
ing. A reasonable man could well have 
believed that appellant's attempt to escape 
negated his previous statements and that a 
further evaluation would be futile. 
[4] Whether or not the trial judge 
changed his mind due to the conduct of the 
defendant or to other reasons is not our 
concern. The sentence imposed in the in-
stant matter was the proper statutory pen-
alty for the offense of rape in the second 
degree,7 and this Court will not reverse or 
modify a sentence prescribed by law unless 
it is clearly excessive or unless the trial 
5. Keller v. State, 543 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1975). 
6. 10 Wash.App. 509, 518 P.2d 237 (1974). 
7. U.C.A., 1953, 76-3-203. 
4. Id. at 751. 
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.?rr 
court abused its discretion.8 We find noth-
ing in the circumstances here to warrant 
either exception, nor do we find that appel-
lant suffered undue prejudice because of 
the sentence imposed. 
The ninety-day evaluation in issue before 
us was not a judgment of the court; it was 
within the complete discretion of the judge 
to grant the evaluation and before being 
reduced to judgment, was rescinded. That 
decision was also within the proper discre-
tion of the trial court. 
Judgment affirmed. No costs are award-
ed. 
CROCKETT, WILKINS and HALL, JJ., 
concur. 
MAUGHAN, Justice (dissenting): 
For the following reasons, I dissent. 
Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the 
crime of rape before the district court 
judge, who directed defendant to the board 
of corrections for a ninety-day evaluation. 
Shortly thereafter, defendant attempted to 
escape from the courtroom. The judge re-
called the defendant to appear before him 
the afternoon of the same day, rescinded his 
order for the ninety-day evaluation, and 
sentenced defendant to prison for a term of 
one to fifteen years. On appeal, defendant 
urges the judge below abused his discretion 
in rescinding the evaluation order. We 
should reverse and remand. All statutory 
references are to Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. 
In referring defendant originally to the 
division of corrections for the ninety day 
evaluation, the judge acted pursuant to sec-
tion 76-3-404, which in relevant part pro-
vides: 
(1) In felony cases where the court is 
of the opinion that imprisonment may be 
appropriate but desires more detailed in-
formation as a basis for determining the 
sentence to be imposed than has been 
provided by the pre-sentence report, the 
court may, in its discretion, commit a 
convicted defendant to the custody of the 
8. See: State v. Pickard, 105 Ariz. 219, 462 P.2d 
87 (1969); People v. Strong, 544 P.2d 966 
division of corrections for a period not 
exceeding ninety days. The division of 
corrections shall conduct a complete 
study of the defendant during that time, 
inquiring into such matters as the de-
fendant's previous delinquency or crimi-
nal experience, his social background, his 
capabilities, his mental, emotional and 
physical health, and the rehabilitative re-
sources or programs which may be availa-
ble to suit his needs. By the expiration 
of the period of commitment, or by the 
expiration of the additional time as the 
court shall grant, not exceeding a further 
period of ninety days, the defendant shall 
be returned to the court for sentencing, 
and the court, prosecutor, and the defend-
ant or his attorney shall be provided with 
a written report of results of the study, 
including whatever recommendations the 
division of corrections believes will be 
helpful to a proper resolution of the case. 
After receiving the report and recom-
mendations, the court shall proceed to 
sentence a defendant in accordance with 
the sentencing alternatives provided un-
der section 76-3-201. [Emphasis added.] 
The purpose of this section is to provide 
the judge with more intimate information, 
concerning the particular defendant before 
him. Thus to enable him to appropriately 
exercise his discretion in sentencing. 
Defendant concedes the judge has discre-
tion under the statute to refuse to order the 
ninety-day evaluation, but contends the 
judge abused his discretion by rescinding 
this order. Defendant states his actions in 
the courtroom subsequent to the order for a 
ninety-day evaluation should not be a basis 
for depriving him of an evaluation as to the 
appropriateness of imprisonment for the of-
fense to which he pled guilty. He claims 
the judge's actions were based on personal 
emotion and contempt for defendant. 
When the judge rescinded the order of 
evaluation, he informed defendant that he 
committed the two additional crimes of at-
tempted escape and contempt of court, and 
(Colo.1976); State v. Hawk, 97 Idaho 1, 539 
P.2d 553 (1975). 
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that he would instruct the county attorney 
to file a complaint for attempted escape. 
Defendant was not given an opportunity to 
explain his actions, and was sentenced to 
the Utah State Prison. 
In Spann v. People,1 the Colorado Su-
preme Court stated: 
Judicial discretion is not personal discre-
tion. All judicial power is held in trust 
for the people, having been delegated by 
them through the constitution. . 
Judicial discretion cannot be distorted to 
camouflage or insulate from appellate re-
view a decision based on the judge's per-
sonal caprice, hostility or prejudice. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held: 
The granting or withholding of proba-
tion rests entirely within the discretion of 
the trial court. [Citation.] If the exer-
cise of that discretion is based upon rea-
son rather than emotion, it will not be 
disturbed by this Court.2 
In this case, the judge ordered a ninety-
day evaluation; the purpose was to assist 
him in determining a proper sentence for 
the crime to which defendant pled guilty. 
Although the judge was not required to 
order the evaluation in the first place, he 
was not free arbitrarily to revoke the order 
without good reasons for so doing. Defend-
ant's attempt to escape did not negate the 
reasons for the original order of evaluation, 
and no valid reason appears in the record 
justifying the revocation of the order. By 
informing defendant the county attorney 
would file a complaint for attempted es-
cape, the judge reasonably reacted to de-
fendant's acts; however, the revocation of 
the evaluation order was unwarranted, and 
was an abuse of his discretion. 
The case should be remanded with in-
structions to enter an order referring de-
fendant to the board of corrections for a 
ninety-day evaluation. 
I. 561 P.2d 1268, 1269 (Colo. 1977). 
Craig BLAMIRES, Plaintiff, 
v. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF the DEPART-
MENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
OF the INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of 
Utah, Defendant. 
No. 15676. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 14, 1978. 
Physical examiner brought action for 
review of decision of Board of Review of 
State Industrial Commission that examiner 
was not in employment of medical examina-
tion company so as to qualify for benefits 
under State Employment Security Act. 
The Supreme Court held that: (1) evidence 
was not sufficient to support finding that 
physical examiner was customarily engaged 
in independently established trade, occupa-
tion, profession, or business for purposes of 
statute creating exemption from employ-
ment subject to Employment Security Act, 
and (2) physical examiner performing ser-
vice for medical examination company of 
kind company held itself out as able to 
perform, for remuneration measured by 
service performed and paid by company at 
rate fixed by company was in company's 
employment for purposes of Act. 
Remanded. 
1. Social Security and Public Welfare 
®=>293 
Where physical examiner rendered per-
sonal services to medical examination com-
pany and was entitled to remuneration 
based on and measured by such personal 
services, physical examiner performed such 
services under a "contract for hire" for 
purposes of statute defining employment 
2. State v. Cornwall, 95 Idaho 680, 518 P.2d 863, 
867 (1974). 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
SHAMPTON, MATTHEW JARED 
f 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant; Investigatbr comments. 
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT: 
Victim Sarah Ellsworth and her mother, Aieda Ellsworth, were contacted and also submitted 
i 
written information, which is attached. 
AUda Ellsworth stated she was shocked when die present offense was disclosed by her 
daughter, "we knew him for many years, we never guessed he was capable of this. Sarah said 
she didn't tell us because she thought she was in love with him. He spent a lot of time with our 
family, and Sarah spent time with his. I always thought there was supervision the whole time. 
Frankly, as a mother, 1 suffer for his family, my hea.it goes out to him and his family. To his 
credit, he pled guilty and didn't make her testify. That's shown to me he's trying to make this 
right. I really feel he wants to make this right. My goal would be that he not be abusive again. 
He was emotionally and physically abusive with Sarah, as well as sexually. Whenever she tried 
to break it off he threatened her. In addition to that, things he talked to her about convinced her 
he's very sick, very perverted- If there's any way I could be guaranteed he could be prevented 
from abusing anyone else [without jail or prison. „but Sarah is afraid his 19 year old wife is going 
though that now, or will, 'Treatment is the oniy way.. J just don't know, I have to trust in God to 
direct the Judge.'" ! 
Sarah Ellsworth stated, ''All the main points are in my letter. Pm very afraid he will retaliate if 
he only does a little time, and I'm afraid he will abuse others, if he isn't already. He's very sick, 
very perverted. He picks people who are vulnerable. He pretends to be this knight in shining 
armor. 1 was vulnerable, my brother committed suicide and I was pouring my heart out on this 
Utah only computer chat program, to anyone who would listen. He responded, and seemed to be 
the only one who understood, [ was looking for a big brother type, .and at first that's what I 
thought he was, I realized pretty quickly he was very- controlling, but 1 was only 12,1 didn't 
know how to do anything about it. He bought me a pager so he could reach me any time. He 
called the shots, what we did, when and where and Vd better like it. If I really resisted, he'd use 
his hand inside me to cause me pain. It was never mutual. The emotional control was heart 
wrenching too. If I didn't'do exactly what he wanted, he'd threaten to leave me. Through the 
entire relationship he threatened to kill himself. Then when I finally got up the guts to say, 'fine, 
do it, I'm leaving/ heM sky, 'well I won't go alone.' Then he started threatening to kill me." 
i 
i 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
SHAMPTON, MATTHEW JARED 
VICTIM IMPACT SlAlEMFm:: (Continued) 
"...I want him to change his life and be a normal person. I don't know if that's possible. I feel 
bad saying 'life sentence/ but all I can hope for is the maximum for what he's done," 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION' 
Victim Sarah Ellsworth; Aleda Ellsworth. 
RESTITUTION: 
The Office of Crime Victim Reparations was contacted and verified, although claim no. 118975 
has been approved, and is being administered by Reparations Officer Joanne Hubcr, no 
disbursements have been made, to date, Aleda Ellsworth was given this information, and stated 
she would forward the bills for out of pocket expenses to CVR, As of the date of dictation, 
information concerning her insurance company, and copies of expenses incurred, had not been 
received. Aleda stated she, her husband and the victim all attended counseling for a period of 
time, but have not gone recently, A total of $ 1,003.50 is owing, to date, to the Ellsworth's 
insurance company, and it appears $226.50 accounts for out of pocket expenses. These figures 
may increase over time, if Sarah requires further counseling, 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The Office of Crime Victim Reparations; Aieda Ellsworth. 
CUSTODY STATUS: 
The defendant was booked into the Salt Lake County Jail on May 4, 2000 and released on May 6, 
2000, after two days in custody. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION 
Records of the Adult Detention Center, 
LAW ENFORCEMENT STATEMENT: 
Detective Jeff DuVal, of the Sandy City Police Department, was contacted and stated he had no 
strong feelings regarding this case, and no recommendations for sentencing. 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
SHAMPTON, MATTHEW JARED 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Detective Jeff DuVal. 
JUVENILE RECORD: 
No juvenile record was located for the defendant, who denied any criminal involvement as a 
juvenile. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant, records ot'the Juvenile Courts. 
ADULT RECORD: 
PATE AGMCY OFFENSE DISPOSITION 
05/04/2000 Sandy City < [ Aggravated Sex Abuse Present offense 
Police Dcpt. ofa Child, First Degree 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Utah Bureau of Criminal Identification (SID # 823502); Federal Bureau of Criminal 
Identification (F.B.I. 4 426954 NB9). 
DRIVING HISTORY 
The defendant possesses valid Utah State driver's license no. 152462893. No arrests were noted. 
The defendant received a speeding citation on October 9. 1999, with a conviction date of April 
18,2000. 
SOURCE OE INFORMATION-
Defendant's Utah State driver's license record. 
FJEND1NG CASES: 
There are no known cases pending against the defendant, other than the present offenses. 
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SHAMPTON. MATTHEW JARED 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Records of the Third District Courts, 
PROBATTpy/PABflLg HISTORY: 
The defendant has no history of probation or parole supervision as a juvenile or adult. 
i 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Records of the Utah State! Department of Corrections. 
BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION: 
The defendant was bom in Murray, Utah, the third of five children born to Michael and Marianne 
Shampton, When the defendant was approximately six years old, the family relocated to Vernal, 
Utah, where they remained until he was 12 or 13 years of age. He was raised in an intact family, 
and the only problems he recalled encountering were being "accident prone," and his mother's 
diagnosis with multiple sclerosis in 1994. In describing his childhood in general, the defendant 
stated, "I guess I was avwjage. I was happy, well taken care of." The defendant stated the family 
was provided with a lower income environment when he was a child, which improved to a 
middle income as he grew up. His father was employed in telecommunications, and his mother 
did not work outside the tiome. The defendant reports he always got along very well with his 
parents and siblings. : i 
The defendant first left the family home at the age of 19, when he resided in a mission training 
center tor the L.D.S. Chuijch for one and a half months. He reports he had a "panic attack7' due 
to the constant pressure and stress, and returned home. The defendant has married, and he and 
his wife reside with the defendant's parents in the home they own. He reported, at the time of his 
interview, they were in th£ process of moving to a larger home his parents had purchased, and 
would be selling their old. house, The new address is reflected on the cover of this report, and 
was effective as of August 5, 2000, He plans to continue this arrangement for the foreseeable 
future. -| 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION 
The defendant. 
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SHAMPTON, MATTHEW JAR ED 
MARITAL HISTORY 
The defendant reports he met Angela Brie Accomando "in a Mormon chat room on the Internet," 
approximately a month after his relationship with the victim in this offense ended, August of 
1999. In December of 1999, he and Ms. Accomando began talking on the phone, and they met in 
person in January, when the defendant went to CaJiforaia, where Angela resided. He proposed to 
Angela in February of 2000, and the couple were married on March 20, 2000, in Las Vegas, 
Nevada. Ms, Accomando is approximately 19 years of age. Concerning their relationship, the 
defendant wrote, "I couldn't be happier, I feel bad for the stress this is causing her, but she is an 
incredible support. We spend a lot of time together, reading, watching movies, playing games. 
We are anxious to start afamiiy together." Concerning the present offense, he stated, "she 
forgives me, and knows it is in the past" His wife submitted a letter, which is attached. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant. 
EDUCATION: 
The defendant graduated from Alta High School in Sandy. Utah in 1993, with a 3.3 grade point 
average. Since that time,:he reports be ha3 taken general ed. courses through Salt Lake 
Community College, andi was last enrolled this past spring; however, he missed too many classes 
and had to drop out. The:defendant plans to return in the fall, and states his employer will pay 
for his classes. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant. 
GANG AFFILIATIONS: 
The defendant has never been associated with local gang activities. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant; records of the Salt Lake Area Gang Project, 
i 
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SHAMPTON, MATTHEW TARED 
PHYSICAL HEALTH: 
As previously noted, the defendant stated he was "accident prone" as a child, requiring a number 
of stitches due to accidents. In addition, he broke his arm in two or three places when he was hit 
by an automobile at the age of 15. The defendant reports no residual effects from these injuries. 
Approximately one and a half years ago, the defendant was diagnosed as having diabetes. He 
stated, "it was pretty inevitable/5 and explained there is diabetes on both sides of his family. He 
states he is not presently taking insulin, but appears able to control his condition with diet and 
exercise- He stated he has lost 30 pounds in the past year, which lias helped. The defendant 
takes the medications glucophase for diabetes, and another prescription medication for acne. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant. 
MENTAL HEALTH: 
In describing his current emotional health, the defendant wrote, "very stressed, but doing okay," 
The defendant reports receiving counseling in the past through L.D.S. Social Services, but did 
not recall the name of his counselor. He reports he attended for a few months approximately one 
year" ago, "to learn to properly deal with stress, anxiety and depression/'7 The defendant was 
prescribed Paxil and Celexa for anxiety and depression, and reports he has taken these 
medications off and on over the past five years. The longest period of time he stayed on his 
medication was approximately one month, "I never could used to the side effects; I was tired all 
the time, but jittery and unable to sleep." 
The defendant expressed a desire to receive counseling, "I could use some more help with the 
stress of this situation-" He was asked if he felt the fact he was dating a 12-year old girl when he 
was 19 years old. might indicate a need for specialized sexual offender treatment and stated, 
"probably." 
The defendant indicated he seriously considered suicide in August of 1999, primarily due to the 
fact the victim had ended her relationsliip with him. At that time, he went to a counselor and was 
placed on medication. He stated, "after a couple of months, me and the therapist both decided I 
should discontinue the medication. The counselor said we were done, it was just a matter of me 
doing the things we had talked about." The defendant denied ever having been subject to 
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SHAMPTON, MATTHEW JARED 
physical or sexual abuse. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant. 
ALCOHOL HISTORY 
The defendant denied any past use or experimentation with alcoholic beverages. No information 
to the contrary was located during the course of this investigation. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant; investigator comments. 
DRUG HISTORY: 
The defendant indicated he has never used any type of illegal controlled substance. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant. 
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY: 
The defendant's Social Security Number is 529-21-7018. 
mmmm 
Kimberly - Clark / 
Ballard Medical 
(illegible) 
Incredible 
Universe 
WAGE 
$11.00 
per hour 
$ 7.00 
per hour 
$ 6.50 
per hour 
TITLE 
customer 
service rep. 
data entry 
computer 
sales 
mjmm 
02/97 - present 
01/96-01/97 
10/95-01/96 
REASON 
FOR LEAVING 
too slow at boxing / 
shipping 
post Christmas / 
grand opening layoffs 
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EMPLOYMENT HISTORY: (Continued) 
The defendant indicates he enjoys his present position, and works 40 hours per week. He 
possesses skills in the areas of data entry, word processing, spread sheets and general office 
work, Fie does not possess any certificates or licenses to perform any particular type of work, 
and has no limitations which might affect the type of work he can do, 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant. 
FINANCIAL SITUATION: 
The defendant reports a gross monthly income of $1,280.00. His wife earns an additional 
$800,00. Expenses include $400.00 per month for food, $450.00 for a car loan, and 
approximately $360.00 in credit card and other monthly payments. His approximate total 
outstanding credit card and loan debt is approximately SI, 100.00. The defendant stated he also 
has past due bills in the form of, "bail and. lawyers fees" in the amount of $ 10,000.00. He has 
never filed for bankruptcy, and has no plans to do so in the immediate future. Fie has never had 
any property repossessed, The defendant indicates he and his wife are not required to pay rent to 
. the defendant's parents, with whom they live, "as long as I'm going to school. They couldn't 
afford to help me with school, so they don't charge me rent while I'm going." 
The only assets claimed by the defendant were a Ford Explorer with an approximate value of 
$5,000.00, and miscellaneous household items with an estimated value of $1,500.00. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION 
The defendant. 
MILITARY RECORD: 
The defendant has never served in any branch of the United States Armed Forces. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
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The defendant. 
COLLATERAL CQNTACISi 
The defendant submitted! letters on his behalf from his parents, grandmother, wife, siblings, 
employer and other friends and members of the community, all of which are attached for the 
Court's consideration. 
As of the date of dictation, attempts to contact the defendant's wife had been unsuccessful. The 
defendant indicated his fioiily would be moving on August 5, 2000, and he would contact this 
investigator with a new telephone number; however, as of the date of dictation, no further word 
has been received from the defendant. 
The defendant's father, Michael Shampton, was contacted via his cell phone. He verified the 
family had moved and the new phone had nol yet been connected. Mr. Shampton stated his letter 
included the majority of his observations concerning his son, and added, "he's a loving, caring 
person. There's no malice toward her (victim), he regrets it. He's feeling very down from 
what's going on. He's trying hard to be a good citizen, pick up where he left off," 
Mr. Shampton was asked! if he and his wife hadn't been concerned when their 19 year old son 
began spending so much time with a 12 year old girl, and stated, "We thought it would go away. 
About that same rime my [job transferred me to Denver. I commuted back and forth, which was 
distracting to us all." 
i 
The defendant's counsel, |Mi\ Joe Goodman, was contacted. Mr, Goodman indicated he would 
reserve the majority of his comments for the time of sentencing, other than to note the defendant 
has been forthright throughout the investigation of the present offense, and has never denied 
responsibility for his actions. Mr. Goodman stated it was apparent the defendant thought of the 
victim as his girlfriend and, although their relationship was not appropriate due to the age 
difference, the defendant never intended any harm,. 
i 
Prosecutor James Cope was contacted, and noted the present offense demonstrated predatory, 
controlling and manipulative behaviors, which warrant a significant punitive measure. The 
prosecutor also felt, in vieiw of the serious nature of these offenses, the terms of probation should 
run consecutively on each count and the defendant should undergo a complete psycosexual 
evaluation in conjunction jwith specialized sexual offender treatment. 
i 
i 
i 
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i 
i 
i 
EVALUATIVE SUMMARY: I 
Appearing before the Ctfurt is Matthew Jared Shamptoo, a 24-year old male, who has entered 
pleas of guilty to Sexual! Abuse of a Child, a Second Degree Felony; and Unlawful Sexual 
Activity with a Minor, aiThird Degree Felony. The present offenses represent the defendant's 
only known criminal evdnts, as an adult or juvenile. 
Seventeen year old Saraii Ellsworth disclosed to Detective DuVal of the Sandy City Police 
Department, she had been dating defendant Matthew Shampton from the time she was 12 and he 
was 19, until the summer of 1999, when Sarah terminated the relationship. During that time, the 
defendant had sexual contact with Sarah frequently, including fellatio, eunnilingus and digital 
penetration of Sarah's vajgina. Sarah indicated, if she attempted to resist or was not in the mood 
to engage in sexual activity with the defendant, he would forcefully penetrate her vagina 
digitally, causing pain. Sarah radicated the defendant was both physically and emotionally 
abusive throughout their relationship. 
Victim Sarah Ellsworth was contacted, and indicated the defendant was extremely manipulative, 
and in retrospect, she believes he chose a 12-year old, when he was age 19, because she was 
naive and easily dominated, Sarah indicated the defendant, shortly prior to her terminating their 
relationship, disclosed tojher he had engaged in activities involving animals and small children, 
which caused her to belieive the defendant has serious sexual deviancy issues. As such, Sarah is 
concerned the defendant (nay present a potential danger to others, She expressed the opinion the 
defendant will seek out those who are particularly vulnerable. She indicated she was 
corresponding on a local website, after her brother died, "crying my heart out to anyone who 
would listen/' The defendant responded. The victim stated, throughout the relationship, when 
they would disagree, the defendant would threaten to kill himself. When she finally told him, 
"fine, do it* the defendant changed his position and threatened to kill Sarah, Sarah indicated she 
felt the defendant, while Acknowledging his sexual abuse of her3 was not being completely honest 
as to the extent of his sextial deviancy, and she feared he would continue to represent a threat to 
the community. She was (further fearful of retaliation from the defendant, should he serve only a 
short term in jail or prison. Concerning sentencing, Sarah stated, "I want him to change his life 
and be a normal person, b(ut I don't know if that's possible. I feel bad saying, 1 think he should 
get a life sentence, but alljl can hope is he will get the maximum for what he's done." 
The defendant describes hieing raised in a stable, middle income environment, in which the only 
difficulties encountered were his perceived "accident proneness" and the fact his mother was 
diagnosed with multiple sblerosis in 1994, He reports he has always enjoyed favorable 
relationships with all family members. He left home briefly at the age of 19, to serve a mission 
i 
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EVALUATIVE SUMMARY: (Continued) 
for the L.DS. Church; however, found the training too stressful, and returned home after one and 
a half months. He has ndt left his parent's home since that time. The defendant graduated from 
high school and is presently taking courses through the Salt Lake Community College, which is 
being financed by his employer. He has a chronic health concern, diabetes, which he is presently 
controlling through diet a(nd exercise. The defendant reports a history of suffering from anxiety 
and depression, and has tkken the medications Paxil and Celexa off and on for the past five years. 
He has received mental health counseling through L.D.S. Social Services. The defendant 
indicates the longest period of time he was on medication was approximately one month, as he 
could not tolerate the side effects. He reports considering suicide approximately one year ago, 
when the victim discontinued her relationship with him. The defendant has no history of alcohol 
or drug abuse. He appears to have been gainfully employed since leaving high school, and has 
been in his present position for three and a half years. 
The defendant reported, within a month of terminating his relationship with the victim, he met 
Angela Accomando through an L.D.S. website. The couple married on March 20? 2000, and 
presently reside with the defendant's parents, who do not require the couple to pay rent, as long 
as the defendant is attending school. 
Following his presentence interview, the defendant was advised to contact this investigator to 
verify he had decided on $ treatment provider, and arranged an intake appointment prior to 
sentencing. He was contacted, through his father, and stated he had an intake appointment 
scheduled with Rick Bashaw, LJD.S. Social Services, for 8/10/00. He was advised to bring 
verification at the time ofjsentencing. 
The defendant is viewed as having assets in the form of strong family and community support, 
lack of a prior criminal record, participation in continued schooling, and his youth, 
! 
Of great concern to this department, is the fact the defendant, while acknowledging his behavior 
was inappropriate, does not appeal* to understand the seriousness of a 19-year old "dating" a 12-
year old child. In addition, allegations made by the victim concerning his behavior during then-
relationship, are disturbing. The defendant denies the elements of physical and emotional control 
and abuse as described by1 the victim. 
^ 
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EVALUATIVE SUMMARY: (Continued) 
As such, although the defendant appears to be an appropriate candidate for probation supervision, 
it is felt a complete psychosexual evaluation is a necessary component of his probation 
conditions, to assist in determining the extent of the defendant's sexual deviancv issues and 
amenability to treatment. 
With the above in mind, tHe following sentencing recommendation is included for the Court's 
consideration. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
UhGhnm 
KATHERINE M. STRATEN, INVESTIGATOR 
APPROVED, 
t L.R.A., 
COURT/SERVICES U&IT*' 
g:\psi\kstraten\shampton.psi\5looder8.00 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
RE: SHAMPTON, MATTHEW JARED 
AGENCY RECOMMENDATION 
Parole, Court Services Unit, respectfully recommend tlie defendant be 
6n supervision, with the 36 month probation term for each count to run 
The staff of Adult Probation anq 
favorably considered for probati 
consecutively, under the following terms and conditions: 
1. The defendant serve six months in the Salt Lake County Jail; 
5. 
The defendant enter into,!participate in, and successfully complete a specialized sexual offender 
treatment program through a provider approved by the Department of Corrections. Treatment is 
to include a complete psjjchosexual evaluation, including plethysmograph testing, to be paid for 
by the defendant; i 
The defendant have no contact of any type with the victim or her family, including personal, 
written, telephonic or thijough third persons; 
The defendant pay restitution in full for tlie costs of the victim's counseling, and those of her 
family members, as directly related to the present offense, to include reimbursement of any third 
parties paying for the treatment; 
The defendant have no cqntact with any females under the age of 18, without prior approval of 
the defendant's therapist imd probation officer. Any approved contact with females under the 
age of 18, must be supervised by an adult approved by the probation officer; 
The defendant pay a fine m the amount of $500 plus an 85% surcharge. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
CATHERINE M. STRATEN, INVESTIGATOR 
rHSRlNTC SHEPI 
COURT SERVICES 
g: \psi\kstraten\shampton.psi\slooser8.00 
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AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
(Use Form 3 also for Mandatory Imprisonment Sex Offender Sentences) 
Circle the numbers of circumstances that may justify departure from the guidelines. Reference the page number 
of the presentence investigation where thejjudge caD find supportive information. 
This list of aggravating and initialing factors in non-e^haustlve and illustrative only. 
if 
j Aggravating Circumstances . 
Only use aggravating circumstances if they are not an element of the offense* 
PSIPage# [ 
1, Established instances of repetitive criminal conduct 
2, Multiple documented incidents of violence not resulting in conviction. (Requires court approved 
stipulation) j; 
3. Offender presents a serious threat of violent behavior. 
""I _ , / / Q Victim was particularly vulnerable. 
T^ Injury to person or property loss was unusually extensive. 
6. Offense was characterize I by extreme cruelty or depravity. 
\\ gr (7*) There were multip3^5r|>es)t)r victims. 
' 8. Offender's attitude is notioondncive to supervisiori in a less restrictive setting. 
9, Offender continued crimijnaj activity subsequent to arrest, 
<5&) Sex Offenses: Corrections** formal assessment procedures classify as an high risk offender. 
U. Offender was injopsitionjof authority over victjm(s). J > 
f V d b — ( 3 ) Other (Specify)flU/vxJjl^ (Y^i^t'UA* <&&^Lfco A ttkk^i^ 
I Mitigating Circumstances 
[ 
__^  L Offender's enminal condjict. neitfier caused nor threatened serious harm. 
2. Offender acted under strotog provocation. 
3, There were substantial grbimds to excuse or justify criminal behavior, though failing to establish a 
defense. I 
\ ( J ) Offender is young. ; 
5. Offender assisted law enforcement in the resolution of other crimes. 
6. Restitution would be severely compromised by incarceration. 
L )3H Cft Offender's attitude suggests amenability to supervision. 
\cj-> <C^ Offender has exceptionally good employment and/or farjaiiy relationships, 
9 Impnsonment would entail excessive hardship on offender or dependents. 
fc^ M £ ^ Offender has extended pekod of arrest-free street time. 
II, Offender was less active participant in the crime. 
12. Ad offenses were from a Jingle criminal episode. 
13. Offender has completed o|; has nearly completed payment of restitution. 
14. Other (Specify) U- — — -
PLEASE COMPLETE THIS SECTION 
DAYS OF JAIL CREDIT Z ^ J 
GUIDELINE MATRIX RECOMl^ RNmATTON TS\$ u w / I W-Ur W\€.A L d . i -C 
AP&P RKCOMMRNDATTQNS : V w \ £ T K*A<>-
REASON FOR DRPARTlfttE ' 
iii_SCORER'S NAME: "T\ .sJtW,sUl^ OFFENDER NAME 
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FOhM 2 - SEX OFFENDER-
CRIMINAL! HISTORY ASSESSMENT 
Thaee are guidelines or»!y. They do riot creeti any right or expectation on behelf of the offender. 
PRIOR FELONV CONVICTIONS 
SEPARATE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS) 
WHOM MISOEMEANOR CONVICTIONS 
(SEPARATE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS) 
(INCLUDES OUJ & HSCKl,eS8> 
{EXCLUDES OTHER TRAFFIC) 
PRIOR JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS 
(ADJUDICATIONS FOR OPPOSES THAT 
WOULD HAVE SEEN FELONIES i? 
COMMITTED BY AN AOULJXTHREE 
MISDEMEANOR ADJUDICATIONS EQUAL 
ONE FELONY ADJUDICATION) 
SUPERVISION HlSTOHV 
(ADULT OR JUYSNILE) 
O NONE 2 ONE 4 TWO I 
5 THREE I! 
8 MOnETHANT^RES 
'WNONE !! 
1 OWE |! 
2 TWO TO FOUR;, 
3 WVBTOSSVew 
4 MORE THAN SEVEN 
( £ ) NONE ! 
l ONE ;| 
a TWO TO FOUR 1 
3 MORE THAN FdUH 
4 SECURE. PLACEMENT 
Q ^ N O PRIOR SUPERVISION 
-Q 
WEAPONS USE IN CUR«SNT OFFENSE (ONLY WHEN CURRENT CONVICT/ON 
DOES NOT REFLECT WEAPON USE QP 
WHEN STATUTORY ENHANCEMENT IS 
NOT INVOLVED'! 
NUMBER OF PRJOR VICTIMS (PRIOR SEX OFFENS£ VICTJMS, NOT 
INCLUDING PRESENT VICTIM) 
nWC RANGE 
(NUMBER OF YEARS OFFENOER HAS 
BEEN OFFENDING SEXUALLY) 
O 
2 
CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION 
ACTUAL POSSESSION 
DISPLAYED OR BRANDISHED 
ACTUAL USE 
INJURY CAUSED 
NO PRIOR VICTIMS 
ONE PRIOR VICTIM 
MORE THAN ONE PRIOR VICTIM 
ONETIME INCIDENT 
WITHIN O N E YEAR 
WITHIN TWO Y£ARS 
TWO YEARS OR OVER 
TOTAL PLACEMENT SCORE: i. 
SUPERVISION RI3K 
(ADULT OR JUVENILE] 
VKXJNCfi HISTORY 
• {PRIOR JUVENILE OR ADULT 
CONVICT'ON FOR AN OFFENSE WHICH 
INCLUDES USE OF A WEAPON 
PHYSICAL FORCE, THREAT OF FORCE, 
OR SEXUAL ABUSE) 
1 PRIOR SUPERViaiCN 
2 PRIOR RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT 
3 PRIOR REVOCATION 
4 ACT OCCURRED WHILE UNDER CURPEN7 
SUPERVISION C^ R. PRE-TRIAL RELEASE Q NO ESCAPES Qfl AB8CCND1NG5 
1 FAILURE TO REPORT ACTIVE OFFENSE) OH OUTSTANDING WARRANT 
2 ABSCONDED FROM SUPERVISION 
3 ABSCONDED FROM RESIDENTIAL PROGRAM 
•i =8CAPED FROM CONFINEMENT £X NONE | I' MISDEMEANORl! 
I 3rd DECREE FiiiONY 
3 2nd DEGREE FELONY 
4 I •! DEGREE PEHONY 
!"•„, . .... .,.••' ..""rr:—.i»'„„,'. •'," •••|j;.M*-.„,,v,.,i|iU. V " V , , f 
-Z±-
Q L 
W-gASF ftlftCLg TH6 CO3RF0T CATSaSHY,. 
D 
CRIME CATEGORY 
B 
IstOegree 
c r D 
> 
0 
H (0 
LH
I 
< 
Z 
S 
(C 
o 
III 
fo\ I / N^, , -^" 
1 
i 
Mandatory 
Prison 15 
Mandatory 
Prison 10 
tetifa 
.Mtndetcnry 
PrlsoniS 
.:-to-Ufi-'-
Mantiatory 
' 'Prftorii1 : 
itoute 
Mandatory 
Primary " 
3loLii« 
.. 6 yrs 
to Life 
3 yrs 
toLffe 
2nd 
Degree 
H 
1 te 15 
Zr4 
Degree 
i 
OtoS. 
21 YPS ! W Y f e ]> 100MQS 75MQ$ 75 MOS 7 5 M O S 75 M O S 64MQS 
10^PS' T2VRS ! 90 MOS ! 66 WGS 64 MOS 66 M Q & 62 MQ5 
16 YRS ! 11 YRS i 60MGS I 60 MOS 42 MOB; 60 M O S 4$ M O S 42 MOS 32 0IOS 
Class A 
met 
J 
OteS 
Rn y ' 
, ^ 
K*' 
CONSECUTIVE ENHANCEMENTS; 40% or the shorter sentence Is to be added to the full length of the Sanger sentence. 
CONCURRENT ENHANCEMENTS: 10% jtf the shorter sentence Is to be added to the full length of the longer sentence. 
Matrix t imeframes refer to impr isonment onfy.ffirefer to the categor izat ion of o f f e m o * . 
.^ »/ M , n i v e cowflcnewa 
MOST SERIOUS "" r ,- / ' • • ' " " * dMXM&. 
NEXT MOST SERIOUS {JaJUuk*. 
OTHER i r 
OTHER 
CRIME WTEGORY 
O^ 
OFFENDER NAME • ) K ^ U v hAq-ltebaTE SCORED:_8!\\^li 
T|ME 
TOTAL _£ j£ . ^<X ' 
SCORER'S NAMgn^. VU r^ou-t S»m>^^ 
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VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT 
Fkass fill out tips fapn. and fcETU&N IMMEDIATELY TTie Victim Impact Statement has bee* 
developed to benefit victims of crime and to bring to the court's attention the concerns of the victim regarding 
sentencing of the defendant. This is your opportunity to let the court know how this crime has affected you and 
your family The District Attorneys Office will present this fomi to the sentencing judge. 
! 
At the time set for sentencing of[ the defendant, the judge will make various decisions regarding sentencing 
alternatives, including incarceration, probation, fines, community service, restitution, etc. The Victim Impact 
Statement is only one of the factors the jsouit considers in imposing a sentence. The District Attorney's Office will 
make every effort possible to represent ypvx needs. Thank you. 
| 
Name: J 
(If other than victim) 
Relationship. 
NOTE: Please bo advised that thd information 
contained in this Victim Impact Statement, (including 
bills or receipt? containing your addressj or telephone 
number), by Court order, may be viewed by the 
defendant either at the time of sentencing, or at any 
subsequent review of sentence. Feel Ifree to delete 
your address and phone number from tike documents 
you submit. | 
i 
L Brief description of crime in which you were imsolved 
! State vs. 
IDA No.: 
1 Court No.: 
Victim: 
Sentence Date: 
Judge: 
Attorney: 
"Matthew SSampton" " ^ J 
8S18 
001907625F5 
Aleda Ellsworth 
August 25? 2000 8:30 am 
H.F, Wilkwuwn 
J,M Cope 
tfnex ooscngaon or crime m wnicn you were involved: 
2. As a result of this crime, were you phyaically injured? 
! 
3a, Did you need medical treatment for these injuries? 
I 
3b, If this case involved sexual abuse, doj you request that the defendant be tested for HIV? 
j 
4. Were you emotionally injured as a resjult of this crime? 
i 
5. Have ycu received any counseling or therapy as a result of this crime? 
6. Has this crime affected your ability tojeam a living? 
i 
7. Has this crime in any way affected your lifestyle or your family's lifestyle? 
YES 
YBS. 
YES 
NO y~-
NO X 
NO ^A 
YES)< NO 
Y E s Y NO 
YES NoV^ 
Y E s X NO 
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i 
i 
9. Amount of expenses incurred to date! as a result of medical treatment received' 
(enclose copies of all bills you hav* leccived) 
Anticipated expenses (enclose doctors statement), 
j 
10. Amount of expenses incurred to date as a result of counseling or therapy: 
(enclose copies of nil bills you have received). 
Anticipated expenses (enclose therapist's statement). 
11. Loss of wages to date: ! 
Anticipated loss of wages; J 
Does your employer pay wages when you ate in court? 
What arc your hourly wages? j 
Please enclose a letter from your employer if you have lost wages or benefits. 
IX ""Diff you suEer any monetary loss or property damage as a result of this: crime? 
If yes, please state amount | 
13. Did insurance cover any of the expenses you have had as a result of this crime? 
If yes, plaase specify the amount and jtype of insurance coverage, and attach a 
statement from your insurance company. $ % A 4«ST O 
YES/^ 
$ 
S 
_NO_ 
$¥t)oc>3,5'o 
$ 
$ 
$ 
YES 
S 
YES 
S 
YES.X 
_NC_ 
-NO-
NO 
yk-
IF YOU WISH TO EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE QUESTIONS, PLEASE DO SO 
ON A SEPARATE SHEET OF 8-U2" x jll»PAPER, 
14. How do you feel about the outcome of this case? ^l&^usM. 
jdkl^L Li 
15. Even though sentencing is determined by law (depending upon the particular crime), the court has choices 
within legal guidelines to impose sentence, Accordingly, your suggestions and recommendations regarding 
sentencing
 Aare important. Please j^s^te #wh*t puqfsfampits ^ you b^evir the ^  defendant shouU 
<Z-i-*o 
le se i stote hat nish ent 
M •> ifll«g-r^'?riy iJ_y^.fal£~<*tx$3i' fry* 
Date Signature 
Please mail this form to the District Attorney for Salt Lake County, Witness Assistance Unit, 231 East 
400 South, Salt Lake City UT 84111. I 
If, for any reason, you do not wisih to fill out his form, please check here 
return Chis form to the above address. | 
, date and sign above, and 
P2 33Vd JK3WiS3rtli.fi NTOia3W^ mi^/r, ?&:&& K7*7.n&jKn 
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VICTIM 'IMPACT STATEMENT 
>Mcase fill out this form, and IRETUftM IMMEDIATELY The Victim Impact Statement has been 
developed to benefit victims of crime I and to bring to the court's attention the concerns of the victim regarding 
sentencing of the defendant. This is ybur opportunity to let the court know how this crime has affected you and 
your family. The District Attorneys Office will present this form to the sentencing judge. 
At the time set for sentencing of the defendant, the judge will make various decisions regarding sentencing 
alternatives, including incarceration,, probation, fines, community service, restitution, etc. The Victim Impact 
Statement is only one of the factors thej court considers in imposing a sentence. The District Attorney's Office will 
make every effort possible to represent your needs. Thank you. 
"TWJTO; 
Name: 
(If other than victim) 
Relationship; 
NOTE; Please be advised that th$ information 
contained in this Victim Impact Statement, (including 
bills or receipts containing your addres^ or telephone 
number), by Court order, may be viewed by the 
defendant either at the time of sentencing, or «t any 
subsequent review of sentence, Feel Free to delete 
your address and phone number from the documents 
you submit. j 
State vs. 
DA No,: 
1
 Court No.: 
Victim: 
I Sentence Date: 
Judge: 
Attorney: 
• " « • • • • • • • ' " • — • — - " • • — — — t 
Matthew Shampton 
SS18 
001907625PS 
Sarah Ellsworth 
August 25,2000 8:30 am I 
H.F. Wilkinson 
J.M. Cope 
1. Brief description of crime in which yt»u were involved: 1 UYYQ (jW^kM i n P> 
2. As a result of this crime, were you physically injured? 
3a. Did you need medical treatment for tljiese injuries? 
i 
3b. If this case involved sexual abuse, do! you request that the defendant be tested for HIV? 
4. Were you emotionally injured as a result of this crime? 
5. Have you received any counseling or therapy as a result of this crime? 
6. Has this crime affected your ability to bam a living? 
! 
7. Has this crime in any way affected yoijx lifestyle or your family's lifestyle? 
Y E S ^ N O 
YES V NO 
YES>N Nfr 
Y E S ^ NO 
YES K NO 
YES X. NO 
YES y NO 
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8. Are there any other egectsofthisqrime which are now being experienced by you
 V y 
or your family? j ' YES X N ° 
9. Amount of expenses incurred to date as a result of medical treatment received: $ 
(enclose copies of all bills you have received) 
Anticipated expenses (enclose doctor's statement). $ 
10. Amount of expenses incurred to date as a result of counseling or therapy: S $ L P ° 3 ^O 
(enclose copies of all bills you hav4 received). 
Anticipated expenses (enclose therapist*s statement), $ 
| — " 
11. Loss of wages to date: \ $ 
Anticipated lo$s of wages: j j " 
Does your employer pay wages wh^n you are in court? YES NO fe/""~ 
What arc your hourly wages? I $ iQ / V>q. , 
Please enclose a letter from your employer if you have lost w&ges or benefits, 
12. Did you suffer any monetary loss qr p*opejrty damage as a result of'this crime? VES'X^ NO ' '" _ 
Ifyes,pl6ase state amount. I $ 
* ll i' • '» l !• " " " W W " 
i 
13. Did insurance cover any of the expenses you have had as a result of this crime? YES V NO 
If yes, please specify the amount and type of insunjnee coverage, and attach a 
statement ten yowinsuraaeexom^y. m R V ) m n ( ( l (VuHi & r - ^ i , 
CJMiflSr U.TiQ—T r ^ * ^ Uuc. Ifaa^.gb 
IF YOU WISH TO EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE QUESTIONS, PLEASE DO SO 
ON A SEPARATE SHEET OF 8-1/2" x l l " PAPER. 
14. How do you faelaboutthe outcome of this case? "T" n t n {i\f\/\ V v P.fl<L 
flflW *TOT ilM"1 T ®w T ™ hamzi 
]f o fO—] 'JH ' j , >. ______»__ ,_ _ __ ? 
15. Even though sentencing is detennined by law (depending upon the particular crime), the court has choices < 
Within legal guidelines to impose sentence. Accordingly, your suggestions and recommendations regarding 
sentencing are important Please! state what punishments you believe the defendant should * 
Date 
, n n c ""f*"^ * * f o n n to * e ^ ^ Attorney for Salt Lake Caimty, Witness Assistance Unit, 231 East 
400 South, Salt Lake City UT 84111. 
j 
If, for any reason, you do not wish to till out his form, please check here , date and sign above and 
return this fonn to the aboy? address. ! 
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Sarah Ellsworth 
1987 Forest Creek Una 
SLC,XJT 84121 
August 8* 2000 j 
District Attorney for S&ifc Lake pounty 
Witness Assistance Unit | 
231 E. 400 S. | 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111 { 
RE: Victim Impact Statement - D A No.; 8818 
i 
Dear Judge Wilkinson: I 
I would like to explain in detail my feelings about this case and sentencing. I realize I am only 17 
years old, but this experience hajs aged me and I hope you will seriously consider my thoughts and 
opinions. j 
In question number 15 ojn the Victim Impact Statement, I began my explanation of what I 
believe to be proper scntenceingj, I would now like to complete that explanation. I stated that 
there are three concerns I have tjhat influence my thoughts: 
1. Hi$ part threat* to irie; Throughout our relationship and then much more when it 
ended, he used threats of killing me to get his way. He was always depressed and suicidal and so 
he would say something like, "If you do this, I'll kill myself and take you with me/11 do believe 
he would because of his extreme} m6od changes and anger. He al*o has a gun and made that very 
obvious to me. When he was uffsct, he didn't think about anything - not his words, or actions, 
There were times that 1 actually Went to the police station, just to sit and be safe, if my parents 
weren't home and he was coming for me I am scared that prison time will only give hint time to 
become more angry and then retaliate if the sentence is short. 
2. My worry of him doilng thia again; Number two is fairly self-explanatory. The pain of 
this experience is so deep, I can'): imagine anyone else going through it. Before w i met, I was 
happy, confident, and outgoing, never afraid to talk to people or express my opinion?. But after 
four and a half years of his constantly putting me down, tailing me what I've done wrong, how 
stupid I am, and how young and Ipathetic I am, I notice every day how it has changed me I nm 
shy, incredibly insecure, and always worried about what other people think about me. I can't trust 
anyone. I can't confide in peoplei I can't have healthy relationships with anyone because of his 
influence on me. The effects are deep and lasting. I still have nightmares abous things he did7 and 
even about the future when fee isjreleaaed. My entire life has changed, my entire personality has 
changed. Every day al) I can do is try to hold on to who I was before him. I know as a judge you 
want to know facts, dates and tinjies and actual evidence of abuse • I have all that, but how can I 
explain the emotional impact that this has had? I pray every day to know why he had to pick me, 
why do I have to have this 4 year! blemish on my life? Why couldn't I grow up and be a teenager 
and be healthy and normal? Why do I now have to distance mysellf from everyone I love just to 
feel safe? j 
There's always someone ijvho will say, "So why didn't you just leave if it was so bad?*' 
Well when he threatens to kill yoik if you try, as a 12, 13, 14, even 15 and 16 year old you believe 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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this person who is 7 years o!de^ than you with your whole heart and soul, and so you stay, He 
plays innocent now by saying he had no idea what he was doing, but when your girlfriend who is 
12 says she wants to break up and have fun and you threaten to kill her? I think you know that is 
wrong.., or at ieast, a normal 19 year old man should know, 
3. Knowledge 1Siave that ctwince* me that he i* skk atsd perverted. Because of our 
four and a half year relationship I have knowledge of him and his p&st that other people do not. It 
is because of these things he has confided to me about that 1 know he is at heart a pervert and that 
cannot be changed. He may leapt to control it, which is a step, but it is inside of him to do horrible 
nasty sexual things and that is his nature. I wish I did not have to tell anyone this, but you have to 
understand how sick he is! He confided in me about two years ago that he was babysitting for a 
family that had two little girls, abd while babysitting he made th&m piay with his penis. He also 
forced them to lay down so he could lick their vaginas. He said they were about 7 and 4 years old. 
He also told me he did the same thing to a baby girl when he was changing her diaper! I would 
hope this is enough to convince}you, but there is more - He also told me that he did the same 
thing to his pet dog. And these are only the ones he chose to tell me, who knows what else has 
happened. Even without those incidences, what he did to me was proof enough, A 19 year old 
man should not perform sexual acts on a U year old girl, He should not ask her to talk dirty and 
satisfy his perverted urges, H* IP *a twisted man who cannot ever be trusted around children or 
women or who knows what else! It is horrifying to me that his career choice is to be in 
elementary school teacher! 
It is because of these three things that I have decided that he should receive the maximum 
leading guilty he has admitted to these actions, and he knows that 
But he has accepted that by his plea, and therefore should be 
asked to stick to it and serve the full time for both charges so that he cannot hurt others, or me. I 
also believe that it will take this jamount of time, if not more, to cure his sickness. This is at least 
fair, and justice will be served, ijcannot ask for more, but I pray it will not be less, 
Judge, you have the chance on this day to stop more trauma and pain in others lives. If this 
man is allowed to pursue his career and work with our children everyday for yeara, I am positive 
that we will one day hear headlines about the horrible things he will do. You have the chance to 
prevent a sick man from ruining janother child's life, To prevent an abusive husband from hurting 
his wife and children. To stop a man who if he becomes a father, may molest his own children! 
Please look into the future and see that my corning out with this now is the chance to prevent 
what I promise you will happen if he is not stopped. I was so scared to wen report this at all, but 
when someone said "what if you, can stop it from happening again?" 1 knew I had to. No one else 
before me could do anything, thdy were too young. But I can, and I have, and I cannot imagine it 
being in vain. I hope and pray that the tremendous amount of power you possess is in good hands 
and will be used to do the right thing Thank you for your time to read this and your consideration 
of my feelings. 
Sincerely, 
sentence for both charges. By pi 
the time for them might be bngj 
Sarah Ellsworth 
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STATE v. 
Cite as 779 P.2d 
that land is qualified for assessment under 
the Act. 
[3] We reject the County's argument 
that the word "devoted" requires exclusive 
use. Land may be actively devoted to mul-
tiple purposes. We likewise reject the "in-
come test" urged by the County, seeing 
nothing in the statute to justify its use. 
Finally, the County has claimed that if the 
property in question qualifies for treatment 
under the Farmland Assessment Act, Ken-
necott should be required to pay a privilege 
tax on the difference between the assess-
ment value under the Act and its value 
without the Act. The privilege tax, how-
ever, applies only to property which is ex-
empt from taxation pursuant to article 
XIII, section 2 of the Utah Constitution. 
Agricultural assessment, permitted by arti-
cle XIII, section 3(2), does not constitute an 
exemption to which the privilege tax ap-
plies. 
The decision of the Commission is af-
firmed. 
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., 
ZIMMERMAN, J., and ORME, Court 
of Appeals Judge, concur. 
STEWART, J., having disqualified 
himself, does not participate herein; 
ORME, Court of Appeals Judge, sat. 
| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM S> 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Bruce GIBBONS, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 860405. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept 13, 1989. 
Defendant was charged with two 
counts of sexual abuse of a child and one 
GIBBONS Utah H 3 3 
1133 (Utah 1989) 
count of sodomy on a child. He pleaded 
guilty and was sentenced to two terms of 
one to 15 years and one minimum mandato-
ry term of 15 years to life, and he appealed. 
The Supreme Court, 740 P.2d 1309, held 
that trial judge failed to inform defendant 
of elements of crimes charged and failed to 
comply with standards of due process and 
remanded case to trial court to allow defen-
dant to withdraw his guilty pleas. Defen-
dant again pleaded guilty and was sen-
tenced by the First District Court, Cache 
County, Gordon J. Low, J., to two terms of 
one to 15 years and one minimum mandato-
ry term of ten years to life. Defendant 
appealed, and the Supreme Court, Stewart, 
J., held that: (1) trial court did not miscon-
strue law in sentencing defendant to prison 
term rather than probation; (2) trial court 
weighed mitigating and aggravating 
factors in sentencing defendant to ten year 
minimum mandatory term; and (3) mini-
mum mandatory sentencing provisions 
were not unconstitutionally vague. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law @=>1134(6), 1147 
Sentence imposed by trial court will be 
set aside if it represents an abuse of discre-
tion, if trial judge fails to consider all legal-
ly relevant factors, or if the sentence im-
posed exceeds limits prescribed by law. 
2. Criminal Law @=>986.2(1) 
In sentencing defendant who pleaded 
guilty to sexual abuse of a child, trial judge 
was influenced by the nature, frequency, 
and duration of abuse as well as other 
circumstances, such as young age of vic-
tim; therefore, trial court's decision 
against probation was based on careful 
consideration of relevant legal factors and 
did not constitute abuse of discretion. U.C. 
A.1953, 76-5-406.5(2). 
3. Criminal Law @=>982.4 
Defendant convicted of sexual crime 
against child can receive probation or re-
duction of sentence only if he satisfies all 
the enumerated requirements of the code, 
and a defendant not meeting all the re-
quirements cannot be granted probation 
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under any other statute. 
3-406, 76-5-406.5. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-
4. Criminal Law <s=>986(3) 
Trial court, in imposing a minimum 
mandatory sentence, is required to (1) iden-
tify the mitigating and aggravating circum-
stances and (2) state the reasons for which-
ever minimum mandatory sentence is im-
posed. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-201. 
5. Assault and Battery <3=>59,100 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in sentencing defendant to ten-year mini-
mum mandatory term; trial court specified 
age of victim, frequency of abuse, and du-
ration of the abuse as aggravating factors, 
and reviewed the mitigating evidence that 
defendant had sought and would continue 
to seek treatment and that defendant did 
not understand how seriously his actions 
were condemned by society. U.C.A.1953, 
76-3-201(5)(c). 
R. Paul Van Dam, Charlene Barlow, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. 
Hans M. Scheffler, Ronald J. Yengich, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appel-
lant. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Bruce Gibbons was charged with two 
counts of sexual abuse of a child and one 
count of sodomy on a child. Sexual abuse 
of a child is a second degree felony. Sod-
omy on a child is a first degree felony, 
subject to a minimum mandatory sentence 
of five, ten, or fifteen years' imprisonment. 
Initially, Gibbons had pleaded guilty to 
all three counts and was sentenced to pris-
on for two terms of one to fifteen years for 
sexual abuse of a child and a minimum 
mandatory term of fifteen years to life for 
sodomy on a child, all terms to run consecu-
tively. He then appealed, asserting error 
by the trial court in failing to determine 
whether his guilty pleas were made know-
ingly and voluntarily. He also attacked the 
constitutionality of Utah's minimum man-
datory sentencing provisions. This Court 
held that the trial judge, by failing to in-
form Gibbons of the "elements of the 
crimes charged and the relationship of the 
law to the facts," failed to comply with 
standards of due process and Rule 11(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 
(Utah 1987). See Utah R.Crim.P. 11(e). 
See also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 
243-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712-13, 23 L.Ed.2d 
274, 279-80 (1969). We remanded the case 
to the trial court to allow Gibbons to with-
draw his guilty pleas but retained jurisdic-
tion for any necessary future action on a 
remaining issue. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 
1310, 1314. Gibbons then withdrew his 
guilty plea but stood trial. At the conclu-
sion of trial, the jury was unable to reach a 
verdict. Prior to retrial, Gibbons once 
again pleaded guilty to all three counts 
pursuant to a plea bargain. 
At the sentencing hearing before Judge 
Gordon J. Low, Gibbons testified in mitiga-
tion and asked the court to notice the vic-
tim's trial testimony. In addition, two wit-
nesses testified as to Gibbons' sincere de-
sire to change and undergo treatment, and 
five documents were admitted, all reflect-
ing Gibbons' good behavior since his arrest. 
The court also referred to a presentence 
report. As agreed in the plea bargain, the 
State presented no aggravating circum-
stances at the sentencing hearing and did 
not oppose defendant's motion to reduce 
the offense of sodomy on a child one de-
gree pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-402 (Supp.1989) so that defendant 
would no longer be subject to a minimum 
mandatory prison sentence. The trial court 
rejected defendant's motion to be sen-
tenced a degree lower. The court sen-
tenced Gibbons to two terms of one to 
fifteen years for the two counts of sexual 
abuse of a child and one minimum manda-
tory term of ten years to life for the of-
fense of sodomy on a child, all three sen-
tences to run concurrently. 
Gibbons has again appealed and raises 
two issues in addition to the retained con-
stitutional question of whether the mini-
mum mandatory provisions are unconstitu-
tionally vague. He contends that the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying him 
probation under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-406.5 (Supp.1989). He also asserts 
that tb 
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that the trial court abused its discretion in 
sentencing him to the minimum mandatory 
term of ten years, the term of middle se-
verity, rather than the lesser term of five 
years. 
I. 
[1] We turn first to the claim that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying 
defendant probation. An appellate court 
will set aside a sentence imposed by the 
trial court if the sentence represents an 
abuse of discretion, State v. Gerrard, 584 
P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978), if the trial judge 
fails to consider all legally relevant factors, 
State v. Holland, 111 P.2d 1019 (Utah 
1989), or if the sentence imposed exceeds 
the limits prescribed by law. State v. Shel-
by, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210, 1219 
(Utah 1984); State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450, 
453 (Utah 1978). 
The trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying Gibbons probation. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5(2) (Supp.1989) pro-
vides that probation may be granted to a 
defendant convicted of sodomy on a child if 
the defendant is the victim's parent, step-
parent, adoptive parent, or legal guardian 
who has lived in the household in the role 
of a parent for one year and 
so long as all of the circumstances enu-
merated in Subsections (l)(a) through (I) 
are found by the court to exist and the 
court in its discretion, considering the 
circumstances of the offense, including 
the nature, frequency, and duration of 
the conduct, finds probation or suspen-
sion of sentence to be proper. 
The "circumstances enumerated in Subsec-
tions (l)(a) through (l)" are: 
(1). . . . 
(a) the defendant did not use a 
weapon or use force, violence, substan-
tial duress or menace, or threat of 
harm in committing the offense; 
(b) the defendant did not cause bodi-
ly injury to the victim during or as a 
result of the offense and did not cause 
the victim severe psychological harm; 
GIBBONS Utah 1135 
1133 (Utah 1989) 
(c) the defendant, prior to the of-
fense, had not been convicted of any 
public offense in Utah or elsewhere 
involving sexual misconduct in the 
commission of the offense; 
(d) the defendant did not commit an 
offense described in Part 4 of this 
chapter against any other victim, at 
the same time, or during the same 
course of conduct, or previous or sub-
sequent to the instant offense, except 
where the additional victim is within 
the same family and the court finds 
unusual circumstances exist justifying 
the granting of probation; 
(e) the defendant did not use, show, 
or display pornography or create sexu-
ally-related photographs or tape re-
cordings in the course of the offense; 
(f) the defendant did not act in con-
cert with another offender during the 
offense or knowingly commit the of-
fense in the presence of a person other 
than the victim or, with lewd intent to 
reveal the offense to another; 
(g) it is in the victim's best interests 
that the defendant not be imprisoned; 
(h) the defendant has been accepted 
for mental health treatment in a recog-
nized family sexual abuse treatment 
center which specializes in dealing with 
the kind of child sexual abuse occur-
ring in this case; 
(i) the defendant, as a condition of 
probation, will maintain residency out-
side the home for at least one year 
beginning with the commencement of 
treatment, and the defendant, as a con-
dition of probation, will not again take 
up residency in the home until allowed 
to do so by order of the court; 
(j) rehabilitation of the defendant 
through treatment is probable; 
(k) a jail term of at least 30 days is 
served prior to treatment and proba-
tion is imposed for ten years maxi-
mum; 
(I) the defendant did not encourage, 
aid, allow, or benefit from any act of 
prostitution or sexual act by the victim 
with any other person, or sexual per-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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formance by the victim before any oth-
er person. 
[2] The trial court examined each of the 
twelve requirements and discussed defen-
dant's compliance. The court's decision to 
deny probation was not based on defen-
dant's failure to qualify under the twelve 
factors listed above. Rather, the trial 
court held that "the circumstances of the 
offense, including the nature, frequency, 
and duration of the conduct," were of con-
trolling importance. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-406.5(2) (Supp.1989). The trial 
judge was influenced by the nature, fre-
quency, and duration of the sexual abuse 
as well as other circumstances, such as the 
young age of the victim. After considering 
those factors, the trial court decided 
against granting probation. Quite clearly, 
the court's decision was based on a careful 
consideration of relevant legal factors. In 
sum, the trial court's decision against pro-
bation does not constitute an abuse of dis-
cretion. 
Gibbons argues that the trial court mis-
takenly believed that it lacked the discre-
tion to grant probation under any circum-
stances. Specifically, he contends that the 
trial court misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-406 (Supp.1989), which states: 
(1) Notwithstanding Sections 76-3-201 
and 77-18-1, and Chapter 16, Title 77, 
and any other provision of law, except as 
provided in Section 76-5-406.5, proba-
tion shall not be granted, the execution 
or imposition of sentence shall not be 
suspended, the court shall not enter a 
judgment for a lower category of of-
fense, and hospitalization shall not be 
ordered, the effect of which would in any 
way shorten the prison sentence for any 
person who commits a felony of the first 
degree involving: child kidnapping, a vio-
lation of Section 76-5-301.1; aggravated 
kidnapping, a violation of Section 76-5-
302; rape of a child, a violation of Sec-
tion 76-5-402.1; any attempt to commit 
rape of a child; object rape of a child, a 
violation of Section 76-5-402.3; any at-
tempt to commit object rape of a child; 
sodomy upon a child, a violation of Sec-
tion 76-5-403.1; aggravated sexual 
abuse of a child, a violation of Subsec-
tions 76-5-404.1(3) and (4); or aggrava-
ted sexual assault, a violation of Section 
76-5-405. 
(Emphasis added.) 
[3] A defendant convicted of a sexual 
crime against a child can receive probation 
or reduction of sentence only if he satisfies 
all the enumerated requirements of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5. If a defendant 
does not meet all the requirements, 
§ 76-3-406 precludes the granting of pro-
bation under any other statute. Here, the 
trial court found that defendant did not 
meet all the requirements for probation. 
The trial judge stated: 
But with respect to probation and the 
possibility of suspending the sentence or 
issuing probation, it must be shown, as I 
read the statute, that in a case involving 
the defendant's mouth and the genitals 
or anus of a child, only if the defendant 
establishes by a preponderance of the 
evidence on all the criteria set forth in 
subsection 76-5-406.5(2) and all of the 
circumstances set forth in 76-5-406.-
5(l)(a) through (I), can I consider that. I 
do not find that that has been shown to 
the Court by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 
Thereafter, the trial court completed stat-
ing the applicable law by quoting the rele-
vant language of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-406.5 and then stated: 
I do not find that I am able as a matter 
of law, even if I should desire to do so, to 
grant probation, nor reduce this to the 
next lower category of offense by stat-
ute. 
The trial court did not misconstrue the 
law. 
II. 
Gibbons further contends that the trial 
court abused its discretion in sentencing 
him to a ten-year minimum mandatory 
term. Since only mitigating circumstances 
were advanced at the sentencing hearing, 
Gibbons asserts that it was an abuse of 
discretion to sentence him to the term of 
middle severity instead of the lesser five-
year minimum mandatory term. 
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[4] Subsections 76-3-201(5)(a), (d), (e), 
and (6)(b) govern the procedural imposition 
of the minimum mandatory sentence: 
(5)(a) If a statute under which the defen-
dant was convicted mandates that one of 
three stated minimum terms shall be im-
posed, the court shall order imposition of 
the term of middle severity unless there 
are circumstances in aggravation or miti-
gation of the crime. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the 
record the facts supporting and rea-
sons for imposing the upper or lower 
term. 
(e) The court in determining a just sen-
tence shall be guided by sentencing rules 
regarding aggravation and mitigation 
promulgated by the Judicial Council. 
(6). . . . 
(b) The court shall state the reasons 
for its sentence choice on the record at 
the time of sentencing. The court shall 
also inform the defendant as part of the 
sentence that if the defendant is released 
from prison, he may be on parole for a 
period of ten years. 
(Emphasis added.) State v. Bell, 754 P.2d 
55, 60 (Utah 1988), amplified the procedure 
to be followed in applying § 76-3-201(5) 
and (6): 
Although § 76-3-201(5)(d) requires that 
the trial court specify "the facts support-
ing and reasons for imposing the upper 
and lower term," § 76-3-201(6)(b) re-
quires that the court need only state the 
reasons for any sentence choice, includ-
ing the middle term sentence, if there are 
no circumstances in aggravation or miti-
gation of the crime. However, when 
there are aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances, as there were in this case, 
the trial court must identify them and 
give them appropriate weight in pro-
nouncing sentence, even if the sentence 
is the middle term. The mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances and the trial 
court's reasons supporting the sentence 
should appear on the record. 
See also State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 
302-03 (Utah 1988). The trial court, in 
imposing a minimum mandatory sentence, 
is required by § 76-3-201 and Bell and 
Schickles to (1) identify the mitigating and 
GIBBONS Utah H 3 7 
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aggravating circumstances and (2) state 
the reasons for whichever minimum man-
datory sentence is imposed. 
[5] Additionally, § 76-3-201(5)(c) states 
that in determining which term to impose 
"the court may consider the record in the 
case, the probation officer's report, other 
reports, . . . statements in aggravation or 
mitigation submitted by the prosecution or 
the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing." In 
this case, defendant specifically asked the 
trial court to consider the child's testimony 
at trial. The trial court also referred to a 
psychological evaluation of the victim. All 
these factors were considered in the trial 
court's sentencing decision in addition to a 
presentence report and defendant's prof-
fered mitigating circumstances. Both the 
presentence report and victim's testimony 
contained aggravating factors which offset 
mitigation presented by defendant and jus-
tified the ten-year term. The trial court 
Specified the age of the victim, the frequen-
cy of the abuse (twice a week), and the 
duration of the abuse (more than a year) as 
aggravating factors. The trial court also 
reviewed the mitigating evidence that de-
fendant had sought and would continue to 
seek treatment and that defendant did not 
understand how seriously his actions were 
condemned by society. The trial court 
identified and weighed the factors and sen-
tenced defendant to a ten-year minimum 
mandatory term. This does not, in our 
view, constitute an abuse of discretion. 
III. 
Lastly, defendant attacks the minimum 
mandatory sentencing provisions as uncon-
stitutionally vague. This argument was 
resolved against defendant's position by 
State v. Bell, 754 P.2d 55 (Utah 1988), and 
State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558 (Utah 1987). 
Affirmed. 
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., 
and DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
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CONCLUSION 
WITHDRAWAL AND ADDITION 
OF SIGNATURES 
Next, property owners argue that the trial 
court incorrectly ruled that petitioners could 
reinstate and add names to the petition after 
the time the petition was filed with the City. 
The only relevant language in the annex-
ation statute states, "a majority of the own-
ers of real property . . . shall . . . file[ ] . . . a 
written petition signed by the petitioners." 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-416 (1992). 
[8] Utah case law expressly permits the 
withdrawal of signatures until the passage of 
the annexation ordinance. Jensen v. Bounti-
ful City 20 Utah 2d 159, 435 P.2d 284, 285 
(Utah 1967). The Jensen court, noting that 
there is no statutory interdiction against 
withdrawal of signatures after a petition is 
filed but before an ordinance is passed, held 
that petitioners could alert the City of their 
position as long as they did so before annex-
ation is a "fait accompli." Id. The court 
stated that "[t]here should be some way . . . 
tinder the statute, reasonably and fairly and 
quickly to apprise almost all of the people as 
to the issue and consequences involved, with 
reasonable opportunity for all or some of the 
people to express their approval or disap-
proval within a reasonable time, in accor-
dance with statutory formulae." Id. at 286 
(emphasis added). 
[9] We conclude that if the Jensen court 
could find no statutory interdiction against 
allowing signatures to be withdrawn, there is 
similarly no statutory interdiction against al-
lowing signatures to be added or reinstated. 
Both allow "the people to express their ap-
proval or disapproval within a reasonable 
time in accordance with statutory formulae." 
Id. 
We conclude the trial court correctly de-
termined that the City substantially complied 
with the annexation statute when it allowed 
petitioners to add or reinstate their names in 
support of annexation after the original peti-
tion had been filed but before a final vote on 
annexation was taken. 
We conclude Bountiful City substantially 
complied with Utah's annexation statute. 
We conclude that a certified map is only 
required at the time the petition is filed with 
the city; that signatures may be added or 
removed at any time prior to a city's passage 
of an annexation ordinance; and that a ma-
jority of property owners in favor of the 
petition is therefore only necessary at the 
time a petition is filed and when a city votes 
on its annexation ordinance. Therefore, we 
affirm the trial court's ruling that Bountiful 
City had the statutory authority to annex the 
proposed unincorporated area of Davis Coun-
ty. 
ORME, P.J., and WILKINS, J., concur. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
C. Randall HOUK, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 950539-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 22, 1995. 
Defendant was convicted in the District 
Court, Tooele County, John A. Rokich, J., 
pursuant to his guilty plea, of two counts of 
theft and two counts of misuse of public 
funds, and he appealed his sentence. The 
Court of Appeals held that sentencing 
judge's statements that he would treat defen-
dant no different from minority defendants 
did not prove that he discriminated against 
defendant on basis of race. 
Affirmed. 
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1. Criminal Law <3=>1147 
Appellate court reviews sentencing deci-
sions of trial court for abuse of discretion. 
2. Criminal Law <s=>1147 
Abuse of discretion may be manifest if 
actions of judge in sentencing were inherent-
ly unfair or if judge impose clearly excessive 
sentence. 
3. Criminal Law <3=>1147 
Appellate court may only find abuse of 
discretion if it can be said that no reasonable 
person would take view adopted by trial 
court. 
4. Criminal Law e=>986(3) 
Statements made by sentencing judge 
that he would treat white-collar defendant, 
convicted of theft and misuse of public funds, 
no different from minority defendants did not 
establish that judge discriminated against de-
fendant on basis of race, though jail term 
imposed exceeded that recommended by 
adult probation and parole, where defen-
dant's sentence was within legally prescribed 
limits and allegedly discriminatory state-
ments were made two weeks after defendant 
was sentenced. 
5. Criminal Law <3=>986.2(1) 
Trial court is not bound by sentencing 
recommendations of adult probation and pa-
role or by requests of parties. 
Richard A. Van Wagoner, Camille N. 
Johnson, and Julianne P. Blanch, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant. 
J. Kevin Murphy and Jan Graham, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before ORME, GREENWOOD and 
WILKINS, JJ. 
OPINION 
PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court on the 
State's "Cross Motion for Summary Affir-
mance." We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
Houk was charged with thirty-four counts 
of theft and misusing public money while 
acting as the principal of Grantsville High 
School. He pled guilty to four counts (two 
for theft and two for misuse of public funds), 
all third degree felonies. In exchange, the 
remaining counts were dismissed. 
Adult Probation and Parole recommended 
that Houk pay $9,591.96 in restitution and 
spend a month in jail, to be stayed upon 
successful completion of community service. 
At sentencing, the trial court accepted the 
recommendation for restitution but increased 
the jail term to nine months. Houk then 
moved to modify his sentence, and a hearing 
was held two weeks later. It was at this 
hearing that the trial court made statements 
that Houk claims were discriminatory and 
that form the basis of his appeal. Specifical-
ly, the trial court stated: 
And in your case, nine months is not a 
tough—is not any length of time for what 
you did, just not any—I mean—and I went 
over your pre-sentence report, I read all 
your—and that's another thing that both-
ered me most of all, is that all these letters 
I get, they overlook the fact that you com-
mitted a serious crime, but those very 
same people, I get a black or Hispanic 
here that didn't do anywhere near what 
you did, and do you know what they want 
me to do? They all have got to be in 
prison. 
But those who can come to this Court in 
a white shirt and tie and suit, they expect 
to be treated different than that illiterate, 
Hispanic down there, or the black, and 
that's the thing that disturbs me most of 
all about our criminal system is that they 
commit a burglary and it's only—total, 
they may have taken a thousand dollars or 
less, but have committed three or four 
burglaries, they don't know any better. 
ISSUE 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the 
trial court imposed a harsher sentence upon 
Houk, a Caucasian, because of his race. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1-3] We review the sentencing decisions 
of a trial court for abuse of discretion. State 
v, Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App. 
1993). Abuse of discretion "may be manifest 
if the actions of the judge in sentencing were 
'inherently unfair' or if the judge imposed a 
'clearly excessive sentence.'" State v. 
Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah App.1995) 
(citations omitted). An appellate court may 
only find abuse "if it can be said that no 
reasonable [person] would take the view 
adopted by the trial court." Id. 
ANALYSIS 
[4] Houk contends that he was singled 
out for uniquely harsh treatment and that 
statements made by the trial court "strongly 
suggest" he received a more severe sentence 
because of his race. The State contends that 
Houk has not shown that "he received an 
intentionally race-disparate sentence" be-
cause the statements "do no more than ex-
press the trial court's intention to not give 
Houk an advantage over minority-race defen-
dants." The State further argues that the 
sentencing guidelines are nonbinding and so 
long as the trial court's sentencing decision is 
within statutory limits, it has broad discre-
tion to impose whatever sentence it considers 
appropriate. 
The allegedly discriminatory statements 
were made at a hearing two weeks after 
Houk was sentenced—a fact that weakens 
his claim. Even if we focus on the state-
ments Houk finds objectionable, we conclude 
there is insufficient evidence to support 
Houk's assertions. The actions of the trial 
court were not "inherently unfair." The trial 
judge did not say he was going to treat Houk 
worse than other defendants, only that he 
was going to treat him the same. This is 
made apparent when the trial judge's com-
ments are reviewed in context. The record 
further reveals that the trial judge's sentenc-
ing decision was not made rashly but was the 
result of careful consideration. The ex-
changes between Houk and the judge do not 
indicate any hostility towards Houk. In fact, 
the judge left open the possibility that he 
would reconsider his denial of Houk's request 
for work release. 
. HOUK Utah 909 
7 (Utah App. 1995) 
[5] Moreover, the sentence imposed by 
the trial court was not a "clearly excessive 
sentence." Wright, 893 P.2d at 1120. A trial 
court may depart from Utah's Sentence and 
Release Guidelines in appropriate situations. 
See Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines, 
Utah Code Jud.Admin., Appx. D in Utah 
Ct.R.Ann. at 1294 (1995). Similarly, a trial 
court is not bound by the sentencing recom-
mendations of Adult Probation and Parole or 
by the requests of the parties. See State v. 
Carson, 597 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1979); State 
v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1300 (Utah App. 
1989). Houk recognized this when he signed 
his plea statement which says that any sen-
tencing recommendations or opinions of 
counsel are not binding upon the trial judge. 
Because the trial judge could have sen-
tenced Houk for up to five years in prison for 
each of the four counts, he did not exceed the 
legally prescribed limits. His statements, 
wThether reviewed alone or in the context of 
the two hearings, do not prove discrimina-
tion. We simply cannot say, on this record, 
that no reasonable person would have im-
posed the sentence that was imposed in this 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
Since Houk's sentence is within' legally 
prescribed limits and we reject his argument 
that the trial court discriminated against 
him, we find no abuse of discretion. Accord-
ingly, Houk's conviction and sentence are 
affirmed. 
ORME, P.J, and GREENWOOD and 
WILKINS, JJ., concur. 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Ben Earl NUTTALL, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 920776-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct. 21, 1993. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Anne M. 
Stirba, J., of aggravated sexual abuse of a 
child, and he appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Greenwood, J., held that trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in failing to 
consider defendant's advanced age as a 
mitigating factor when imposing sentence. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <£=>1147 
Sentence will not be overturned on ap-
peal unless trial court has abused its dis-
cretion, failed to consider all legally rele-
vant factors or imposed sentence that ex-
ceeds legally prescribed limits. 
2. Criminal Law ©^986.2(1) 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in failing to consider 56-year-old child sex-
ual abuser's advanced age as mitigating 
factor when imposing sentence; abuser's 
advanced age and 20-year period during 
which he engaged in pedophilic behavior 
minimized his prospects for rehabilitation 
and exacerbated, rather than reduced, his 
culpability for these crimes and sentence 
and release guidelines did not list, or even 
suggest, that court should consider offend-
er's age, let alone advanced age, as mitigat-
ing factor. 
3. Criminal Law <s=>1205 
State is not prohibited from incarcerat-
ing individual for purposes other than reha-
bilitation and one of these other purposes 
may be to protect society from individual 
deemed to be danger to the community. 
4. Criminal Law <3=>1088.1 
Presentence investigation report does 
not become part of the record on appeal 
unless party or party's counsel notifies 
court clerk, in writing, that presentence 
investigation report is the subject of an 
appeal and, upon such notice, clerk includes 
sealed presentence investigation report as 
part of the record. Judicial Administration 
Rule 4-203(2). 
5. Criminal Law @=*1177 
Even if trial court confused child sexu-
al abuser's "cognitive abilities" with his 
"developmental disabilities" when imposing 
sentence, error was harmless; guidelines 
for aggravating and mitigating factors in-
dicated that developmental disabilities 
could be considered if highly structured 
alternative could be utilized to control crim-
inal behavior and, in abuser's case, there 
were no treatment programs outside of the 
prison and statutory sentencing guidelines 
required court to commit abuser to prison. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-3-406(1). 
Ronald S. Fujino and Lynn R. Brown, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appel-
lant. 
Jan Graham and Kris C. Leonard, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. 
Before BILLINGS, GREENWOOD and 
ORME, JJ. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant Ben Earl Nuttall appeals his 
two first-degree-felony convictions of ag-
gravated sexual abuse of a child, a viola-
tion of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 
(1990). On appeal, defendant argues that 
by imposing two consecutive minimum 
mandatory nine-year terms the trial court 
abused its discretion because it failed to 
consider his age and developmental disabili-
ties as mitigating factors. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
Defendant was charged with sexually 
abusing five children, ranging in age from 
six to eleven years old. Four of the victims 
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were young girls and the fifth victim was tencing report, 
defendant's grandson. The trial court 
found that defendant showed pornographic 
movies to his grandson and two of the 
girls, that he compelled them to perform 
various sexual acts with him and with each 
other, and that he took photographs of the 
various acts. Additionally, the trial court 
found evidence that defendant had threat-
ened at least one child with physical 
harm—as well as threatening to harm the 
child's family members—to secure the 
child's silence regarding defendant's sexual 
abuse. 
Utah 455 
The trial court found that defendant had 
been sexually molesting children, without 
detection, for approximately twenty years. 
Furthermore, the court recognized that de-
fendant had himself been the victim, as a 
child, of "physical abuse and at least some 
other mal-treatment that was not attended 
to." 
After abusing the children, but before 
his criminal acts were discovered, defen-
dant left Utah. The State of Utah subse-
quently filed criminal charges against de-
fendant. Fortuitously, he was picked up in 
another state and extradited to Utah for 
trial. The State originally charged defen-
dant, by information, with nine criminal 
counts.1 Pursuant to plea bargain negotia-
tions, the State filed an amended informa-
tion charging defendant with two counts of 
aggravated sexual abuse of a child. De-
fendant pleaded guilty to the amended 
charges and the court ordered a presen-
1. The original nine counts were: 
1) one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a 
child, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (1990); 
2) two counts of sexual abuse of a child, a 
second degree felony, in violation of id.; 
3) three counts of sodomy upon a child, a first 
degree felony, in violation of id. § 76-5-403.1; 
4) one count of object rape of a child, a first 
degree felony, in violation of id. § 76-5-402.3; 
5) one count of sexual exploitation of a minor, 
a second degree felony, in violation of id. 
§ 76-5a-3; and 
6) one count of dealing in harmful material to a 
minor, a third degree felony, in violation of 
id. § 76-10-1206(l)(a) (Supp.1993). 
2. In identifying the relevant aggravating and 
mitigating factors, the trial court apparently re-
Utah Rep. 858-862 R2d—15 
The trial court ultimately 
sentenced defendant to serve two consecu-
tive minimum mandatory terms of nine 
years to life in the Utah State Prison. In 
addition, the trial court ordered defendant 
to pay a fine of $5000, extradition costs of 
$1868.69, a recoupment fee of $400, and the 
costs of counseling for the victims. 
In sentencing defendant, the trial court 
found the following aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances:2 
Aggravating Circumstances3 
1. Prior History of Similar Offenses: 
Defendant had an extensive prior his-
tory of similar offenses; 
2. Extreme Cruelty or Depravity: De-
fendant's abuse of the children was 
extremely depraved; and 
3. Vulnerability of Victims: The vic-
tims were unusually vulnerable be-
cause of their young age. Also, defen-
dant's grandson was especially vulner-
able because he trusted his grandfa-
ther. 
Mitigating Circumstances4 
1. Single Offense: The trial court 
found that the offenses did not repre-
sent a single incident with the offender 
having no prior history of such of-
fenses; 
2. Cooperation with Law Enforce-
ment: The trial court found, with the 
exception of defendant's willingness to 
plead guilty to the two counts of ag-
gravated sexual abuse of a child, that 
there was no basis for finding that 
lied on Form 2 of the Utah Sentence and Re-
lease Guidelines, entitled "Aggravating and Miti-
gating Circumstances Associated with Mandato-
ry Sentences Required by H.B. 209." Utah Code 
Jud.Admin., Appx. D in Utah Ct.R.Ann. at 1137 
(1993). 
3. The trial court found that three of the five 
aggravating factors listed on Form 2 of the Utah 
Sentence and Release Guidelines were present. 
The two not discussed by the court were (1) 
substantial bodily injury to the victim, and (2) 
the existence of a non-familial relationship of 
trust. Utah Code Jud.Admin., Appx. D in Utah 
Ct.R.Ann. at 1137 (1993). 
4. The trial court addressed and discussed all 
five of the mitigating factors listed on Form 2 of 
the Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines. 
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defendant was exceptionally coopera-
tive with law enforcement; 
3. Good Candidate for Treatment: 
The court found that defendant was 
not a good candidate for a recognized 
treatment program because the only 
sex offender treatment program avail-
able to defendant is in the prison; 
4. Incest Offender: The court found 
that this was not a case of incest, 
despite the involvement of defendant's 
grandson; 
5. Developmental Disabilities: The 
court found no developmental disabili-
ties and also indicated the lack of high-
ly structured alternative treatment 
programs outside of prison. 
In addition to the factors from the Utah 
Sentence and Release Guidelines, the trial 
court considered the following: 
(a) that defendant's abuse of the children 
has had and may have, "for who knows 
how long/' a devastating impact on them 
and their families; (b) that defendant 
threatened at least one of the children and 
some family members with bodily harm 
and/or death; (c) that defendant was "an 
extremely high risk to the safety of the 
children in this community;" and (d) that 
"leniency has already been shown to [de-
fendant] in this case" as a result of the 
plea bargain in which the State reduced the 
charges from nine various criminal counts 
down to two counts of aggravated sexual 
abuse of a child. 
After considering the various aggrava-
ting and mitigating circumstances, or lack 
thereof, the trial court found that the ag-
gravating circumstances outweighed the 
mitigating circumstances and accordingly 
imposed the two, consecutive, nine-year 
minimum mandatory sentences. 
5. Defendant was 56 years old at the time of 
sentencing. 
6. The Utah Legislature, the Utah Supreme 
Court, and this court have all approved the 
imposition of consecutive sentences. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1990) (sentences for 
state offenses shall run concurrently unless 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The issues to be decided on appeal are 
whether the trial court failed to consider (1) 
defendant's age, and (2) his developmental 
disabilities, as mitigating factors in sen-
tencing. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] A sentence will not be overturned 
on appeal unless the trial court has abused 
its discretion, failed to consider all legally 
relevant factors, or imposed a sentence 
that exceeds legally prescribed limits. 
State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 
(Utah 1989) (citations omitted). In State v. 
Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990), the su-
preme court stated that an "abuse of dis-
cretion may be manifest if the actions of 
the judge in sentencing were 'inherently 
unfair' or if the judge imposed a 'clearly 
excessive' sentence." Id. at 192-93 (cita-
tion omitted). The supreme court also not-
ed in State v.. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 
1978) that "the exercise of discretion in 
sentencing necessarily reflects the personal 
judgment of the court and the appellate 
court can properly find abuse only if it can 
be said that no reasonable [person] would 
take the view adopted by the trial court." 
Id. at 887 (citation omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
Age As a Mitigating Factor 
[2] Defendant argues that the trial 
court should have considered his advanced 
age 5 as a mitigating factor. Specifically, 
defendant asserts that the juxtaposition of 
his age and the consecutive sentences 6 im-
poses an unfair delay in his chance to enter 
the prison's sex offender rehabilitation pro-
gram, and essentially commits him to pris-
on for the remainder of his life. 
Defendant's argument relies heavily on 
the recent Utah case of State v. Strunk, 
court orders them to run consecutively); State 
v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1986) (consec-
utive sentences are statutorily permissible); 
State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 715 (Utah App. 
1993) (section 76-3-401 does not preclude impo-
sition of consecutive sentences). 
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Strunk stands for the proposition that a 
court must look at the defendant's age— 
whether young or old—as a mitigating fac-
tor. 
In Strunk, a sixteen-year-old boy forci-
bly took his six-year-old neighbor into the 
mountains where he sexually abused, and 
eventually murdered her. In reversing the 
trial court's minimum mandatory sentence 
of twenty-four years, the supreme court 
cited the boy's youth, his lack of prior 
criminal activity, and the court's desire to 
accord flexibility to the Board of Pardons 
as the primary reasons.7 Id. at 1302. 
Although Strunk discussed age as a mit-
igating factor (and remanded because the 
trial court failed to consider the offender's 
youth as a mitigating factor), the court 
only addressed "youth" as a relevant miti-
gating circumstance. The Strunk court 
viewed the defendant's youth as a factor 
that arguably detracted from his culpabili-
ty and affected his comprehension of the 
seriousness of the crime. Additionally, the 
court also viewed the defendant's youth as 
a favorable factor in his chances for suc-
cessful rehabilitation. Id. 
Arguing by analogy, defendant contends 
that Strunk compels the trial court to con-
sider his "old" age in connection with his 
STATE v. NTJTTALL Utah 457 
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He argues that sentencing or rehabilitation.8 We do not 
agree that Strunk can be so construed. 
On the contrary, Strunk argues against 
defendant's position. That is, defendant's 
age and the number of years he has en-
gaged in pedophilic activity actually mini-
mize his prospects for rehabilitation and 
exacerbate, rather than reduce his culpabil-
ity for these serious crimes.9 In addition, 
the Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines 
do not list, or even suggest, that a court 
should consider the offender's age, let 
alone advanced age, as a mitigating fac-
tor.10 Thus, we believe that Strunk stands 
only for the proposition that young age— 
not old age—may be a mitigating factor. 
Defendant also argues, as a corollary to 
his advanced age theory, that the trial 
court abused its discretion by imposing con-
secutive sentences which deprive him of 
early entrance into the prison's sex offend-
er program. Incarcerated sex offenders 
are eligible to participate in the prison's 
rehabilitation program only when they are 
within three years of their first projected 
parole date. As defendant's first parole 
date will not be for some eighteen years, he 
must wait fifteen years before he can en-
roll in the prison's sex offender rehabilita-
tion program. At the time defendant quali-
fies for rehabilitation, he will be approxi-
mately seventy-one years old. To defer 
7. The supreme court's desire to accord flexibili-
ty to the Board of Pardons underscored the 
court's recognition of the boy's youth and the 
hope that he could be rehabilitated and eventu-
ally released back into society. Strunk, 846 
P.2d at 1302. 
8. In two factually similar cases from Louisiana, 
the courts imposed long sentences for child mo-
lestation despite the offender's advanced age. 
See State v. Driggers, 582 So.2d 369 (La.Ct.App. 
1991) (imposing consecutive sentences at hard 
labor totalling 14 years for grandfather who 
molested preschool-age granddaughter); State v. 
Davis, 514 So.2d 757 (La.Ct.App. 1987) (imposing 
consecutive sentences at hard labor totalling 25 
years for grandfather who molested 35-year-old 
daughter, 7-year-old granddaughter, and 12-
year-old grandson). 
9. The trial court specifically found that defen-
dant was not a good candidate for rehabilitation 
because the only available program for which 
he qualified was in prison. Furthermore, the 
trial court was concerned more with protecting 
society and other potential young victims than 
with rehabilitating defendant for an early re-
turn to society. 
As expressed by the Alaska Court of Appeals: 
A defendant's age and the nature of his 
offense are, nevertheless, highly relevant in 
determining his potential for rehabilitation. 
In some cases, the fact that a defendant is of 
mature years and has engaged in a continu-
ous course of sexual abuse, might justify a 
trial court in discounting his potential for 
rehabilitation, despite the enthusiastic testi-
mony of mental health professionals, 
Kirby v. State, 748 P.2d 757, 764 (Alaska Ct.App. 
1987) (citing Bartholemew v. State, 720 P.2d 54 
(Alaska Ct.App.1986)). 
10. Even though it found the offender's young 
age relevant, the Strunk court noted that age is 
not listed as a mitigating factor in the Utah 
Sentence and Release Guidelines. Strunk, 846 
P.2d at 1300. A defendant's young age is listed, 
however, as a statutorily prescribed mitigating 
factor for capital felonies. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-207(3)(e) (Supp.1993). 
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needed rehabilitation for fifteen years, he 
argues, is an abuse of discretion by the 
trial court. 
The supreme court noted in Strunk that 
sentencing courts are instructed by statute 
to consider the " 'gravity and circum-
stances of the offenses and the history, 
character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant'" in determining whether to im-
pose consecutive sentences. Id. at 1301 
(citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) 
(1990)). In Strunk, the supreme court 
found that the trial court abused its discre-
tion "in failing to sufficiently consider de-
fendant's rehabilitative needs in light of 
his extreme youth and the absence of pri-
or violent crimes.''1 Id. at 1302 (emphasis 
added). In the present case, the two ele-
ments deemed critical by the supreme 
court—extreme youth and absence of prior 
criminal behavior—are lacking. Thus, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
placing more emphasis on punishing defen-
dant rather than rehabilitating him. 
[3] Additionally, the Utah Supreme 
Court has clearly expressed that the state 
is not prohibited from incarcerating an indi-
vidual "for purposes other than rehabilita-
tion." State v. Bishop, 111 P.2d 261, 268 
(Utah 1986). One of those "other pur-
poses" may be to protect society from an 
individual deemed to be a danger to the 
community. Id. at 265; see also State v. 
McCuin, 167 Ariz. 447, 808 P.2d 332, 334-
35 (Ariz.Ct.App.1991) (need to protect po-
tential victims is appropriate factor in de-
ciding length of sentence); People v. Lintz, 
245 Ill.App.3d 658, 185 IU.Dec. 807, 812, 
615 N.E.2d 366, 371 (1993) (main reason 
court incarcerated defendant was its con-
11. The Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines 
state that "[developmental disabilities of the 
offender may be considered in mitigation if 
highly structured alternatives can be utilized to 
control the offender's criminal behavior." Utah 
Code Jud.Admin., Appx. D in Utah Ct.R.Ann. at 
1137 (1993) (emphasis added). 
12. The record on appeal is vague as to defen-
dant's alleged developmental disabilities. The 
only statement in the record is from the trial 
judge: "Evidently, Mr. Nuttall as a child experi-
enced at least some physical abuse and at least 
some other mal-treatment that was not attended 
to." Apparently, the trial judge based this state-
cern for safety of public); Scott W. Rodg-
ers, Binding Sentencing Guidelines: A 
Means of Controlling Utah's Prison Pop-
ulation, 1990 Utah L.Kev. 309, 314 (stating 
that punishment, deterrence, incapaci-
tation, and rehabilitation are four oft-dis-
cussed reasons for incarceration). 
Therefore, because we hold that Strunk 
does not require a trial court to weigh a 
defendant's advanced age as a mitigating 
factor, and because a trial court can incar-
cerate a child sex abuser for purposes oth-
er than rehabilitation, we determine that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
by failing to consider defendant's age. 
Developmental Disabilities 
Defendant next argues that the trial 
court erred by considering his l 'cognitive 
abilities" rather than his "developmental 
disabilities" n as mitigating factors. Con-
trary to defendant's assertion, the trial 
court specifically stated, "In short, I don't 
find that there is [sic] any developmental 
disabilities that would be considered mitiga-
tion in this particular case for the reasons I 
have just cited." Defendant, however, 
quibbles with the trial court's reasons un-
derlying its finding of no developmental 
disabilities. He argues that the trial court 
confused "developmental disabilities" with 
"cognitive abilities." Defendant asserts 
that his current verbal and cognitive skills 
are irrelevant to how he developed dysfunc-
tionally as a child. 
[4, 5] The record before us does not in-
dicate any developmental disabilities to be 
considered as mitigating factors.12 It does 
show, nonetheless, that the trial court con-
ment on information she gleaned from the pre-
sentence investigation report. That report was 
not made part of the record on appeal and our 
review of this issue is thus limited. We note, 
for future purposes, that the presentence investi-
gation report does not become part of the rec-
ord on appeal unless a "party or a party's coun-
sel notifies the court clerk, in writing, that the 
presentence investigation report is the subject of 
an appeal." Utah Code Jud.Admin. R4-203(2) 
(1993). Upon such notice, "the clerk shall in-
clude the sealed presentence investigation re-
port as part of the record." Id. 
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sidered defendant's possible problems dur-
ing his youth and his cognitive abilities as 
would affect his rehabilitation. Therefore, 
the trial court did not err by failing to 
consider defendant's developmental disabil-
ities as a mitigating factor.13 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's reading of Strunk is in er-
ror. There is no requirement, announced 
in Strunk or elsewhere, that a trial court 
must consider the advanced age of a child 
sex abuser in the matrix of aggravating 
and mitigating factors. The trial court did 
not abuse its discretion nor did it fail to 
13. Even if the trial court did confuse defen-
dant's "cognitive abilities" with his "develop-
mental disabilities"—assuming some merit to 
defendant's assertion—the point seems irrele-
vant. The guidelines for aggravating and miti-
gating factors indicate that developmental disa-
bilities may be considered // a highly structured 
alternative can be utilized to control the offend-
er's criminal behavior. In defendant's case, the 
trial court specifically stated that there were no 
look at any legally relevant factors in sen-
tencing defendant. Therefore, we affirm 
the trial court's imposition of two, consecu-
tive, nine-year minimum mandatory sen-
tences. 
BILLINGS and ORME, JJ., concur. 
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OPINION 
DAVIS, Judge: 
SI 1. Defendant Michael Paul Pierson was convicted by a jury of 
murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-203 (1999); aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1999); and aggravated 
kidnaping, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-302 (1999). Defendant appeals on four grounds: (1) the 
aggravated burglary conviction is a lesser included offense of the 
murder conviction; (2) the aggravated kidnaping conviction merges 
with the aggravated burglary conviction;ffnll (3) the trial court 
failed to instruct the jury on included and merged offenses 
pertaining to both the aggravated burglary and kidnaping 
convictions; and (4) his sentence^ is excessive. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
1 2. On January 27, 1997, defendant devised a plan to steal 
marijuana from a house in West Valley City. Co-defendants Clint 
Hartley, Jeffery Burgener, and Melisa Parker agreed to participate 
in the plan. 
SI 3 . At approximately 7:30 that evening, Melisa Parker knocked on 
the door of the house. Defendant, Hartley, and Burgener, all 
wearing masks and carrying guns, hid to the side of the door so as 
not to be seen. When Jared Bowers opened the door, defendant and 
Hartley rushed into the house and defendant fired his gun once. 
Then, Hartley fired once, apparently unintentionally killing 
Donald Dobson, a resident of the house. 
St 4. One of the perpetrators f f n21 placed a gun to Neyna Davis's head, 
told her to get down, and asked her where the "weed" was. She was 
then directed, at gunpoint, downstairs to the basement where they 
entered Jared Bowers's room. Inside, they looked in a closet that 
contained a rifle. The perpetrator told her, "Don't think about 
touching that." From there the gunman forced her into the 
entertainment room, as well as a storage area. When the gunman Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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found no marijuana, he ordered her to get down on the floor, and 
then left her. Tfn31 Shortly thereafter, the perpetrators left the 
house without taking anything. 
1 5. Two months later, Melisa Parker came forward, confessed her 
involvement in the crimes, and revealed the involvement of the 
others. Defendant was subsequently arrested. From the time of the 
crimes until ;<sentencing^, defendant threatened several of the 
witnesses that they and their families would die if they testified 
against him. 
SI 6. After being convicted by a jury, defendant was <.sentenced>. to 
two consecutive terms of five-years-to-life for the murder and 
aggravated burglary convictions, and one consecutive term of 
fifteen-years-to-life for the aggravated kidnaping conviction, as 
well as three consecutive one-to-five year dangerous weapon 
enhancements. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
S[ 7. Defendant argues that aggravated burglary is a lesser included 
offense of felony murder and should have been dismissed. "[T]he 
propriety of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
dismiss is a question of law that we review for correctness." 
Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996). Likewise, 
"[w]hether one crime is a lesser included offense of another is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness." State v. Bertha, 
957 P.2d 611, 617-618 (UtahCt.App. 1998). 
S[ 8. Defendant also argues that the aggravated kidnaping charge 
should merge with the aggravated burglary charge. "This is 
essentially an issue of statutory construction that we review for 
correctness, according no particular deference to the trial 
court." State v. Mecham, 2 0 00 UT App 247, 1 20, 4 02 Utah Adv. Rep. 
12. 
9[ 9. Defendant next'argues that the trial court failed to correctly 
instruct the jury on the law of merger and lesser included 
offenses. Whether to give a jury instruction is a conclusion of 
law that is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Parra, 
972 P.2d 924, 927 (UtahCt.App. 1998). 
f 10. Defendant finally argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion by ordering defendant to serve maximum consecutive 
<sentences>. "We review the <.sentencing>. decisions of a trial court 
for <abuse>. <pf>. ^ discretions. <Abuse> <of> <discretion>. vmay be mani 
the actions of the judge in <sentencing> were "inherently unfair" or 
if the judge imposed a clearly excessive <sentence>.'" State v. 
Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah Ct.App. 1995) (citations omitted); 
see also State v. McCovev, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) 
(finding <abuse>. ^ ofs <discretion> when court fails to consider all 
legally relevant factors or when <sentence> imposed is clearly 
excessive); State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 886, 887 (Utah 1978) 
(concluding that "appellate court can properly find abuse only if 
it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view 
adopted by the trial court"). 
ANALYSIS 
A. Aggravated Burglary as a Lesser Included Offense 
I 11. Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by denying 
his motion to dismiss the aggravated burglary count because it was 
a lesser included offense of the felony murder count. The Utah 
Supreme Court addressed this very issue in State v. McCovev, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 199 0). The McCovev court decided "whether 
aggravated robbery is a lesser included offense of second 
degree [JL£n41] felony murder." Id. at 1235. The court held that, 
"Allowing punishment for both felony murder and the underlying 
felony violates neither the double jeopardy principles of the 
fifth amendment of the United States Constitution, Article I, 
section 12 of the Utah State Constitution, nor Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-402 (3) (1978) . " [fn5] Id. at 1239. 
S[ 12 . To determine whether an offense is a lesser included offense 
of another crime, a two-part test is used. "[F]or purposes of the 
prohibition against conviction 'of both the offense charged and 
the included offense,• the greater-lesser relationship must be 
determined by comparing the statutory elements of the two crimes 
as a theoretical matter and, where necessary, by reference to the 
facts proved at trial." Id. at 1236 (quoting State v. Hill, 
674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983)). The trial court, if necessary, must then 
determine "whether the greater-lesser relationship exists between 
the specific variations of the crimes actually proved at trial." 
Id. 
S[ 13. The statutory elements of murder charged in this case include 
the elements of aggravated burglary. Aggravated burglary is a 
predicate offense which removes intent as an element of 
homicide. ffn61 Thus, as a theoretical matter, felony murder has all 
the elements of aggravated burglary. 
S[ 14. The second part of the test requires a determination of 
whether evidence of the lesser included offense was presented at 
trial. Id. at 1237. Here, it is undisputed that aggravated 
burglary was proven at trial. 
SI 15 . However, the McCovev court disregarded the result of this 
test, and instead looked to the intent of the Legislature. McCovev 
held: 
Despite the fact that under the Hill analysis aggravated 
robbery would be a lesser included offense of felony murder, 
we recognize that enhancement statutes are different in 
nature than other criminal statutes. . . . Yet the only 
reason aggravated robbery is encompassed within the 
definition of [the] lesser included offense of felony murder 
is that the legislature designated it as an enhancing 
offense. Aggravated robbery does not, by its nature, have 
overlapping elements with any traditional form of murder. 
McCovev, 803 P.2d at 1237-38. Likewise here, aggravated burglary 
does not by its nature "have overlapping elements with any 
traditional form of murder" and it is used as an "enhancing 
offense." Id. 
S[ 16. Defendant argues that State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 
1986), should control instead of McCovev. Shaffer held that 
aggravated robbery was a lesser included offense when used to 
enhance second degree murder to first degree murder. See id. at 
1314. However, in McCovev, the court distinguished Shaffer for two 
reasons. First, in McCovev, the robbery victim and the homicide 
victim were different people, unlike in Shaffer. Second, in 
Shaffer, the defendant was subject to a <sentence> of capital 
murder, which would make it "surplusage to consider the underlying 
felony as a separate offense, " whereas the defendant in McCovev 
was subject to only five-years-to-life imprisonment. McCovev, 803 
P.2d at 1238. 
S[ 17. The case before us, like McCovev, is distinguishable from Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Shaffer. First, the burglary victim, as indicated in the jury 
instructions, was a different person than the murder victim. 
Second, here, defendant was convicted of murder (formerly second 
degree murder), and not aggravated murder (formerly first degree 
murder), and was <sentenced>: to five-yeare-to-life imprisonment. 
Thus, this case is controlled by McCovev and aggravated burglary 
is not a lesser included offense of murder. 
B. Merger of Aggravated Kidnaping with Aggravated Burglary 
SI 18. Defendant next argues that under the facts of this case, 
aggravated kidnaping should merge with aggravated burglary. 
According to defendant, aggravated burglary, as charged here, 
requires the use of a dangerous weapon against a person, and a 
detention is therefore inherent in the burglary. We disagree that 
detention is inherent in the "host crime" of aggravated burglary. 
Unlike crimes such as aggravated robbery or rape, which by their 
nature can contain elements of aggravated kidnaping, detention is 
not inherent in the criminal act of aggravated burglary. 
SI 19. The supreme court adopted a three-part test to determine if 
kidnaping merges with another crime. See State v. Finlayson, 2 0 00 
UT 10, 1 23, 994 P.2d 1243 . The three-part test states: 
"If a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to 
facilitate the commission of another crime, to be kidnaping 
the resulting movement or confinement: 
(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely 
incidental to the other crime; 
(b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature 
of the other crime; and 
(c) Must have some significance independent of the 
other crime in that it makes the other crime 
substantially easier of commission or substantially 
lessens the risk of detection." 
Finlavson, 2000 UT 10 at SI 23 (quoting State v. Bucrcrs, 
547 P.2d 720, 731 (Kan. 1976)). 
SI 20. Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1) (1999), "[a] person is 
guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a 
felony or theft or commit an assault on any person." Aggravated 
burglary is a burglary in which the defendant either causes injury 
to a nonparticipant in the crime, uses or threatens the use of a 
dangerous weapon against any nonparticipant, or possesses a 
dangerous weapon. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203(1) (19 99) . Thus, 
the crime of aggravated burglary can be completed upon entry of 
the building, and detention is inherent in neither the definition 
of aggravated burglary nor under the facts of this case. 
C. Jury Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses and Merger 
SI 21. Defendant argues that the judge should have given the jury 
instructions on lesser included offenses and the doctrine of 
merger despite trial counsel's failure to request such 
instructions. However, based upon our holdings above, the trial 
court did not err in determining that aggravated burglary is not a 
lesser included offense of murder and that aggravated kidnaping 
does not merge with aggravated burglary. Thus, the court was not 
required to instruct the jury on these concepts. 
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D. <Sentencing>. 
SI 22. For a trial court to determine whether to impose concurrent 
or consecutive <sentences>, it "shall consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant. . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-401(4) (1999). Here, the record is replete with support for 
consecutive <sentences>. Defendant was the mastermind behind the 
scheme to burglarize the house, he carried a gun into the house, 
and he fired it. Additionally, based upon defendant's criminal 
history and his lack of remorse, the trial court clearly did not 
abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive <sentences>. 
SI 23. Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
imposing the maximum <sentence> under the dangerous weapon 
enhancement, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) (1999), and for 
aggravated kidnaping, see id. § 76-5-302(3). The trial court 
evaluated defendant's age and his rehabilitative needs and 
accepted all letters in support of defendant in <sentencing^. Unlike 
State v. Struck, 846 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Utah 1993), defendant was 
not sixteen years old, nor did his criminal record lack prior 
violent crimes. Additionally, the facts of this case are 
distinguishable from the facts in State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 
(Utah 1998), in which none of the victims were injured and 
defendant's criminal history consisted of traffic offenses and a 
misdemeanor theft. Here, defendant organized the raid of the 
house, he was the first to enter the house with his gun displayed, 
and he was the first to shoot his gun. In addition, he had an 
extensive juvenile record and was held in detention three separate 
times for committing offenses such as robbery, shooting in a 
restricted area, and contempt. Based upon these facts and 
defendant's criminal history, it was well within the trial court's 
discretion to impose the maximum <sentences>. ffn71 
CONCLUSION 
SI 24. We conclude that: (1) aggravated burglary is not a lesser 
included offense of felony murder; (2) aggravated kidnaping does 
not merge with aggravated burglary; (3) the jury instructions were 
proper; and (4) defendant's <sentence> was not excessive. 
I 25. WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge, and WILLIAM A. 
THORNE, JR., Judge. 
[fnl] Defendant conceded during oral argument, that under current 
Utah law, aggravated kidnaping is not a lesser included offense of 
aggravated burglary; thus, we will not address the issue. 
[fn2] Although the testimony is conflicting over which one of the 
perpetrators forced Neyna Davis downstairs, it is undisputed that 
defendant is liable under an accomplice liability theory. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999) . 
[fn3] Elaina Hoggard was also held at gunpoint during this incident. 
However, defendant was not charged with kidnaping her. 
[fn4] After 1991, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 no longer made the 
distinction between first and second degree murder. However, the 
murder charge proven here is akin to the second degree murder 
charge in McCovev. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1) (d) (1999) 
with Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1) (d) (Supp. 1988). 
[fn5] The 1978 version of the statute is still valid. 
[fn6] Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1999), Murder, reads as follows: Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if the actor: 
(d) while in the commission, attempted commission, 
or immediate flight from the commission or 
attempted commission of . . . aggravated burglary 
. . . causes the death of another person other than 
[an accomplice]. 
[fn7] Defendant contends that there were mitigating circumstances 
regarding his role in the murder of Mr. Dobson. However, the fact 
that he was not the one who actually shot Mr. Dobson, the shooting 
may have been unintentional, and he did not shoot at Mr. Dobson 
are not mitigating factors under the felony murder statute. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1999). It is this very type of incident 
that the felony murder statute is intended to address and 
apparently is the reason that defendant was not charged with a 
greater degree of homicide. Thus, based solely upon his 
involvement in the scheme itself, he is criminally liable for Mr. 
Dobson' s death, and imposing the maximum <.sentence>i for felony 
murder with the dangerous weapon enhancement was not an <abuse>. <of>: 
^discretions. 
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STATE OF UTAH, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, v. ALAN S. RHODES, DEFENDANT AND 
APPELLANT. 
No. 900498-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
October 4, 1991. 
Appeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Raymond 
S. Uno, J. 
Nancy Bergeson and Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
R. Paul Van Dam and Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellee. 
Before BILLINGS, GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Defendant appeals from a sentence^, imposed following judgment 
and conviction for sexual abuse of a child, asserting that the 
trial court abused its discretion by <.sentencing> him to prison in 
lieu of probation. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Defendant Alan Rhodes was charged with sodomy on a child, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403 .1 
(1990); and sexual abuse of a child, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (1990). Rhodes pleaded 
guilty to the second degree felony in exchange for dismissal of 
the first degree felony violation. On May 7, 1990, following the 
procurement of and upon the recommendation of a presentence 
report, the trial court ordered a ninety-day diagnostic 
evaluation through the Department of Corrections, rfnll while 
denying Rhodes's request for further evaluation on an outpatient 
basis. On August 6, 1990, the trial court <sentenced> Rhodes to a 
term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, following 
the recommendations of the ninety-day diagnostic team and 
refusing Rhodes's request for probation. 
The staff performing the ninety-day evaluation on Rhodes based 
its recommendation on three key elements: (1) Rhodes's denial of 
responsibility; (2) Rhodes's substance abuse; and (3) Rhodes's 
psychological implications (borderline range of intelligence, 
inner conflict, chaotic thought patterns). In addition, Rhodes 
participated in a group diagnostic assessment program to 
determine his amenability to treatment. The program's staff 
concluded that Rhodes was a marginal candidate for treatment. He 
was intellectually and emotionally inadequate; demonstrated Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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little initiative to change; and denied responsibility for his 
actions by omission, vagueness, rationalization and assumption of 
a manipulative victim stance. 
Rhodes's diagnostic staff sent a referral to the two centers 
that they felt could offer Rhodes the treatment he required. Both 
facilities denied Rhodes access: the Fremont facility based on 
discrepancies in his story, alcohol abuse, and lack of remorse or 
guilt; and Ogden Community Correctional Center based on his vague 
recollection of events, lack of commitment to prior programs, and 
the lack of available space. Overall, the ninety-day diagnostic 
staff concluded that Rhodes's denial of action and 
responsibility, his manipulative victim stance, and his physical 
limitations would all impair his treatment to the extent that "he 
will need a lot of help if he is ever to function in the world" 
and, consequently, that Rhodes should be committed to the state 
penitentiary as he is still a threat to children. 
Rhodes appeals the <sentence> imposed by the trial court arguing 
that denial of guilt and minimization of criminal conduct is not 
a legally sufficient basis to deny probation.ffn21 Rhodes also 
asserts that the trial court should have allowed him time to 
personally cross-examine the personnel who denied him access to 
their programs. He contends that the examination is necessary to 
clarify inaccuracies he perceives to exist concerning the bases 
for denial. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The decision whether to grant probation is within the complete 
discretion of the trial court. See State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 
310 P.2d 388, 393 (1957) . 
The granting or withholding of probation involves 
considering intangibles of character, personality and 
attitude, of which the cold record gives little 
inkling. These matters which are to be considered in 
connection with the prior record of the accused, are 
of such nature that the problem of probation must of 
necessity rest within the discretion of the judge who 
hears the case. 
Id. The only legal restriction is that the trial court not 
exceed the bounds of discretion. This court reviews the 
<sentencing> decisions to discover any <abuse> <pf>, ^ discretions by 
applying varying standards of review consistent with the issues 
raised. See Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P. 2d 23 , 
2 6 (Utah App. 1991). For questions of law we employ a 
"correctness of error" standard. See State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 781 n. 3 (Utah 1991). For questions of fact, frequently 
constituting threshold inquiries that must be satisfied prior to 
addressing the legal intricacies, a "clearly erroneous" standard 
applies. See id. "[A] correctness review necessarily 
incorporates a review of the trial court's resolution of factual 
questions and the associated determination of credibility that 
may underlie the decision to admit [evidence]. This subsidiary 
determination will be overturned only if clearly erroneous." 
Id. 
ANALYSIS 
Initially, Rhodes claims the trial court jeopardized his due 
process rights by refusing to entertain his motion to continue 
<.sentencing>. to obtain a personal examination and evaluation by the 
treatment facilities that rejected him, and in-court testimony as Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to their capacity to successfully treat him. In support of his 
argument, Rhodes relies on Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(4) (b) 
(1990) rfn31 which states, "[a]t the time of <.sentence^, the court 
shall hear any testimony or information defendant or the 
prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the 
appropriate <sentence>." Id. (emphasis added). Upon evaluating 
the statute and interpretive case law, we hold that due process 
was afforded to Rhodes. 
In State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1242 (Utah 1980), the 
defendant appealed his <sentence> to a term of imprisonment 
asserting that his due process rights had been violated because 
he was not shown the contents of his presentence report prior to 
the hearing. In remanding the case to the lower court, the 
supreme court held that "the trial court may receive information 
concerning the defendant in the form of a pre-<.sentences report 
without the author of the report necessarily personally appearing 
and testifying in open court . . . but that the report should be 
disclosed to the defendant." Id. at 1244. See also State v. 
Anderson, 632 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 1981). 
Applied to the instant case, the Lipsky holding indicates 
that the trial court is not required to permit Rhodes to 
illustrate the contents of the diagnostic evaluation by live 
testimony, even under section 77-18-1(4)(b). "Neither § 77-35-17 
[now § 77-18-1(5) (a) (Supp. 1991)] nor § 76-3-404 indicates that 
the Legislature intended that the probation report or the 
ninety-day diagnostic evaluation be presented to the <sentencing> 
court by the testimony of witnesses examined in open court[.]" 
Lipsky, 608 P.2d at 1244 (quotation omitted). 
The Lipsky court emphasized that the decision to compel 
disclosure of presentence reports was not intended to impinge 
upon the <sentencing> judge's discretion to determine what 
punishment fits both the crime and the offender. Id. at 1249. 
Rather, the court was interested in shoring up the soundness and 
reliability of the factual basis upon which the judge relies in 
the exercise of that resentencings discretion. "Fundamental fairness 
requires that procedures both in the guilt phase and in the 
resentencings phase of a criminal proceeding be designed to insure 
that the decision making process is based on accurate 
information." Id. at 1248. The court acknowledged the fact that 
presentence reports are generally accurate without the need for 
verbal examination. 
However, the oral evidence Rhodes is attempting to submit may 
concern matters beyond the four corners of the diagnostic report, 
and thus beyond the scope of the Lipsky exception, absent a 
broad reading. Nonetheless, the trial court did not violate 
Rhodes's due process rights by rejecting his motion for a 
continuance. According to Lipsky, a defendant has the right to 
contest the accuracy of the factual bases upon which the <sentence> 
is predicated and should have the opportunity to bring such 
inaccuracies to the court's attention. Id. at 1248-49. Section 
77-18-1(4)(b) secures a defendant the means to effectively 
capitalize on this right by obligating the trial court to accept 
any evidence defendant wishes to present concerning resentencings 
at the time of <sentencing>.. Because Rhodes had full and complete 
access to both the presentence report and the diagnostic 
evaluation for almost two weeks prior to the second hearing, he 
had the opportunity to effectively contest any perceived factual 
inaccuracies at the second resentencings hearing. Like the defendant 
in State v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1986), whose 
appeal seeking the right to explore through cross-examination the 
assertions made by his victims in the presentence report was 
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denied under section 77-18-1(4)(b), Rhodes's request for a 
continuance to reap more favorable testimony must be denied. 
Rhodes had substantial opportunity to cultivate witnesses and 
obtain personal evaluations after receiving the diagnostic report 
and before the second hearing. Consequently, the purpose of the 
statute, to insure the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the 
basis of <sentence>, and Rhodes's due process rights, were 
satisfied in this case. 
Finally, Rhodes argues that the trial court's exercise of 
discretion was improper given the factual circumstances of the 
case. Rhodes insists that there were inconsistencies in the bases 
used by the evaluators to reach their conclusions, that the 
conclusions themselves are vague, and that the court, as 
conservator of the mentally ill, must compensate for the 
discrepancies and insure that the defendant is given the help he 
needs. The first two arguments are questions of fact which the 
trial court could consider in deciding whether to follow the 
evaluator's recommendations to send Rhodes to prison. The latter 
is strictly within the realm of the legislature. 
The trial court has broad discretion in imposing <sentence> 
within the statutory scope provided by the legislature. See 
Sanwick, 713 P.2d at 708; Lipsky, 608 P.2d at 1244. The 
defendant is not entitled to probation, but rather the court is 
empowered to place the defendant on probation if it thinks that 
will best serve the ends of justice and is compatible with the 
public interest. Lipsky, 608 P.2d at 1250 (Crockett, C.J., 
dissenting); State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 388, 393 
(1957) ("Probation is not a matter of right, and this is so no 
matter how unsullied a reputation one convicted of a crime may be 
able to demonstrate to the trial judge."). 
In addition, rehabilitation is not the only factor the trial 
court may consider when making a <:sentencing.^ determination. Other 
factors include deterrence, punishment, restitution, and 
incapacitation. See Scott W. Rodgers, Binding <Sentencing> 
Guidelines: A Means of Controlling Utah's Prison Population, 
1990 Utah L.Rev. 309 (1990). Because so many different 
ingredients factor into the <.sentencing>. process, and because the 
discretionary imposition of probation rests in many cases upon 
subtleties not apparent on the face of a cold record, before the 
reviewing court may overturn the.<sentence>. given by the trial 
court: 
it must be clear that the actions of the judge were 
so inherently unfair as to constitute <abuse>. <pf>: 
^discretions. To do otherwise would have a chilling 
effect on the trial court which has the main 
responsibility for <sentencing>. and which attempts to 
arrive at a proper <sentences based on the facts and 
law before it. 
State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978) (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted). See also State v. Gibbons, 
779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989); State v. Russell, 772 P.2d 971 (Utah 
1989); State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 124, 378 P.2d 671, 671-72 
(Utah 1963). 
There is ample factual substance in the record to support the 
trial court's finding that Rhodes's denial of responsibility and 
physical limitations would prohibitively deter successful 
treatment, and its consequent ruling that probation is not the 
appropriate alternative for Rhodes.[fn41 The trial court had the 
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the recommendations of the prosecutor, the fears of the mother of 
the victim that Rhodes be kept securely isolated from the victim, 
the diagnosticians' sentiment suggesting Rhodes '. s continued 
threat to children, and the rejection by the two facilities most 
likely to be able to help Rhodes, one of which personally 
interviewed him. Not only did the court have all this relevant 
data at its disposal, it had the unique opportunity to personally 
evaluate Rhodes at the hearing. Rhodes has failed to show how the 
denial of his request for a continuance was "inherently unfair" 
in light of the evidence. We hold that the court did not abuse 
its discretion by <.sentencing^ defendant to prison. 
CONCLUSION 
The <sentence> imposed below is affirmed. 
BILLINGS and GREENWOOD, JJ., concur. 
[fnl] A ninety-day diagnostic evaluation may be ordered at the 
discretion of the trial court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-404 (Supp. 1991) in order to obtain more information that 
will aid in the <sentencing>. determination. 
[fn2] On appeal, defense counsel emphasized that the trial court 
utilized an improper General Disposition Matrix submitted with 
the presentence report by Adult Probation and Parole to determine 
the appropriate <sentence>; thereby denying Rhodes's due process 
rights. Counsel insists that, had the trial court relied on the 
matrix published in the Utah <Sentence> and Release Guidelines, 
Code of Judicial Admin., Appx. H (1985), Rhodes would have 
received probation. Although the issue is not properly before us 
on appeal as it was not raised at the <: sentencing.^ hearing, we note 
for future reference that such argument is without merit, as 
acknowledged in defendant's brief. The matrix published in the 
Code of Judicial Administration was prematurely printed prior to 
its final revision and adoption. The matrix used by the trial 
court is the matrix approved and employed in the field by Adult 
Probation and Parole in preparing presentence reports since 1985. 
[fn3] Rhodes's case arose under the 1990 version of the statute. 
The statute was subsequently amended and appears at Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1(5)(b) (Supp. 1991). 
[fn4] Several <sentencings rulings appealed before the Utah Supreme 
Court which either were based on less information than this trial 
court had or were made in direct contravention of the 
recommendations of the prosecutor or the diagnosticians were left 
untouched. See Gibbons, 779 P. 2d at 1135-36 (no ;<abuse.> <of> 
<discretion> where probation denied under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-406.5(2) (199 0) even though all twelve conditions of the 
statute were met); Russell, 772 P.2d at 971 (trial court had 
sufficient information on which to impose an appropriate <sentence> 
even absent a ninety-day evaluation); State v. Carson, 
597 P.2d 862, 865 (Utah 1979) (no <abuse>. <of^ ^ discretions for ^sentences to 
penitentiary in face of department of corrections's request for a 
second ninety-day evaluation); Plum, 378 P.2d at 672-73 (no 
<abuse> <of> <discretion> where trial court denied probation based on 
the facts presented including State's recommendation for 
probation). 
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ary. Rather, it described the boundary as 
being 31.6 feet east of the fence line. 
We therefore conclude that the findings 
of the trial judge on the boundary issue are 
supported by the substantial weight of the 
evidence and that they thus withstand ap-
plication of the clearly-erroneous standard 
of review. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded for the purpose of entering judg-
ment quieting title to the strip in plaintiff. 
HOWE, Associate C.J., and STEWART, 
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ , 
concur. 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Randy Ray RUSSELL, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 880172. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 18, 1990. 
Defendant was convicted on guilty 
pleas in the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Frank G. Noel, J., of aggravated 
sexual assault, aggravated robbery, and 
aggravated kidnapping. The Court sen-
tenced defendant to two 15-year minimum 
mandatory terms on sexual assault and 
kidnapping counts, with five-year enhance-
ment added to sexual assault for use of 
firearm, and sentenced defendant to five 
years to life on robbery charge with five-
year enhancement for use of firearm. De-
fendant appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Howe, Associate C.J., held that: (1) mini-
mum mandatory sentences of 15 years for 
aggravated sexual assault and aggravated 
kidnapping did not constitute cruel and un-
usual punishment as applied, even though 
defendant was juvenile at time crimes were 
committed; (2) amendment to definition of 
aggravated robbery did not preclude en-
hancement of defendant's sentence based 
on defendant's use of firearm; and (3) trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in sen-
tencing defendant to term of highest sever-
ity under minimum mandatory sentencing 
scheme. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <©=>1213.8(3) 
Minimum mandatory sentences of 15 
years for aggravated sexual assault and 
aggravated kidnapping did not constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment as applied, 
even though defendant was juvenile at time 
crimes were committed. U.C.A.1953, 76-5-
302(3), 76-5-405(2); U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 
8; Const. Art. 1, § 9. 
2. Criminal Law ®=>1213.2(1) 
Minimum mandatory sentencing provi-
sions for aggravated sexual assault and 
aggravated kidnapping do not violate fed-
eral or state constitutional prohibitions 
against cruel and unusual punishment. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-5-302(3), 76-5-405(2); U.S. 
C.A. ConstAmend. 8; Const. Art. 1, § 9. 
3. Assault and Battery <®=>100 
Kidnapping <§=6 
Minimum mandatory sentencing provi-
sions for aggravated sexual assault and 
aggravated kidnapping are not unconstitu-
tionally vague. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; 
U.C.A.1953, 76-5-302(3), 76-5-405(2). 
4. Criminal Law <s=>1213.8(3) 
Application of minimum mandatory 
15-year sentencing provisions for aggrava-
ted sexual assault and aggravated kidnap-
ping to defendant did not shock moral 
sense of all reasonable men so as to render 
sentences cruel and unusual; defendant 
raped victim in her own home at gunpoint, 
kidnapped her, drove her to remote location 
while she was clad only in towel where he 
forced her to perform fellatio upon him, 
and ordered her out of truck into snow on 
penalty of death. U.C.A.1953, 76-5-302(3), 
76-5-405(2); U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8. 
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5. Criminal Law ®=>1213.8(4) 
Application of 15-year minimum man-
datory sentencing provisions for aggrava-
ted sexual assault and aggravated kidnap-
ping to defendant was not "unnecessarily 
vigorous7' within meaning of State Consti-
tution; crimes and defendant's manner of 
committing them were severe and shock-
ing, he had extensive juvenile criminal 
record of violent crimes, and all attempts at 
rehabilitation in juvenile system had failed. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-5-302(3), 76-5-405(2); 
Const. Art. 1, § 9. 
6. Criminal Law <$=>1208.6(2) 
Amendment to definition of aggrava-
ted robbery did not preclude enhancement 
of aggravated robbery defendant's sen-
tence based on defendant's use of firearm. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-3-203, 76-6-302(l)(a). 
7. Criminal Law <$=>1177 
Any error in trial court citing severity 
of aggravated sexual assault defendant's 
offenses as aggravating factor in sentenc-
ing defendant to term of highest severity 
under minimum mandatory sentencing 
scheme was harmless as trial court con-
sidered severity of offenses ''together 
with" additional aggravating factors. U.C. 
A.1953, 76-3-201(5)(a, d, e), (6)(b), 76-5-
405(2). 
8. Criminal Law <s=>986.1 
In determining whether to sentence de-
fendant to term of highest severity under 
minimum mandatory sentencing scheme, 
one factor in mitigation or aggravation 
may weigh more than several factors on 
opposite scale; overriding consideration is 
that sentence be just U.C.A.1953, 76-3-
201(5)(a, d, e), (6)(b). 
9. Criminal Law <s=>986.2(l) 
Trial court, in sentencing aggravated 
sexual assault defendant to term of highest 
severity under minimum mandatory sen-
tencing scheme, did not abuse its discretion 
in failing to list as mitigating factor defen-
dant's lack of prior history of sexual of-
RUSSELL Utah 189 
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fenses; record showed that defendant had 
committed 14 prior acts which would have 
constituted felonies had they been commit-
ted by adult, nine of which were acts 
against persons. 
Joan C. Watt, Richard G. Uday, Salt 
Lake City, for appellant. 
R. Paul Van Dam, Christine F. Soltis, 
Salt Lake City, for appellee. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant 
entered guilty pleas to one count of aggra-
vated sexual assault in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-405, one count of aggra-
vated robbery in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-302, and one count of aggra-
vated kidnapping in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-302. All are first degree felo-
nies. He was a juvenile when he commit-
ted the crimes but was certified to be pros-
ecuted as an adult under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3a-25. This certification is not chal-
lenged. 
The aggravated sexual assault and ag-
gravated kidnapping counts carry mandato-
ry minimum sentences. In accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(5)(d), the trial 
court entered specific findings of aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors in sentencing 
defendant to two fifteen-year minimum 
mandatory terms. A five-year enhance-
ment was added to the aggravated sexual 
assault for use of a firearm pursuant to 
section 76-3-203Q).1 Defendant was sen-
tenced to five years to life on the aggrava-
ted robbery charge with a five-year en-
hancement for the use of a firearm. The 
three sentences on the substantive counts 
are to run concurrently. The two enhance-
ment sentences are concurrent to each oth-
er but consecutive to the substantive sen-
tences. 
I. 
[1] Defendant first contends that the 
minimum mandatory sentences required by 
1. An enhanced sentence imposed upon defen-
dant in the aggravated kidnaping charge was 
corrected after being adjudged improper. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-405(2) and 
§ 76-5-302(3) constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment as applied to him, because he 
was a juvenile at the time the crimes were 
committed. He relies on Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 
101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988), in which a plurality 
of the United States Supreme Court over-
turned a death sentence imposed on a de-
fendant for a murder he committed when a 
juvenile. Defendant cites some of the plu-
rality's reasoning and concludes that be-
cause fifteen-year-olds are less culpable 
than adults and have a "greater opportuni-
ty for growth . . . and rehabilitation" than 
an adult, his fifteen-year mandatory sen-
tences are cruel and unusual punishment. 
Thompson is distinguishable from the 
instant case. It dealt only with a death 
sentence, a penalty "different from all oth-
er penalties." State v. Bishop, 111 P.2d 
261, 269 (Utah 1986). Defendant failed to 
address in his brief a fact which under-
mines his argument, viz., that defendant 
Thompson was sentenced to life imprison-
ment on remand to the sentencing court. 
Thompson v. State, 762 P.2d 958 (Okla. 
Crim.App.1988). Only the death sentence 
is per se cruel and unusual punishment for 
juveniles under the Thompson decision. 
[2,3] The juvenile court certified defen-
dant to stand trial as an adult. That certi-
fication was not challenged, and defendant 
must accept exposure to adult punishment. 
This is precisely why the transfer of a 
juvenile to the adult system is a " 'critically 
important5 question" to be determined af-
ter affording the juvenile "appropriate pro-
cedural protections." State in re Clatter-
buck, 700 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1985). 
The certification statute requires the juve-
nile court to consider, among other factors, 
those factors of maturity and likelihood of 
rehabilitation that defendant now seeks to 
raise on appeal. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3a-25(2)(d), (f). Consequently, we ex-
amine defendant's challenges to the consti-
tutionality of the minimum mandatory sen-
tencing scheme as if he were an adult. 
The minimum mandatory sentencing provi-
sions for aggravated sexual assault do not 
violate the federal and state constitutional 
prohibitions against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 
1034 (Utah 1987). They are not unconstitu-
tionally vague, as defendant argues. State 
v. John, 770 P.2d 994, 996-97 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Bell, 754 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1988). 
The minimum mandatory sentencing provi-
sions for certain felonies are identical for 
analytical purposes when determining their 
constitutionality. State v. Shickles, 760 
P.2d 291, 301-02 (Utah 1988). Therefore, 
the aggravated kidnapping minimum man-
datory sentencing provision is also constitu-
tional. 
[4] Defendant's challenge must meet 
the test for cruel and unusual punishment 
in specific applications: "whether the sen-
tence imposed in proportion to the offense 
committed is such as to shock the moral 
sense of all reasonable men as to what is 
right and proper under the circumstances." 
State v. Bastian, 765 P.2d 902, 904 (Utah 
1988); State v. Hanson, 627 P.2d 53, 56 
(Utah 1981); State v. Nance, 20 Utah 2d 
372, 375, 438 P.2d 542, 544 (1968). Defen-
dant raped the victim in her own home at 
gunpoint. He kidnapped her and, while she 
was clad only in a towel, drove her to a 
remote location, where he forced her to 
perform fellatio upon him. Defendant then 
locked her in the shell of the truck, drove 
to another location, and raped her again. 
He ordered her out of the truck on penalty 
of death. She was forced to walk barefoot 
in the snow until she received help, and she 
suffered from sores and numbness in her 
feet for two months as a result. Defen-
dant's sentences do not "shock the moral 
sense of all reasonable men." 
[5] Defendant also argues that his sen-
tences violate article I, section 9 of the 
Utah Constitution on the basis that broader 
protection is afforded by its provision that 
"[pjersons arrested or imprisoned shall not 
be treated with unnecessary rigor." While 
we indicated in State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d at 
267, that section 9 was arguably broader 
than its federal counterpart, we neverthe-
less stated that its content and limitations 
were best explicated on a case by case 
basis. As we examine the facts of this 
case, we do not find that the concurrent 
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fifteen-year minimum mandatory sentences 
are unnecessarily rigorous. The crimes 
and defendant's manner of committing 
them were severe and shocking; he had an 
extensive juvenile criminal record of violent 
crimes; and all attempts at rehabilitation in 
the juvenile system had failed. Strong cor-
rective measures were justified. 
II. 
[6] Defendant next contends that the 
trial judge improperly enhanced his sen-
tence for aggravated robbery based on the 
use of a firearm. Prior to 1975, aggrava-
ted robbery, like aggravated burglary and 
aggravated assault, required the use of "a 
deadly weapon." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-302(l)(a) (Supp.1973); cf 
§ 76-6-203(l)(c) (Supp.1973) (aggravated 
burglary required being armed with a dead-
ly or dangerous weapon); § 76—5—103(l)(b) 
(Supp.1973) (aggravated assault may result 
from use of a deadly weapon). A 1975 
amendment changed the definition: "A per-
son commits aggravated robbery if in the 
course of committing robbery, he: (a) 
[u]ses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, 
knife or a facsimile of a knife or a deadly 
weapon " Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-302(l)(a) (Supp.1975). Defendant 
argues that this change in language sug-
gests that the increased punishment for the 
use of a firearm is already incorporated in 
the aggravated robbery statute and that 
the more general firearm enhancement 
statute, section 76-3-203, cannot be applied 
to again increase punishment where a fire-
arm is used in the commission of a crime. 
Section 76-3-203 was amended in 1976 to 
enhance a sentence at the court's discretion 
"if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a 
facsimile or the representation of a firearm 
was used in the commission or furtherance 
of the felony...." 1976 Utah Laws ch. 9, 
§ 1 (codified at Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-203(1) (1977)). The amended en-
hancement statute states the scope of its 
coverage in the opening sentence: "A per-
son who has been convicted of a felony 
may be sentenced " Id. No exclusion 
was provided for the earlier amended felo-
ny of aggravated robbery or for any other 
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felony. The plain meaning of the statute is 
that all convicted felons are subject to the 
statute's provisions. 
The legislative intent in changing the 
wording of the aggravated robbery statute 
in 1975 is clarified by the records of the 
debates in both the house and the senate. 
Under the prior aggravated robbery stat-
ute, the prosecutor was "required to prove 
that a firearm [was] a deadly weapon, 
which mean[t] that he must prove that it 
was loaded." Since this was "an undue 
prosecutorial burden, . . . the language 
'facsimile' has been inserted." Remarks of 
Rep. David Irvine on S. 159, 41st Utah 
Leg., Gen. Sess. (March 13, 1975) (H. Re-
cording Disc # 405, side 1). Similar re-
marks were made in the senate. We con-
clude that nothing in the amendment to the 
definition of aggravated robbery in 1975 
shields that felony from the effect of the 
enhancement provision enacted in 1976. 
III. 
Defendant lastly contends that the trial 
judge abused his discretion in sentencing 
him to the term of highest severity (fifteen 
years) under the minimum mandatory sen-
tencing scheme. As we stated in State v. 
Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1989): 
Subsections 76-3-201(5)(a), (d), (e), and 
(6)(b) govern the procedural imposition of 
the minimum mandatory sentence: 
(5)(a) If a statute under which the de-
fendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms 
shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severi-
ty unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the 
record the facts supporting and rea-
sons for imposing the upper or lower 
term. 
(e) The court in determining a just sen-
tence shall be guided by sentencing 
rules regarding aggravation and miti-
gation promulgated by the Judicial 
Council. 
(6) . . . . 
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(b) The court shall state the reasons 
for its sentence choice on the record 
at the time of sentencing. 
(Emphasis added by the court.) In sentenc-
ing defendant, the court made the follow-
ing findings of fact in accordance with this 
procedure: 
1. The Court finds that the age of the 
defendant is a mitigating factor. 
2. The Court finds aggravating cir-
cumstances as follows: 
a. The severity of the offenses of 
which the defendant has been ad-
judged guilty, together with the man-
ner of their commission, the lack of 
regard for the victim's safety and wel-
fare, and the extent of the physical and 
emotional trauma inflicted on the vic-
tim as a result of defendant's actions. 
b. The extent of defendant's juve-
nile court record, both in number of 
referrals and adjudications, and in the 
severity of several of the adjudicated 
offenses, as they appear in the pre-sen-
tence report. 
c. The failure of defendant to re-
spond to rehabilitative treatment or-
dered as a result of several of juvenile 
court adjudications and his apparent 
unwillingness to cease criminal activi-
ty. 
3. The Court finds that the aggravat-
ing circumstances substantially outweigh 
the mitigating circumstance, and that the 
aggravating circumstances are sufficient 
to compel the Court to order the fifteen-
year minimum mandatory incarceration 
provided by law. 
[7] Defendant asserts that the trial 
court's reliance on "the severity of the 
offenses" is misplaced, since the legislature 
already considered the severity of the 
crime when it made the crime subject to 
the minimum mandatory sentencing stat-
ute. We have previously noted that "al-
though a listed aggravating circumstance 
is an essential element of the crime of 
aggravated sexual assault, one convicted of 
that crime nevertheless cannot be sen-
tenced to a mandatory term greater than 
that of middle severity in the absence of 
additional aggravating circumstances." 
State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 560 (Utah 
1987) (emphasis added). However, while 
we agree with defendant's assertion, we 
point out that the trial judge considered the 
severity of the offenses "together with" 
additional aggravating factors. Any error 
in citing the severity of the offenses as an 
aggravating factor was therefore harm-
less. 
[8] Defendant also asserts that the trial 
court abused its discretion because it did 
not find a "majority of the aggravating 
factors listed by the Judicial Council." We 
have stated that trial courts "have the dis-
cretion, to weigh the circumstances in ag-
gravation or mitigation of the presumptive 
term of middle severity in order to arrive at 
a just sentence." State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 
909, 912 (Utah 1988). This discretion is not 
to be surrendered to a mathematical formu-
la by which numbers of circumstances rath-
er than weight of circumstances are deter-
minative. The overriding consideration is 
that the sentence be just. One factor in 
mitigation or aggravation may weigh more 
than several factors on the opposite scale. 
[9] In addition, defendant complains 
that the trial court did not list as a mitigat-
ing factor his lack of prior history of sexu-
al offenses. The record shows that he had 
committed fourteen prior acts which would 
constitute felonies if they had been commit-
ted by an adult, nine of which were acts 
against persons. The court made specific 
reference to "[t]he extent of defendant's 
juvenile court record." Under these cir-
cumstances, it was not an abuse of discre-
tion to omit finding that defendant had no 
prior charges or convictions of sexual of-
fenses. There is no failure "to consider all 
legally relevant factors" in this case. See 
State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 
(Utah 1989). 
"This Court does not disturb a sentence 
unless it exceeds that prescribed by law or 
unless the trial court has abused its discre-
tion." State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 
(Utah 1986); State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 
885, 887-88 (Utah 1978). An abuse of dis-
cretion may be manifest if the actions of 
the judge in sentencing were "inherently 
unfair" or if the judge imposed a "clearly 
excessive s 
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State v. Gerrard, ceived it in the absence of negligence, and 
thus plaintiff could rely on doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur, and was not required to pro-
duce expert testimony; (2) multiple defen-
dants could be held liable under doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur, thus relieving plaintiff of 
necessity of showing that particular defen-
dants were involved; and (3) plaintiff was 
not entitled to damages for emotional dis-
tress arising from injury she suffered. 
excessive" sentence, st t  . 
584 P.2d at 887. The trial judge followed 
the procedural guidelines of the minimum 
mandatory sentencing statute, section 76-
3-201, and his sentence did not exceed that 
prescribed by law. We find neither inher-
ent unfairness in the trial court's exercise 
of discretion nor a clearly excessive sen-
tence imposed. 
Affirmed. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, 
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
Jeanna M. DALLEY, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH VALLEY REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER; IHC Hospitals, Inc., d/b/a 
Utah Valley Regional Medical Center; 
Howard R. Francis, M.D.; Kent R. 
Gamette, M.D.; Provo Obstetrics and 
Gynecology Clinic; and James P. 
Southwick, M.D., Defendants and Ap-
pellees. 
No. 880360. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 19, 1990. 
Patient brought medical malpractice 
suit arising from burn on her leg which 
allegedly occurred while she was undergo-
ing caesarean section operation. The 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, 
George E. Ballif, J., granted defendants' 
motions for summary judgment, and plain-
tiff appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, 
C.J., held that: (1) it was within common 
knowledge of laypersons that a patient who 
goes into an operating room for a caesare-
an section with no burn on her leg and 
emerges with a burn would not have re-
Vacated and remanded. 
1. Physicians and Surgeons <§=>18.12 
General rule is that a person asserting 
a medical malpractice claim must prove the 
standard of care required of physicians un-
der similar circumstances practicing in the 
same field or specialty, that the applicable 
standard of care was breached, that the 
injury to the plaintiff was proximately 
caused by the defendant's negligence, and 
that the damages occurred as a result of 
defendant's breach of duty. 
2. Physicians and Surgeons <s=*18.80(8) 
To establish standard of care required 
of a physician in a particular field, breach 
of that standard, and proximate cause, 
medical malpractice plaintiff is generally 
required to produce an expert witness who 
is acquainted with the standards of care in 
the same or similar field as the defendant 
doctor; however, it is not necessary for a 
plaintiff who is asserting doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur to obtain an expert witness to 
establish negligence and causation. 
3. Negligence <s=>121.2(3) 
Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur requires 
plaintiff to establish an evidentiary founda-
tion which includes the following: the acci-
dent was of a kind which in the ordinary 
course of events, would not have happened 
had the defendant used due care; the in-
strument or thing causing the injury was 
at the time of the accident under the 
management and control of the defendant; 
and the accident happened irrespective of 
any participation at the time by the plain-
tiff. 
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